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International law has largely adhered to its traditional foundations, centring upon 
states as the pre-eminent actors. States have generally remained as the main subjects 
of international law, and state-centric considerations such as their jurisdiction, 
sovereignty and relations with other states, the law’s main concern. There has been a 
general lack of attention, or sufficient attention, to the ‘other’ international players 
now common in the 21st Century. This is concerning. A greater recognition and 
acceptance of these ‘other’ international players is needed, and this could lead to 
the reconceptualisation of international law in the 21st century. The development of 
international law from the central tenets of its Westphalian inception to a form that 
adequately reflects modern international society is required. A failure of evolution 
could bring about its irrelevance. 
The reconceptualisation of the paradigm of international law in a way that makes it 
more reflective of 21st-century realities would lead to its enduring relevance. A failure 
to adapt could be its downfall. The Westphalian conception of international law can 
be seen as the glue that holds the international legal framework together; shaping 
and defining the space within which states relate. However, in the 21st century, other 
actors have come to play a real role in that international space, and have done so 
actively and relevantly. Expectedly, the proliferation of activities by these new players 
in the international space has worn the adhesive attribute of the proverbial glue of 
the Westphalian notion of international law. It is becoming more apparent that the 
reconceptualisation of the international legal paradigm is necessary. 
Amongst the new players, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) play a prominent 
role. NGOs have played and continue to play a highly relevant and important role in 
today’s global community. Their influence and impact are becoming increasingly 
pivotal to the legal, social, economic and political construct of today’s global 
community, and their role remains central to the reconceptualisation of international 
law and the international legal framework.  
This thesis argues that NGOs must play a central role in the imperative that is the 
reconceptualisation of the international legal paradigm to maintain its fitness for 
purpose in the face of globalisation. 
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1.1. Chapter 1: Introduction     
The 21st-century world has changed remarkably, and it has done so as though in haste. 
Hence, establishing the need for a paradigm shift in the conceptualisation of 
international law from its limited state-centric Westphalia design to a more inclusive 21st 
Century conception, using the increasing global presence, work, and contributions of 
NGOs as an example, is imperative.  
The former secretary-general of the United Nations - Kofi Annan had held the view that 
any attempt to argue with the realities and impact of globalisation in our world today 
could be likened to arguing with the laws of gravity.1 Globalisation is the single most 
significant attribute of the 21st Century. Few subjects, however, are as polarising and 
intoxicating as globalisation. Globalisation blurs the boundaries between states and puts 
to question the concept of sovereignty. International law, like the proverbial old wineskin, 
fashioned by the fabrics and threads of Westphalian concepts such as the principles of 
state and sovereignty, seeks to house within itself, the phenomenal new wine – 
globalisation. In this 21st Century, it has become apparent that the skin of the Westphalian 
international law is undoubtedly thin, and it becomes possible and even probable that it 
could burst and spill. Then it will be apparent that a new concept of international law is 
inevitable. 
There exists considerable scepticism as to a reconceptualisation of the old 
international legal framework to reflect the realities of globalisation. However, at the 
same time, the gravitation of the international community, particularly with the 
emergence of diverse, influential non-state global players, suggests that a 
reconceptualised international legal framework is imperative.   Daniel Bethlehem 
remarked that sovereignty and territorial boundaries, upon which the Westphalian 
international law is pivoted, are like rocks in a river. They may impede the flow, and 
even perhaps, on occasion, dam up the water. More usually, however, they merely 
act as an impediment to the directionality of the flow of water, which eventually finds 
a new pathway on its free-flowing gravitational course.2 A reconceptualised 21st-
century international law is certainly more probable than not!  
                                                             
1 'Non-Governmental Organization/DPI' (Un.org, 2016) <http://www.un.org/dpi/ngosection/annualconfs/53/sg-
address.html> accessed 28 November 2016. 
2 D. Bethlehem, 'The End of Geography: The Changing Nature Of The International System And The Challenge To International 
Law' (2014) 25 European Journal of International Law. 
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Undoubtedly, some of the key non-state players that have already emerged in the 
global space, whose influence prod at the legitimacy of the Westphalian international 
law in the 21st Century, are overwhelmingly significant. However, this research focuses 
its enquiry on just NGOs, largely because their interests are not for profit, but firstly, for 
the furtherance of a variety of ‘worthy causes’ and secondly, without the 
encumbrance of government. Governments are an extension of states and the 
Westphalian regime. They are arguably in the same mix of the quagmire of relevance 
or irrelevance of the Westphalian international law in the face of globalisation. These 
defining characteristics of NGOs being for causes and without any government 
influence,  accrue to NGOs some moral currency from the general global populace 
in the 21st Century and place them in a very strategic position in the face of 
globalisation. 
Hence, the core aim of establishing the need for a paradigm shift in the 
conceptualisation of international law from its limited state-centric Westphalia design 
to a more inclusive 21st Century conception, using the increasing global presence, 
work, and contributions of NGOs as an example. 
The research is segmented into eight chapters.  Each chapter inches the research 
closer to the central aim of the research –  a paradigm shift in the conceptualisation 
of international law, and the role that NGOs play in the process.  
So, Chapter 1 sets the framework for the exploration of the concept of international 
law as it is, sectioning the research question in two prongs. Concerning the first prong, 
it questions whether the conceptualisation of international law from a state-centric 
Westphalian paradigm to a more inclusive concept is pivotal to its fitness for purpose 
in the 21st Century. On the second prong, it draws the map for the arguments that will 
ensue in the course of the thesis to determine NGO as central to this paradigm shift.  
It highlights that these two-pronged questions are constructed in a way that the later 
prong is dependent on the findings of the former.  
The thesis progresses the arguments with Chapter 2. It depicts the basis for these 
research enquiries in the light of the prevalent argument that traditional-Westphalian 
inspired assumptions about the state power and authority in the international space 
are increasingly incapable of providing a contemporary understanding of today’s 
international legal system.   
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After that, chapter 3 highlights the deficit of the Westphalian concept of international 
law and the challenges facing the current conceptualisation of sovereignty. It will 
assess the impacts of globalisation vis-à-vis the “fitness for purpose” of the Westphalian 
international legal framework for the 21st Century. It shows how the signature attributes 
of sovereignty have been supplanted by the myriad of factors of globalisation, with 
emphasis on three, i.e. failed states, global health and the internet.  
Furthermore, chapter 4 engages with the process of reconceptualisation. It explores 
the potential of reconceptualisation by evaluating the notion of sovereignty and its 
reconceptualisation. In discussing this point, it illustrates the concept of sovereignty in 
its full essence, which includes a depiction of the elements of consent and the 
delegation of sovereignty by state. It argues that sovereignty delegated does not 
compromise its efficacy but instead reveals it in its full essence.  
Chapter 5 commences with the second prong of the research question and deals 
with the role of NGOs in reconceptualisation.  Firstly, it examines the emergence of 
NGOs, their increasing influence, and the extent to which they are acknowledged or 
given some legitimacy on the international plane. Along these lines, it critiques the 
extent of their participation in international law, particularly in their relations with the 
United Nations.   It submits that there is a lag between the extent of the participation 
of NGOs and their actual influence in international affairs. 
To buttress this point further, chapter 6 examines the International Chamber of 
Commerce as an example of the growing influence of NGOs. The ICC is depicted to 
be an informal international lawmaker, whose influence has impacted the 
international legal landscape for over a century. The chapter argues that the ICC is 
more than just a pressure group, and its composition and workings give impetus to the 
argument that new forms of diplomacy and global governance on the international 
plane have emerged. These new norms of international governance should be 
considered more seriously. 
To this end, chapter 7 considers the norms of international law and the making of 
customary international law; with a focus on state practice and opinio juris. Then, it 
examines the concept of plurality of norms with various examples. It submits that 
plurality of the international legal order is a bed-rock for the inclusion of the order of 
NGOs in the reconceptualisation of international law in the 21st Century. On this 
premise, it poses a question for the reconceptualisation of international law by adding 
layers to the international pluralistic legal paradigm. In so doing, a justification for the 
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legitimised role of NGOs as a significant added layer of governance will be made to 
the end of keeping international law in step with the 21st-century global realities. 
Finally, chapter 8 concludes with a summation of the preceding arguments and the 
ensuing legal thoughts for consideration.  
1.2. Research Question and Development of the Research Objectives 
Whether the reconceptualisation of international law from a 
state-centric Westphalian paradigm, to a more inclusive 
concept, is pivotal to making it more fit for purpose3 in the 21st 
Century and how  NGOs are central to this paradigm shift? 
It is a two-pronged research question, with the latter prong premised on the findings 
of the former. The research question forms the basis for the development of the 
objectives of the study. 
Firstly, this research question infers that the current international legal framework could 
be more fit for purpose and that its relevance in today’s globalised world is shaken 
and uncertain. There is the current predominant argument that the traditional 
Westphalian-inspired assumptions about the state, power and authority in the 
international space are increasingly incapable of providing a contemporary 
understanding of today’s international legal system. Westphalian sovereignty is the 
concept of nation-state sovereignty based on two principles: territoriality and the 
                                                             
3 The term ‘more fit for purpose’ as a comparative adjective suggest that the Westphalian status quo could still 
be fitting, albeit, insufficient. The increasing pace in the integration of the international community brings to 
question the perpetuity of the Westphalian’s fitness in the near long term. Oxford’s Lexico, in defining the phrase 
– fit for purpose, refers to an institution, facility, etc. well-equipped or well suited for its designated role or 
purpose. See -'Fit for Purpose | Definition of Fit for Purpose by Oxford Dictionary on Lexico.Com Also Meaning 
of Fit for Purpose' (Lexico Dictionaries | English, 2020) <https://www.lexico.com/definition/fit_for_purpose> 
accessed 11 July 2020.  
This definition underpins the crux of this thesis – that is the Westphalian design being fit for the purposes of the 
1600s and onwards vis à vis the question of it being outmoded in light of the 21st century purposes. Following 
this definition, the context of the phrase ‘more fit for purpose’ in this work  relates to the question of whether 
the Westphalian design and its inspired assumptions about the state, power and authority in the international 
space are capable of providing a contemporary understanding of today's international legal context. It suggest 
that the Westphalian notion of international law is not fit for its intended design of regulating the international 
community, primarily because it is not sufficiently representative of the 21st century international community. 
Essentially, being a state-centric notion; it does not effectively capture the significance of non-state actors, 
informal normative structures, and private, economic power in the global political economy and basically a 
pluralised international community. For example, the ensuing events from the 9/11 bombing led to one of the 
most enigmatic wars in history; the War on Terror. The inscrutable nature of the war is hinged on the point that 
the declaration of the war in the first place was against an abstract noun. Evidently far-removed from the 
Westphalian International Law depiction of war to be an armed conflict between states and not against flagless 
belligerents or independent citizens of various states scattered abroad. 
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exclusion of external actors from domestic authority structures. It has been argued 
that the Westphalian inspired notions of state-centricity, positivist international law, 
and ‘public’ definitions of authority are increasingly inadequate. They are incapable 
of capturing the significance of non-state actors, informal normative structures, and 
private, economic power in the global political economy.4 In this post-modern 21st-
Century times, there is a widening gulf between the theory and practice of the 
Westphalian system5. This divergence between theory and practice suggests in strong 
terms that the international legal system faces a question as to its capability of 
theorising contemporary developments of globalisation that do not fit within the 
Westphalian paradigm of international law6. 
The global community is yet to have a relevant international legal framework that 
adequately provides for the current realities of globalisation. The Westphalian 
international law struggles with its fitness for purpose; perpetually lagging behind the 
fast-paced global community and for the most part, in a state of indeterminacy.   
Martti Koskenniemi in the preface to the reissue of From Apology to Utopia said – 
‘Examined from the outside, international law appears to be 
sidelined by the informal structures of private governance 
while, from the inside, its functional differentiation 
(‘fragmentation’) has raised questions of whether any unifying 
centre remains in public international law that would seem 
worthy of professional or ideological commitment.’7 
It is, therefore, imperative that the current international legal paradigm is remodelled 
to be fit for purpose in governing the 21st-century international community. Whether 
or not the reconceptualised paradigm would result in the emergence of a global 
constitution or a more empowered and inclusive United Nations is beyond the scope 
of this research. However, it is of interest to the researcher. There are arguments that 
it is an exercise in futility to expect a utopian international legal concept and like 
framework far removed from the realities and social behaviours in the international 
relations of states and citizens, even in the 21st Century. Indeed, this research, to some 
extent, is aligned with that viewpoint. It is acknowledged that the increasing impact 
                                                             
4 Gabel, Medard; Henry Bruner (2003). Global Inc.: An Atlas of the Multinational Corporation. New York: The New Press. p. 2.  
5 A. Claire Cutler (2001), ‘Critical Reflections on the Westphalalian Assumptions of International Law and Organization; A 
Crisis of Legitimacy’, Review of International Studies, 27, pp. 133 - 50 
6 Ibid 
7 Martti Koskenniemmi, ‘From Apology to Utopia: The structure of International Legal Argument’ Cambridge University Press 
(2005) pg xiii 
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of globalisation, tags along with it the temptation to swim consonant with the currents 
of its tides, thereby nursing a barren expectation for an entirely new international legal 
framework. On the contrary, the question this research seeks to explore is not the 
possibility of a new international legal framework, but a reconceptualised 
international legal paradigm with the centrality of NGOs as one of its key catalysts.  
This position is what leads to the second prong of the question. Amongst the many 
other key players that have come on the international scene, the role of NGOs in a 
reconceptualised international legal framework underpins this research. The choice 
of NGOs as the focal subject of this research is because NGOs interfaces across all 
the strata of the international legal system. It engages with all players in the global 
space. NGOs are characterised by their apparent diversity. They encompass a broad 
range of organisations, social movements, and pressure groups which are the pivot of 
activism in various fields of public concern.8  Also, interest comes from the essential 
characteristics of NGOs; some of which could be gleaned from the definition of Peter 
Macalister-Smith. His definition underpins the choice of this subject of research. In 
defining non-governmental organisations, he explained that as their name indicates, 
they are not established by a government, nor by an international agreement. Also, 
while they are typically private organisations founded on that basis and under the 
regime of private law of a state, the concerns, purposes and objects of NGOs are, in 
contrast to their origins, of public nature,9 and they are not profit-seeking.10  It puts 
them in a vantage position of being referred to as the social conscience of the society 
because they have no government agenda nor personal agenda driven by profit.   
Furthermore, their legitimacy in the international legal order is gradually gathering 
some momentum. For instance, Article 71 of the UN-Charter enables the Economic 
and Social Council to consult with NGOs which are concerned with matters within its 
competence.11  
                                                             
8 Daniel Thurer (1999), ‘The Emergence of Non-Governmental Organizations and Transnational Enterprises in International 
Law and the Changing Role of the State’ in Rainer Hofmann (ed.), Non-State Actors as New Subjects of International Law, 
Bzerlin: Dunker & Humbolt, p. 43 
9  Peter Macalister-Smith, Non-Governmental Organisations, Humanitarian Action and Human Rights in : Rudolf Bernhardt 
and Ulrich Beyerlin, Recht Zwischen Umbruch Und Bewahrung (1st edn, Springer 1995). See also - Jürgen Schramm, The Role 
Of Non-Governmental Organizations In The New European Order (1st edn, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 1995). See also - Daniel 
Thurer (1999), ‘The Emergence of Non-Governmental Organizations and Transnational Enterprises in International Law and 
the Changing Role of the State’ in Rainer Hofmann (ed.), Non-State Actors as New Subjects of International Law, Berlin: 
Dunker & Humbolt, pp 37-58 
10 Stephan Hobe, ‘Article 71 of the UN Charter, Resolution 1996/31’ in Bruno Simma Et al., The Charter of The United Nations 




The centrality of NGOs in international relations cannot be overstated. The point is 
emphasised that the increased visibility of NGOs on the international plane cannot be 
overlooked. Their visibility is relevant in establishing the need for a paradigm shift in the 
conceptualisation of international law from its limited state-centric Westphalia design 
to a more inclusive 21st Century conception if international law is to be fit for purpose.  
 
1.3. Aim and Objectives 
1.3.1. Aim  
To establish the need for a paradigm shift in the conceptualisation of 
international law from its limited state-centric Westphalian design to a more 
inclusive 21st Century conception using the increasing global presence, 
work, and contributions of NGOs as an example.  
1.3.2. Objectives 
1.3.2.1. To evaluate the concept of international law and appraise its processes; 
establishing that traditional-Westphalian inspired paradigm of 
international law is incapable of providing a contemporary 
understanding of today’s international legal context of increased non-
state actors, particularly NGOs. 
1.3.2.2. To appraise the deficits of the Westphalian concept of international law 
in a 21st-century construct; evaluating the concept of sovereignty and 
its fitness for purpose against factors calling for a rethink of the concept.  
1.3.2.3. To critically examine the process of reconceptualisation and how it 
relates to the notion of sovereignty to depict sovereignty in its full 
essence; positing that delegated sovereignty does not compromise its 
efficacy but instead reveals it in its full essence. 
1.3.2.4. To consider the emergence of NGOs, their increasing influence, and 
critique the extent of their legitimacy on the international plane; 
highlighting the disconnect between their participation and influence. 
1.3.2.5. To show the International Chamber of Commerce as an example of the 
growing influence of NGOs; highlighting its composition and workings as 
an added impetus to the argument that new forms of diplomacy and 
global governance in international law have emerged, and should be 
considered more seriously. 
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1.3.2.6. To consider the norms of international law and the making of customary 
international law; with a focus on state practice and opinio juris; 
reconceptualising international law by examining the concept of 
plurality of norms and the international legal order as a bed-rock for the 
inclusion of added layers in keeping with the 21st-century realities. 
1.4. Literature Review 
There is a wealth of relevant writing in the broad area of examination. It reflects the 
extent to which these issues falling within the scope of the research are relevant and 
topical. This section represents only a brief overview of the perspective of scholars. It 
covers a range of issues. It explores the doctrines of international law from a 
Westphalian paradigm of the sovereignty of states and the debatable misfit of that 
concept in the 21st Century. Then it engages in an exposition primarily premised on 
the perspective of globalisation and notably, the increasing centrality of NGOs in the 
metamorphosis of International law, from its Westphalian inception to the 21st Century. 
1.4.1.1. Westphalian Doctrine of Sovereignty of State and International Law in 
the 21st Century 
History has aptly made it clear that states have hardly shown interest nor implied that 
it is in their interest that a new international legal framework should emerge. 
According to Pierre Calame: 
“History even goes as far as to emphasise that the conception of 
international action is determined and limited by the concept of the 
state itself.12 
It follows then that the international actions or inactions of states are premised on the 
idea of the sovereignty of states. So any venture across national borders is therefore 
always to the end of reaching a state’s interest vis-à-vis respect of other sovereign 
states. It rings true in all circumstances, whether it is to conquer new territories, to 
defend existing borders or to control the natural resources of new territories 
imperialistically.13 
Albeit, history bears to us that international law continues to evolve. Globalisation has 
taken its toll on the concept of state and its sovereignty to the extent that on certain 
                                                             
12 Pierre Calame Non-State Actors and World Governance (2008) ‘Non-State Actors And World Governance’ (World-




occasions international concerns may very well be valid enough reason to undermine 
national interest. 
As Daniel Thurer puts it: 
“Nowadays, international law is to a diminishing extent state-centred.”14  
A typical example is the European Union (EU), whose evolution is consequential of the 
second world war and is perceived as the ‘necessitated good’ that proceeded from 
the trauma of the second world war. The EU initial member states acknowledged that 
the defence of national interests would amount to collective suicide. Today, the 
realisation of the EU, with its member states indirectly subjecting their sovereignty to 
the international pact, is at present, an example that validates the possibility of 
surpassing sovereignty.15 However, this analogy would be imbalanced without 
pointing out the internal revolt of nationalist citizens of the various states to the 
concept of a supranational state. A typical example of this internal uprising within the 
EU was the 2016 United Kingdom referendum and the eventual exit from the EU in 
January 2020. The debate was hinged mainly on the concept of sovereignty; 
acceptance of supranational laws, lax borders with free movements of goods, 
capital, services and persons, amongst other factors. It resulted in the democratic 
outcome of the British people reclaiming the sovereignty of the United Kingdom with 
the Brexit decision. This single example, amongst a myriad of other similar uprisings, 
mainly in the western states, suggest that states still hold fast to the Westphalian 
concept of their sovereignty while trying to adapt to the realities of globalisation.  
However, in reality, the international legal system has changed. The concern is that it 
has hardly changed theoretically even though it has considerably in practice, due to 
the emergence and activities of various non-state actors.  
Daniel Thurer further stated while reiterating Dietrich Schindler Sen. et al. - 
“These new global and multinational entities may not have fully 
metamorphosed into full-fledged subjects of international law, but they 
certainly contribute to creating a ‘social milieu’ or ‘ambience’ in 
international life out of which new legal structures and entities may 
grow.16 
                                                             
14 Thurer (n8), pp. 37 - 58 
15 Calame (n 12) 
16 Dietrich Schindler sen., Verfassungsrecht und soziale Struktur, 5th. Ed., 1970, 92 et seq  cited in Daniel Thurer (1999), ‘The 
Emergence of Non-Governmental Organizations and Transnational Enterprises in International Law and the Changing Role 
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The question that comes to bear, however, is why it is so controversial to incorporate 
non-state actors, or particularly NGOs, within the framework of international law as 
primary subjects?  
According to John Klabbers: 
“States, as the gate-keepers of the system, have every incentive to treat 
non-state entities as somehow of lesser rank rather than to elevate the 
newcomers to their own level and jeopardise their state sovereign 
prerogative.”17   
The attribute of the sovereignty of the state is of inestimable value to states. It has often 
been regarded as that unique quality a state has which can be referred to as the 
highest authority under international law within the territorial limits of its jurisdiction18.  
States are and remain the indispensable focal point of authority and power in the 
world of international relations and international law. They still hold the monopoly of 
force, and they provide the necessary infrastructure in the present world public order, 
which still has a mostly non-centralised character19. The existence of the international 
community is hinged on the existence of the state. 
As Pierre Calame stated: 
“States have not quite diminished in importance on the international 
scene. They still wield firm muscles in their strategies of power or defence, 
their capacity to build stable international agreements, their role in 
regulation enactment by adopting international norms, their capacity 
to invest in infrastructures and research. Hence, they remain as the 
primary international players.”20 
However, it would be a mistake to consider non-state actors or particularly NGOs as 
second-rate or secondary players due to their influence. With the current phase of 
transition that globalisation has brought about to the international scene; a distinctive 
characteristic of these new non-territorial actors (the offspring of globalisation) is how 
                                                             
of the State’ in Rainer Hofmann (ed.), Non-State Actors as New Subjects of International Law, Berlin: Dunker & Humbolt, pp 
37-58 
17 Jan Klabbers (2003), ‘(I Can’t Get No) Recognition: Subject Doctrine and the Emergence of Non-State Actor’, in Jarna 
Petman and Jan Klabbers (eds), Nordic Cosmopolitanism. Essays in International Law for Martti Koskenniemi, Leiden/Boston: 
Martinus Nijhoff, pp. 351 -69 
18 Thurer (n 8) 
19 Ibid 
20 Calame (n 12) 
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they have used their influence to partially de-territorialise the notion of state 
sovereignty.  
Daniel Thurer added to the whole argument poetically stating: 
‘Traditional institutions like the state are certainly here to stay but – in a 
process characterised by new, often ambiguous concepts and notions 
and by the tentative partly soft-law effects of new regulations – their 
appearance and function are to a certain extent been changed in the 
present times. In the place of the crumbling ‘walls’ of the old ‘state 
fortresses,’ new ivory networks are rapidly spreading and are covering 
up the old towers, bestowing on them new and exciting appearance.”21 
It is not the normative substance of the concept of states and the Westphalian 
international law, which is of concern here. Instead, it is the function as well as the 
extent of the power which states under the Westphalian international law exercise, 
albeit, in a rapidly changing – i.e. integrating and at the same time shrinking- public 
international system. Evidently, due to globalisation, there has been a veering off of 
power from the states to private actors.22 
1.4.1.2. The increasing centrality of Non-Governmental Organisations in the 
conceptual evolution of international law from its Westphalian 
inception to the 21st Century 
There is no gainsaying in pointing out the undeniable fact that NGOs are an intrinsic 
feature of the 21st-century international life. They have had an encompassing 
coverage of diverse activities ranging from fields of human rights, humanitarian 
action, business and commerce, environmental protection, women’s right, 
safeguarding children and vulnerable people or consumer protection. It has been 
stated that NGOs are a typical product of the western civilisations, characterised by 
their inherent missionary tendencies.23  Some of the first activities of what is now 
referred today as NGOs was the campaign for the abolition of the slave trade and 
eventually slavery itself, dating back to the 17th and 18th centuries. The next 
noticeable occurrence of NGOs in the global scene was the establishment of the Red 
Cross Movement in 1863, and since then, there has been an increase in the 
emergence of various NGOs across the world. However, in recent times, with the 
                                                             
21 Thurer (n 8) 
22 Ibid, p. 39 
23 Ibid, p. 41 
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advent of globalisation in the 21st Century, NGOs have grown significantly and has 
become a global phenomenon, influencing worldwide policy-making and 
execution.24  
Following the analysis of Leon Gordenker and Thomas G. Weiss, the growth of 
influence and impact of the NGOs was increasingly made prominent during the Cold 
War. NGOs emerged as the conscience of the civil society, claiming the rights of 
political, cultural and economic freedom, which eventually paved the way for the 
breakdown of the communist regime.25 It was followed by the increase in activism in 
the Post-Cold War phase on human rights, environmental protection, women’s rights 
and other matters that became a priority in international relations. This phase 
consequently created inroads for NGOs to policy-makers and gave more weight to 
their voice and global influence.  
The international community have been reduced to a ‘global space’, and new global 
communities have emerged, which have made it possible for other non-state actors 
to influence the space as significantly as they have done in recent times. This 
increased influence and these new global communities have been primarily due to 
the advent of information technology. Information technology remains one of the key 
vehicles of globalisation, the pillars upon which the new global communities have 
been framed, which have formed the premise for the influence of other global non-
state actors, and in particular, the NGOs. This position has been underpinned by the 
statements by Leon Gordenker and Thomas G. Weiss on the increasing influence of 
NGOs: 
“Electronic means have literally made it possible to ignore 
borders and to create the kinds of communities based on 
common values and objectives that were once almost the 
exclusive prerogative of nationalism. Modern communications 
technology is independent of territory. ‘By providing institutional 
homes in the same way that states have accommodated 
nationalism’, one author suggests, ‘NGOs are the inevitable 
                                                             
24 Ibid, p. 42 
25 Leon Gordenker and Thomas G. Weiss, ‘Pluralizing Global Governance: Analytical Approaches and Dimentions in Thomas 
G Weiss and Leon Gordenker (eds.), NGOs, The UN, And Global Governance (1st edn, Lynne Rienner 1996) p 24. See also, 
Daniel Thurer (1999), ‘The Emergence of Non-Governmental Organizations and Transnational Enterprises in International 
Law and the Changing Role of the State’ in Rainer Hofmann (ed.), Non-State Actors as New Subjects of International Law, 
Berlin: Dunker & Humbolt, p. 42 
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beneficiaries of the emergence of the new global 
communities’.”26  
It goes without question that NGOs today play a more prominent role in the affairs of 
the international community. This position was reiterated by Christine Baker and Luisa 
Vierucci when they stated as follows – 
 
‘it is today beyond doubt that NGOs play a prominent role in 
international law – relevant fields, from treaty-making to rule 
implementation; from support to courts to aid delivery.’27 
 
The conflict lies in the fact that regardless of the increasingly active stance of NGOs 
in the global space, their status in the international legal order remains somewhat in 
limbo. There is the category of scholars who strongly hesitate to accrue any 
international legal significance to the activities of NGOs in the international space. It 
stems primarily from the anachronistic conception of international law, where subjects 
of international law stay defined within the narrow parameters of states, international 
organisations, and a few historical legal subjects such as the Holy See and per some, 
the Sovereign Order of Malta. 28 However, there is another category of scholars, 
particularly in the human rights field, who hold a view that NGOs, as well as other non-
state actors, have been further propelled beyond the traditional conception of the 
subjects of international law.  
August Reinisch further buttressed the point suggesting that the international 
obligations with regards to human rights do not reserve the expectation of 
compliance for states alone. It is extended to other non-state actors, thereby inferring 
that an entity can be considered a subject of the international legal system if it has 
rights and obligations under that system.29   
Daniel Thurer brought about a new perspective to the arguments, stating: 
‘we can avoid the intensely debated but largely sterile questions 
as to whether or not NGOs […] have emerged as new subjects 
within the international legal order. Instead – using a 
constitutional or functional approach – these entities can be 
                                                             
26 Ibid 
27 Pierre-Marie Dupuy and Luisa Vierucci, Ngos In International Law (1st edn, E Elgar 2008) pp. 2-3. 
28 Ibid 
29 A. Reinisch (2005), ‘The changing international legal framework for dealing with non-state actors’, In Philip Alston (ed.), 
Non-State Actors And Human Rights (1st edn, Oxford University Press 2005) p. 70. 
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elegantly integrated into a broader concept of “international 
community”'30 
This position cannot be overstated, given the position held by Pierre-Marie Dupuy and 
Luisa Viercci that NGOs are the epitome of the public opinion and the social 
conscience of a cosmopolitan civil society as per international relations.31 
Daniel Thurer further stated: 
'If we now try in a few words to evaluate the impact of 
international NGOs on international life, we easily see that they 
exceed by far the informal status accorded to them in 
international instruments. Undoubtedly, the most prominent 
NGOs represent a driving and shaping force of progress in 
today's international political life.'32 
The former UN Secretary-General Boutros-Boutros Ghali stated: 
'NGOs have become a basic form of popular participation and 
representation in the present-day world.'33 
Given the preceding arguments, the research intends to lend its voice to 
the ongoing debate, with the added perspective of identifying and 
establishing NGOs as pivots for a reconceptualised international legal 
paradigm. 
1.5. Methodology 
1.5.1. Introduction to the Legal Methodology 
The methods applied which would be discussed below are hinged upon the 
conceptual framework of the research. The various concepts that have inspired the 
research in the first place have, to a considerable extent, inspired the choice of the 
methods applied and discussed hereunder. 
                                                             
30 Thurer (n 8), p.53. 
31 Dupuy and Vierucci (n 27), p. 5. 
32 Thurer (n 8), p.45. 
33Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Foreward in  Leon Gordenker and Thomas G. Weiss, ‘Pluralizing Global Governance: Analytical 
Approaches and Dimentions in Thomas G Weiss and Leon Gordenker (eds.), NGOs, The UN, And Global Governance (1st edn, 
Lynne Rienner 1996) p.7. 
15 
 
1.5.2. The Conceptual Framework 
The conceptual framework of this thesis centres on the concepts of sovereignty and 
the conflicts of globalisation. Furthermore, it extends to the concept of international 
legal personalities, particularly about NGOs. 
1.5.3. Methods Applied 
1.5.3.1. Qualitative Doctrinal Research Method  
Given the normative attribute that characterises most legal researches; part of the 
research would be investigating the International law as it ought to be rather than as 
it is. However, the normative character of the international law implies that the 
veracity of this work must manifestly be derived from the developing consensus within 
the scholastic community and the aggregate of opinions in the current legal debate 
around the core of the subject of the research. 
Hence, this research is primarily carried out by an investigation into existing legal 
theories and doctrines, as well as scholarly positions underlying the research area, 
being International law, its subjects, and its fitness for purpose as well as the concepts 
of the sovereignty of the state. This investigation is done primarily by library desk-based 
research approach using both primary and secondary sources. It uses various 
reasoning techniques. It includes analogical and inductive reasoning. It will engage 
in analysing the findings to reach a precise and contributory conclusion. More 
specifically, the legal discourse engages in a qualitative and a meticulous library desk-
based analysis of a variety of soft data, legislation, relevant case-law, books, 
academic journals, electronic sources and legal conferences. This exercise would 
enable the deciphering of their possible interpretations and relevance to the core of 
the research in realising its stated aims and objectives. 
There is, however, the tendency to append more credibility to research work, 
especially scientifically, where it is not belaboured exclusively with conceptual 
constructions or the finding of coherence or the development of abstract theory, but 
is also derived from empirical investigations34. This tendency forms the basis for one of 
the major criticism of this approach. The criticism could be that this method may be 
perceived as being autonomous in its disposition to the economic, social and political 
realities. So, it could be described as being too remotely internal to the legal discipline 
                                                             
34 J. M Smits, The Mind And Method Of The Legal Academic (Edward Elgar 2012). 
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that it almost loses its relevance to the much broader objective of the research. It is to 
the end that another additional method is also applied in the course of this research.  
1.5.3.2. Qualitative Non-Doctrinal Research Method 
The non-doctrinal research method could also be referred to as interdisciplinary or 
socio-legal research method, as it engages external factors to reach its findings within 
the legal context of the research.35 This research holds the view that international law 
could be regarded as an international social engineering implement. The results of 
this work can only authenticate its integrity to the extent that it is relevant and reflects 
the realities of society. To this end, it entails an interdisciplinary endeavour, to 
recalibrate its findings and engage in the systematic challenge of international law, 
not as it ought to be, but as it is, in its historical and social context. This interdisciplinary 
expedition will give the desired meaning and relevance to the subject of this research 
in its current global context. It involves an analysis of mainstream political debates and 
records of states, regions and influential organisations in the international community, 
as well as the making, growth and acceptance of international law in the 
international community. 
It endeavours to understand globalisation in its socio-economic and political context, 
to the end of clearly contextualising the investigated international law doctrines in 
both, its historical and socio-political contexts structured coherently and logically. It 
scrutinises the emergence of NGOs and studies their journey to global relevance, to 
the end of investigating whether or not they have indeed attained a status of 
indispensability in the social and legal construct of the international community. It then 
explores whether there is a space in the international legal framework that 
encapsulates the relevance of such entities vis-à-vis the fitness for the purpose of 
international law in the international community. More specifically it entails, engaging 
in both desk-based literature analysis, websites of various institutions as well as organs 
of both governmental and inter-governmental bodies, and where unavoidable, 
direct and participatory enquiries into relevant international and state entities.  
Although it is still primarily desk-based, the matters investigated are more operational 
and factual rather than doctrinal.  
                                                             
35 Geoffrey Wilson 'Comparative Legal Scholarship' in Michael McConville and Wing Hong Chui, Research Methods For Law 
(1st edn, Edinburgh University Press 2007). 
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1.5.4. The justification for the Methods Applied 
1.5.4.1. Qualitative Doctrinal Research Method - Justification 
Descriptive legal science is usually equated with a doctrinal, black-letter or dogmatic 
approach.36 There is hardly an academic discipline that can sufficiently carry on its 
research without engaging in some systematic description of the research objects. In 
various disciplines, the framework upon which such description is conducted is 
subjective to the peculiarities of the discipline. It also takes into consideration the 
object of the research. Such frameworks can be gleaned from the various textbooks 
of different fields.  For example, research in the discipline of physics will engage in 
some measure of descriptive analysis of objects by quantification of their 
characteristics and behaviour, using a framework of symbols, terms and formulas to 
describe the physical reality.37  The legal research is not excepted; it is only different 
to the extent that the context or style of the description is subjective to the discipline 
and, in this case, the journey of international law, globalisation and NGOs. The 
descriptive contents of these mentioned core frameworks of the study could be 
gotten from a variety of books, academic journals, case law, statutes, et cetera. This 
line of thought forms the basis of the choice of this approach of a doctrinal library 
desk-based method in this study.  
The ultimate objective of this research is to proffer a reformed international legal 
system. This reformed system, in itself, is not a creation of a new system altogether, but 
rather the accommodating of global realities and NGOs into this system, and 
consequently, would recalibrate the system. This objective remains constant in the 
application of different sub-methodologies within the core doctrinal method. Hence, 
on the one hand, it systematically describes and questions not just international law 
itself, but its operation, application and relevance as well as its underlying 
philosophical, social, moral, economic and political assumptions. It is thereby 
determining the viability or lethargicness of the current state of the system. On the 
other hand, it explores the journey of NGOs and their current status of relevance to 
the international community. This expedition could be accurately be referred to as an 
applied form of expository, doctrinal research methodology, which delves as of 
necessity into some interdisciplinary expeditions.  
                                                             




1.5.4.2. Qualitative Non-Doctrinal Research Method- Justification 
Given the view that real knowledge needs to be empirically testable38, it is intended 
that this research will not exist in its doctrinal research-driven vacuum, but will engage 
in the environments in which its objectives are likely to be tested. One of the 
underpinning quests of this research is whether international law as an international 
legal instrument has and continues to meet its initially intended aims. An empirical 
approach is inevitable to resolve this question. However, it is essential to mention that 
expectations of the outcome of this method should be fixated within the context of 
the legal discipline and not comparable to other disciplines. Hence, the outcome 
sought to be reached may not be as robust as what would be obtainable in the 
natural sciences, though it would not be any less significant. The distinction here lies in 
the difference between the qualitative approach and the quantitative approach. 
The approach of this research, being qualitative, may engage in interviews, carrying 
out case studies, for example, a case study of the International Chamber of 
Commerce, or reading of various documents, which may not necessarily be laws 
concerning the organisation. That notwithstanding, the intended result is not 
envisioned to be generalised in the sense of natural sciences. Instead, it is to 
understand better the legal phenomenon of globalisation as well as the increasing 
relevance of non-governmental organisation to the international legal framework 
and globalisation.39 
1.6. Impact of Research and Contribution to Originality  
As can be gleaned from the literature review section, there has been a robust debate 
in the subject area of this research. A majority of the current academic debate 
captures the possible need for an improvement in the international legal framework. 
The debate across other academic quarters include the necessity to give other global 
players in the world stage some elevated status in the international community. 
However, there appears to be a vacuum in the campaign for NGOs, not merely to be 
given a more recognised legal status, but to be resituated as the socio-legal centre 
of the international community in the 21st Century. This position is the thrust of this 
research. As mentioned earlier in this chapter concerning NGOs, the altruistic nature 
of such organisations forms part of the rationale for choosing NGOs. It plays out in their 
lack of the encumbrance of government in its form. There is also a lack of profit as 
                                                             
38 Ibid 
39 Baldwin John and Gwynn Davs, Empirical Research in Law Edited by Peter Cane and Mark V Tushnet, The Oxford Handbook 
Of Legal Studies (Oxford University Press 2003). 
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motivation in its disposition. Yet, its ability to epitomise the conscience of society across 
various sectors forms the rationale for this research. 
An expectation that this research would bring about an actual realignment of the 
current international legal framework, in the manner in which this research explores, 
would be highly optimistic though still possible. However, the core and more realistic 
intent of the researcher is to expand the current debate and introduce the new 
paradigm of thinking, that NGOs could be key drivers of a reconceptualised 
international legal paradigm in the 21st Century. In academia, this would extend the 
parameters of knowledge within the current public international law discipline. 
 
1.7. Ethical Matters 
There are no known ethical concerns about this research. The material engaged 
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2.1. Chapter 2: Introduction 
 
This chapter seeks to assess the Westphalian concept of internal law and its processes. 
It is composed of two uneven subsections.  
The first section will attempt an understanding of ‘law’ and secondly an understanding 
of international law. It highlights the process of international law and the challenges it 
encounters in the 21st Century with the proliferation of actors; including NGOs and the 
perennial concern of enforcement. 
The second section generally addresses the problems with the Westphalian 
international legal system. 
2.2. Understanding the Westphalian Concept of International Law 
The treaties of Münster and Osnabrück40 gave to Europe what could be likened to as 
a kind of international constitution which was the premise for the conceptualisation 
of public international law. The Westphalian system of sovereign states was 
established in 1648 as part of the Peace of Westphalia.41  The treaty covered a wide 
range of matters dealing with the political concerns at the time, and scholars have 
distilled three main points which were core to the treaty: 
 The principle of state sovereignty; 
 The principle of (legal) equality of states; 
 The principle of non-intervention of one state in the international affairs of 
another.42 
These three points are the key points relevant to the context of this research.43 Over 
the years, the Westphalian model became universally accepted and widely 
respected as the framework for the international legal system. However, as this thesis 
                                                             
40 Westphalian Peace Treaties 1648 – See 'GHDI - Document' (Ghdi.ghi-dc.org) <http://ghdi.ghi-
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portends, with time, changes came to the society.  With the changes, comes the 
critique of the system.  So as will be seen in the subsequent chapters, challenges to 
this model of international law and relations come from various fields, such as global 
health, environment, failed states, the internet and the global economy, among 
others. Nevertheless, the Westphalian model still plays a huge role in modern society, 
although it needs adjustment to today’s society’s needs.44 
The Westphalian concept of international law can hardly be discussed without a 
discussion on the concept of sovereignty.45 So often, Westphalian international law is 
synonymous with the concept of sovereignty. However, it has been argued that the 
Westphalian idea of sovereignty was not new in the 1640s; the question was whether 
sovereignty should be multipolar.46  F. H Hinsley defined the Westphalian sovereignty 
as follows - 
'the idea that there is a final and absolute political authority in the political 
community ... and no final and absolute authority exists elsewhere',  
This idea is best represented and articulated in a treaty establishing the principle of 
sovereignty.47 So, while the effects of a paper are debatable, and it has been argued 
that the best a paper can do is convince people that states ought to have exclusive 
territorial authority. However, further to this definition, Hinsley added that  
'sovereignty is not a fact. Authority and power are facts [...] Sovereignty is 
an assumption about authority.'48  
Along these lines, John Ruggie suggests that the Westphalian concept of sovereignty 
'signifies a form of legitimation'.49  In a Westphalian system of sovereign states, each 
state recognizes the authority of the other state as the final authority within their given 
territories, and only they can be considered actors within the Westphalian 
international legal system. It is precisely on this ground that scholars have identified 
Westphalia with the origins of sovereignty: as a formal statement of the principle of 
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47 F. H Hinsley, Sovereignty (2nd edn, Cambridge University Press 1986), first published in New York, 1966, p.26; See also, 
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sovereignty, even if the practice has been contended to be established earlier than 
1648.50 
 
2.2.1. Understanding Law 
 
An attempt to define law may turn out to be a more onerous task than to describe it. 
Law has been since the existence of humankind, from the age of the cave right until 
these contemporary times. The idea of law from which 'order' stems is pivotal to the 
existence of a just and stable of society. Lawlessness, on the other hand, from which 
chaos is incidental in inimical.51 It follows that regardless of the players in the 
international community, the existence of some law remains intrinsic.  Therefore, 'law' 
could be described as the thread with which the fabric of any community is hemmed; 
it creates the framework of recognised and accepted ideals, by which any 
community of people would commune together, progress and develop.   
 
2.2.2. Understanding International Law 
This description of law could be extrapolated to bear on the international community. 
However, there is a distinct contrast, in that while, generally speaking, the subjects of 
any community of people are people, in the international space, the subjects are 
nation-states. With this in mind, caution is needed when extrapolating the above 
description of law to international law. 
Often when the term international law is used, either of two classifications of laws is 
inferred. The first being private international law and the second being public 
international law. 
Private international law or what some may refer to as a conflict of laws is the 
collection of laws within the legal system of different nation-states that would regulate 
the private relationship (often, business) between the individual citizens of the states. 
Many times, the peculiarity of each state and its legal system could obtrude, and 
questions of applicability of certain foreign laws or the role of foreign courts come to 
the fore.52  
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Public deals primarily with the relationship of states. International law, on the other 
hand, given the whole spectrum of international relations and activities of the nation-
state in the global milieu, the extent of public international law remains expansive. 
Hence, public international law could range from bilateral, i.e. between two states, 
to regional, i.e. a group of states linked together either by the geographical location 
or by an ideology, and finally to being universal, i.e. being generally binding on all 
states.53 
2.2.3. The Process of Law 
Without engaging in an exposition of legal theory, a contrast, however, should be 
reached between universal ideals or morality and international law. While a certain 
standard of behaviour or ethical standards may be acknowledged in the 
international space, the legality of such behaviour or ethical standards is the 
determining factor of whether it is international law or not. It does not suggest that 
leaving the status of a certain agreed international standard of conduct as 'ethical' is 
a depreciatory epithet. Rather it is the obligatory strength or legality of such standard 
in the community that makes it law or not. This legality is deciphered through a myriad 
of social processes, as well as the content and form. It is this process that more robustly 
and accurately authenticates international law as law in its entirety. Hence, when 
encountered with a body of international behavioural or ethical standards, the 
question of legality is paramount if its validity or legitimacy as the law is to be 
ascertained. 
Morality, fairness, idealism, or ethical positions and like concepts, do not equate to 
the law in any given community until they have gone through a prescribed process, 
or over time have become customary in that community and is an established state 
practised. Furthermore, even with the emergence of customary international law 
following from state practice, the principle opinio juris sive neccessitatis still remains an 
essential factor.  It is the subjective element used to judge whether the practice of a 
state is due to a belief that it is legally obliged to do a particular act.54 It is that 
legitimacy that gives rise to the element of a legal obligation.  The ICJ explained 
opinio juris, in the Nicaragua case, as follows: 
"[…] for a new customary rule to be formed, not only must the acts 
concerned 'amount to a settled practise', but they must be accompanied 
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by opinio juris sive neccessitatis.  Either the States taking such action or other 
States in a position to react to it, must have behaved so that their conduct 
is evidence of a belief that the practice is rendered obligatory by the 
existence of the rule of law requiring it. The need for such belief..the 
subjective element, is implicit in the very notion of opinio juris sive 
neccessitatis."  
 
2.2.3.1. The process of law and NGOs 
These kinds of concepts, like morality, fairness, idealism, or ethical or like concepts, 
mainly form the premise for the founding of most NGOs. However, it is their lack of 
legitimacy when they stand in isolation that also plagues the legitimacy of NGOs in 
the international community. So likewise, though NGOs and their influence for good, 
mostly, in the international community cannot be contended, their legitimacy in the 
international community is still lacking. Hence, understanding what international law 
is and the process by which it becomes law, may provide a kind of blueprint to how 
NGOs could attain legality or legitimacy in the international community as a key 
subject and influencer of international law.  
2.2.3.2. The international legal system 
Understanding the legality of international law or the authenticity of the international 
legal system leads to the likelihood of drawing from the legal order of the nation-
states. There is the tendency to use the legal order of nation-states as parameters that 
will aid the explaining of the international legal system.  The challenge with this 
approach is that, while it is logical to expect that the international legal system should 
mirror, at least in some respect what is applicable in some states, the reality is that this 
is not quite the case. In most domestic legal systems, there are three tiers of 
government, being the executive, the legislature and the judiciary; the absence of 
any these tier makes any legal system practically defunct.55  
While the United Nations has a General Assembly made of delegates of member 
states, the resolutions of the General Assembly do not have the element of a direct 
effect on the states. Further to Article 17 of the United Nations Charter, with a few 
exceptions on some internal matters, such as budgeting, the resolutions of the United 
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Nations are generally recommendatory and are not binding on the member states. 
In this light, it cannot be akin to the legislative arm of the nation-states.56  
Also, the International Judiciary does not replicate what is obtainable in the nation-
states. Though there is the International Court of Justice in the Peace Palace, The 
Hague, its jurisdiction is extant only by the consent of the states. Even when there is 
competent jurisdiction, the court is unable to ensure that its decisions are followed. 
Moreover, most importantly, an executive arm is absent in the International polity. The 
closest to the idea of the executive is the United Nations Security Council which is 
made up of 5 permanent members and ten elected members with two-year terms.57 
However, the enforcement powers and duties of the United Nations Security Council 
are often effectively impaired by the veto power of the five permanent members.58 
Given the preceding it becomes an obscure exercise to determine the legality of 
international law as law, especially when what is obtainable as law in the states is used 
as a premise to set the expectation of what should be obtainable in the international 
space.  
2.2.3.3. The proliferation of actors & the process of international law 
The introduction of the term 'politics, although not listed in Article 38 of the Statute of 
the International Court of Justice, is very relevant. It gives a practical bend, and a  
human likeness to the abstract terms of nations, states or any term by which organised 
society is described. These nations or states are primarily an aggregate of individuals 
subjugated by an apparatus called states59. Moreover, across the international space 
are a myriad of these apparatuses called states.  
However, it is this concept of states that underpin the rationale for this thesis. It is the 
view of the research that states are relevant to the order of the international 
community. Furthermore, their relevance will remain in the foreseeable future. 
However, the contention with this assertion is that, given the origins of international 
law, the position that state's relevance eclipses the relevance of other actors on the 
international plane is debatable and not in tune with the 21st-century realities.   
Following from the Westphalian regime, it is the states that are the primary subjects of 
international law and not the individuals that make up the states. However, the states 
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57 James A. Paul, "UN Security Council" (Globalpolicy.org, 2016) <https://www.globalpolicy.org/security-council.html> 
accessed 5 February 2016. 
58 Shaw (n 51) p. 2 
59 Antonio Cassese, International Law (Oxford University Press 2005) p. 3. 
27 
 
are by themselves inanimate and require the agency of the individuals whom they 
subjugate, referred to as citizens, to engage with other states in the international 
community. It is the individuals that have the effective mandate to govern or 
represent the states, and their governance is usually subjective to their proclivities as 
balanced out with the states' interests and priorities.  As described, this process could 
be tantamount to the term politics - the art and science of governance and 
diplomacy.    Antonio Cassese eloquently stated it thus – 
"Indeed, in international law more than any other field, the 
phenomenon of the state as 'fictitious person' manifests itself in 
a conspicuous form: individuals engage in transactions or 
perform acts, not in their personal capacity, that is to protect or 
further their own interests, but on behalf of collectives or a 
multitude of individuals. Why is it that the world community 
consist of sovereign and independent States, while human 
beings as such play a lesser role?"60 
These individuals constitute for themselves other entities, such as non-governmental 
organisations or multi-national corporations,  which in recent times have had 
extensive global influence.  The role of the 'individual' leads to another ramification of 
this challenge with the concept of international law. The various players in the 
international space, originate from various states but increasingly have dealings 
across national borders. This particular ramification is beyond, mere states interactions, 
but the interaction of her citizens, whether natural or juristic. With this being on the 
increase, it is hard to categorise international law as the law that regulates the 
dealings of states only. The realities of this phenomenon, called globalisation, make 
that definition practically inaccurate.  
2.2.3.4. Authenticating international law - sources  
To establish what international law is, or the process by which international law 
becomes law, it is recommended, though incongruous at this stage, to glean from the 
statutes of international law itself to establish its legality or its definition of itself.  
What are the social processes that international law or the international community 
recognises as valid enough to bring about the legitimacy of international law? What 
is its provenance? These are what the international community or international law 
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would refer to as the social processes that bring about the legality of any 
internationally recognised and accepted standard of conduct.  
Treaties - Some processes include international agreements from which rules are 
brought about that are binding on the parties to the agreements. These are referred 
to as treaties.  
Custom - Also, there are customary state practices in the international space that are 
recognised by the international community as an agreed and accepted old pattern 
of behaviour or conduct that is now metamorphosed into a customary law for the 
international community.  
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice encapsulates what the 
sources or what components need to be brought together to form international law. 
Essentially, the sources enumerated by Article 38 (1) include –  
 treaties;  
 customary international law;  
 general principles of international law;  
 subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and teachings of most 
highly qualified publicist of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the 
determination of the rules of law.  
However, relying on just these prescribed sources as a sufficient-enough premise to a 
limpid understanding of international law would be at best elementary.61  
2.2.3.5. Origins of International law 
If international law is to be given an ideal and robust context or legitimacy, then it 
must come from a place that is not in itself international law nor a progeny of 
international law, rather the reverse should be the case. The complexity of this 
expedition into what international law is can be garnered from the perspective that if 
the law can only exist in a society and there can be no society without a system of 
law to regulate the relation of its members, what then would be first in existence? Is it 
the law or society? So if the term in itself is international law, then it presupposes that 
it is the law that governs the inter-action of nations. This then suggests that nations (or 
society) pre-exist international law. This position is in sync with the position of Brierly, 
when it was stated that– 
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"the law of nations had its origins among a few kindred nations 
of western Europe, despite their frequent quarrels and even 
despite the religious schism of the sixteenth century, all had and 
were all conscious of having a common background in the 
Christian religion and the civilisation of Greece and Rome. They 
were, in a real sense, a society of nations."62  
It is important to note that this was before the advent of the modern state system, 
which in itself was a creation of necessity and the Westphalian international law. It 
marked the inception of international law as is known today. Soon after the 30 years, 
long European wars of religion was the birth of the modern state which undermined 
the traditions of the unity of the Christendom or the medieval ideal of a single world 
empire and eventually gave rise to the rise of the sentiments of exclusive nationalism63. 
By this, out of necessity to maintain peace, sovereignty and territory, international law 
was born, occasioned by the Westphalia Treaty of 1648. 
Sir Frederick Pollock held the view that - 
"the essential conditions for the existence of law are the 
existence of a political community, and the recognition by its 
members of settled rules binding upon them in that capacity, 
international law seems on the whole to satisfy these 
conditions…"64 
Sir Fredericks's position introduces a new complex term to the whole equation of 
finding what international law is – political.   
So far, it has been established that the making of international law includes a social 
process that ultimately authenticates international law as law. These processes 
include - 
 the creation of treaties, i.e. agreements between states – bilateral or 
multilateral;  
 the evidence of customary practices which legitimises the community of 
nations;  
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 a set of rules or standards of conduct and an understanding that there is an 
obligation to abide by those standards (some of which include rules which are 
so compelling that there could be no derogation from – Jus cogens);  and now,  
 politics.  
2.2.3.6. The proliferation of actors, the international legal system and the 
ensuing conflicts 
It has been argued that the term 'international law' is something of a misnomer, in the 
same way, the terms statehood and nationhood are not necessarily synonymous.65 
Besides human beings being practically the primary 'engagers' in the international 
space representing the interests of the primary subjects of international law, such as 
the states, there are instances where human beings also represent the interest of other 
juristic persons, such as NGOs. It is common knowledge that NGOs across national 
borders today wield much influence in the international space and have become 
pivotal stakeholders. The import of this is, as, with any human relationship, their 
interaction with other actors in the international space would naturally entail a set of 
governing rules of engagement. Usually, the select framework of such rules would 
reflect the legal processes of the home states of the various actors. So it is almost a 
given that the rules would conflict one to the another, but the common denominator 
will be the NGO, who straddles across state lines.  
The implication is then that because individuals are practically the 'real' active 
members of the international community, the international legal order is therefore 
patterned after the national legal orders with which these individuals are familiar. As 
has already been briefly seen, this comes with its significant problems. Firstly, the 
members of the international community would then nurse an expectation that the 
international order would hold a striking semblance to what is obtainable in the states. 
Secondly, because the expectation cannot entirely be met, particularly with the 
consistency with which domestic legal orders adapt to the realities obtainable within 
the state, the international legal order will continually struggle with legitimacy. Thirdly, 
with the advent of other entities, which have their internal standards of conduct as 
well as global impacts of their conducts, the state-centric international legal system 
appears to play catch-up with the rapid evolution of these entities. These dilemmas 
continually open up the international legal system to the criticism of being obsolete 
or not representative enough.  
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Additionally, various international NGOs from diverse nations, with their peculiarities, 
would struggle to adapt to the legal system of the international plane. This struggle is 
because, on the international plane, there is a myriad of interests and norms. Also, 
there is a lack of political will from the stakeholding nations in the international 
community to recognise the norms or the international legal order, which do not 
directly further the national agenda of the nations. Hence, although NGOs may be 
recognised nationally, they face a dilemma of legitimacy on the international plane; 
especially as the international community in itself even struggles to adapt 
international norms to international law cohesively is in the first place. To an extent, this 
struggle is because of the lack of an institutionalised central organ of absolute 
authority on the international plane, as the international plane is a collection of 
sovereign states, who readily want to assert their independence and their territorial 
absoluteness within the international legal system.  
 
2.2.3.7. The domestic legal system and the international legal system 
On the other hand, within the national legal system, there are substantive rules that 
define rights, standard and conducts. There are also procedural rules by which these 
rights, standard and conducts are established and enforced. Moreover, these 
developments of the legal order within the state community emerge from a group of 
individuals who wield power and institutionalise themselves into central organs of the 
community. They establish the power and order into institutions or systems of 
government to the end of furthering the overriding state-community interests and 
priorities, within the states, and at times, in the international space. These institutions 
operate under the leadership of the ruling group of individuals or representatives of 
the masses.  The ruling group is often referred to as the government in power who, 
ideally, should abide by a system of accountability to the institutions and the 
constituent who elected them as representatives. The government in power sets the 
strategic agenda of the state for the protection of the life, property, peace and 
prosperity of the citizenry. In order to establish order, unlawful use of force is forbidden 
except in certain circumstances such as self-defence. Also, lawful coercion is 
monopolised by the states.66 Furthermore, the central organs of government have the 
responsibility for the three primary functions of the operation of the state, which are - 
legislating, adjudicating the laws and enforcing the laws of the state67.  
                                                             




However, in contrast to what is obtainable globally, the challenge remains with the 
international community, where no state or group of states have managed to have 
such overriding influence such as to impose its will on the whole global community. In 
the international space, what is obtainable are alliances; political, economic, military, 
and sometimes even geographical. These alliances emerge in the international space 
and converge on common interests. While sometimes, there are institutionalised 
structures which emerged from this, the international legal order remains horizontal 
across states and makes the channels for accountability blurred.68  In line with this 
thought, Malcolm Shaw stated – 
"While the legal structure all but the most primitive societies is 
hierarchical and authority is vertical, the international system is 
horizontal, consisting of over 190 independent states, all equal in 
legal authority (in that they all possess the characteristics of 
sovereignty) and recognising no one in authority over them."69 
This conceptual deficit and structural incoherence of the international legal order as 
seen above is in itself a source of criticism, which makes it all the more difficult to 
accurately ascertain what international law is or how it is made and enforced. 
2.2.4. International Law & its Process 
2.2.4.1. International law defined 
International law is a term quite challenging to define with finality and precise 
accuracy. With consideration given to the direction of this research, the most relevant 
and practical concoct of a definition, which could probably the most generally 
accepted is - 
"The reference to the rules and norms that regulate the conduct 
of States and other entities which at any time are seen as being 
bestowed with International personality."70 
It is noteworthy that this definition, in an attempt to have a general acceptance as 
well as present-day relevance, slightly deviates from the rigid, theoretical and 
traditional understanding of international law. Historically, the parameters of a 
definition of international law are usually limited to only the regulation of the 
relationships of states, the regulations of the seas and the conduct of war. States 
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remained the centre and the primary subjects of international law. However, this 
historical status quo struggles with relevance in the face of globalisation and the 
advancements in many sectors across the globe; particularly the NGO sectors. Other 
players are increasingly more influential in the international space, hence making it 
less possible to remain affixed to the Westphalia concoction of a state-centric 
international Law. 
 
2.2.4.2. The process of international law - enforcement 
It has been established that one of the most legitimate sources of international law is 
treaties - agreements between 'states'. The dilemma with treaties is the age-long 
question; what will be the consequence of not obeying the terms of a treaty? The 
universal principle of Pacta Sunt Servanda71 requires agreements to be kept.72 
Although parties should commit to their undertakings under a treaty, there are still 
times of disregard of the provisions of treaties. It brings to the fore another challenge 
with the concept of international law - the lack of teeth.  
Within the national legal systems, citizens are aware of the consequences of acting 
contrary to a social contract – the law. The consequences are well spelt out in a 
substantive legal instrument, and the procedure to enforce those circumstances are 
precise. At times,  where there is no substantive law broken, and no procedure to 
apply, some states, like the UK, and in particular, Scotland, have what is referred to as 
the principle of nobile officium. It empowers the Court of Session and the High Court 
of Justiciary to exercise its equitable jurisdiction to fill a lacuna in certain 
circumstance.73 So, where there is no legal rule adequately covering a given situation, 
the court can give a remedy. The principle echoes the social conscience of the 
society as a remedy or consequence is provided in the absence of any prior written 
or customary one. The court can use the nobile officium to grant any remedy or make 
any order. The workings of this principle reflect the powers of established institutions of 
governance, and in this case, the courts. Hence, the default position within the 
national legal system is that all citizens know the law, and trust that where there is a 
gap in the law, the courts are empowered fill that gap under certain circumstance.  
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In contrast, in the international space, the laws are often described as a body of 
suggestions for international behaviour, to which none is really obligated. As a result, 
it appears that international law could be considered as too flexible, vague and 
uncertain to be treated as law. The lack of institutions which have enforcement 
powers is a significant weakness of the international legal framework. There are 
incidences of breaches of international law which go unpunished.  
An example of such international actions is the annexation of Crimea from Ukraine by 
the Russian Federation in 2014 and the ensuing events. This act of the Russian 
Federation was argued to be in breach of international law, and particularly in breach 
of the Belavezha Accords establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States in 
1991, the Helsinki Accords, the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances of 1994 
and the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between the Russian 
Federation and Ukraine74. In response to international criticism, and actions, 
considered in most circles as ineffective by both the G8 and the United Nations, Russia 
has maintained that the action was in concord with the international law principle of 
self-determination.  
Another example is the invasion of Iraq by the United States without the permission of 
the UN Security Council. In 2010, an independent commission of inquiry set up by the 
government of the Netherlands maintained that UN did not authorise any member 
states to use military force to compel Iraq to comply with the Security Council's 
resolutions. As a result, the Dutch commission concluded that the invasion violated 
international law.75 In 2004, the former Secretary-General of the UN stated in an 
interview with BBC as follows –  
"[F]rom our point of view and from the Charter point of view [the war] was 
illegal."76 
Above are two instances of influential global powers disregarding international law, 
without any substantial repercussion.  
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There is the school of thought which holds the view, contrary to popular belief, that 
states observe international law, and violations are comparatively rare.77  This school 
of thoughts holds the view that even where there are violations of international law 
by states, just like some of the examples above, it is so unduly and highly publicised, 
to the extent that it impacts negatively on the efficacy of international law.  They have 
argued that there are just as many violations on the national plane. Hence, just as the 
violations of national legal orders (murder, robbery, rape, et cetera.) within the states 
do not undermine the legitimacy of the national legal order, so analogously assaults 
upon the international legal rules should not undermine its value to the international 
community. At worst, it should merely point to its weakness.78  
 
2.2.4.3. The process of international law - transacting with sovereignty & 
consent 
The concept of sovereignty introduces the element of consent with states in the 
application of international law. Hence, certain factors come into play when they 
exercise their consent. One of which is the factor of reciprocity. Malcolm Shaw stated 
as follows –  
"States quite often do not pursue one particular course of action 
which might bring them short-term gains, because it could 
disrupt the mesh of reciprocal tolerance which could very well 
bring long-term disadvantages."79 
Hence, long-term considerations are often significant factors to states when they 
decide on whether or not to give their consent and thereby to subject themselves to 
some international law. So, where a decision will have a long-term outcome that will 
be detrimental to a long-standing reciprocal arrangement with other states, the state 
is likely to refrain from such a decision to safeguard the long-term reciprocal 
arrangement and relationship. 
 A typical example of reciprocal arrangements is the subject of immunity, as it is in the 
interest of states for the immunity of their foreign diplomats to be protected, hence 
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the immunity of other states' diplomats are protected. Another example is when states 
decide on extradition. International cooperation and legal obligation, comity and 
reciprocity are inherent to extradition and in someways condition the entire process.80 
These are examples of how the process of international law is influenced by reciprocal 
reasoning or transactional motivation, and indeed, a significant part of the 
transactions of sovereignty or the giving of consent is influenced by reciprocal factors. 
This transactional element of states and their sovereignty in relations with the 
international community is an upshot of the sovereign status of states, and it brings to 
question the sense of obligation of the states in the international community, or the 
strength or integrity of international law itself.81  
2.2.4.4. The process of international law – Aggregating consent 
Central to the Westphalian international legal system, states are sovereign free 
agents; independent, and could only be bound by their consent. This attribute has 
been described as a self-limitation, which declares that states could only be obliged 
to comply with international legal rules if they had first agreed to be so obliged.82 
However, where a state arbitrarily disobeys an international rule which the state had 
prior consented to, such action of the state does not render the international rule 
invalid, or optional, nor does it remove from its aura of legality. Instead, it is merely a 
breach of the state's obligation under international law. This opinion is further to the 
norm that agreements are binding - pacta sunt servanda- and this is the premise upon 
which treaty laws are reached. While consent is required to reach an agreement, the 
legal principle of pacta sunt servanda when the agreement is reached estops an 
agreement from being invalid because of the retraction of consent. It is common 
legal knowledge that where a party has entered a contract, the parties in so doing 
have taken on themselves a duty to perform their solemn obligations. This point is not 
limited to international law or the law of treaties, but it is a norm across various sectors 
of the society. This point is also obtainable in contract law in many domestic legal 
traditions around the world. As with the general principles of contract, every 
agreement of a legal nature, domestic or international, whether it is a contract 
between individuals or a treaty between states, presupposes that in concluding the 
agreement the parties acted intending to abide by its provisions. 
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To contend with this subject of consent is the notion of consensus, by which 
international law gains significant legitimacy. The notion of consensus refers to the 
influence of the majority of states in the international space concerning the creation 
and acceptance of new norms of international law83. The position of this notion is to 
prioritise the creation of international multilateral co-operation over the bilateral 
interests of individual nation-states. There is the contention that consent by itself does 
not create international law. However, it is the collective consents of states that form 
a consensus, by which multi-lateral international law is made. This argument is not in 
any way a suggestion that the doctrine of consent is irrelevant in understanding the 
concept of international law. Rather, it is to recognise the limitations of consent and 
not necessarily to neglect its significance. Consent is one of the major components of 
international law, and it is only by consent that nation-states would be signatories to 
treaties. Generally speaking, it is the consent of states that makes the concept of the 
international legal system conceivable in the first place. However, it is the aggregate 
of the consent of states that create the consensus by which the international legal 
system gains its legitimacy and is given consideration over national interests in certain 
circumstances. So in effect, consent creates consensus and legitimises the system as 
a whole. Hence, while states can retract consent on particular rules of the 
international legal order, states may not be able to object to the consensus of the 
international legal system as a whole.  
2.2.4.5. The process of international law: consent v consensus 
A conflict between consensus and consent as to the making of international law 
could arise when a significant section of the citizens of the states globally have an 
apparent consensus on a particular subject matter in the international space. 
However, there is a lack of political will to give the state's consent on such a subject 
matter. In such a scenario, what would be the fate of such a subject matter? This 
question goes to one of the core objectives of this thesis - legitimising the status or 
influence of NGOs across the international space.  Whereas there is a growing 
consensus from the global citizenry as to the increasing influence of NGOs and the 
need to be given legitimacy, formal recognition and core role in the international 
legal system, there is the lack of states' consent to elevate the status of NGOs on the 
international plane. Hence, James Paul – the executive director of the Global Policy 
Forum, stated as follows -  
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'In the field of international relations, scholars now speak of NGOs as 
"non-state actors" (a category that can also include transnational 
corporations). This term suggests NGOs' emerging influence in the 
international policy arena where previously only states played a 
significant role. Though NGOs have few formal powers over 
international decision-making, they have many accomplishments to 
their credit. In recent years, they have successfully promoted new 
environmental agreements, greatly strengthened women's rights, 
and won important arms control and disarmament measures. NGOs 
have also improved the rights and well-being of children, the 
disabled, the poor and indigenous peoples. Some analysts believe 
that these successes resulted from increasing globalisation and the 
pressure of ordinary citizens to control and regulate the world beyond 
the nation-state.' 
At times, the influence of the NGOs is at odds with the interest of states. This latent 
conflict is one of the reasons for the on-going contention between NGOs and states, 
leading to states seeking to hold back their acknowledgement of the central role 
NGOs play. For example, in 2018, the Nigerian state, through its military, has accused 
Amnesty of spreading "fictitious allegations" to "destabilise and dismember Nigeria"; 
calling for the closure of Amnesty operations in Nigeria "if such recklessness 
continues".84 BBC reported that Nigeria's position was in response to Amnesty's 
allegation that at least 3,641 Nigerian residents died in clashes between farmers and 
herders between  2016 and 2018. It is a conflict involving the Fulani tribe of the 
president of Nigeria- Muhamadu Buhari, who has been accused of a tacit response 
to the atrocities being allegedly carried out by his clansmen.85 So, here is an example 
of where the majority consensus of the international community has recognised the 
growing influence of the human rights organisation – Amnesty International. However, 
for political reasons, such an NGO contends with the government of some states 
concerning legitimacy, freedom to exist and express their position on a local matter 
with international concerns. This is just one of many examples across various sectors 
globally, where there is a global consensus on issues or status. However, there is a lack 
of state's consent; and political considerations often drive the lack of consent. The 
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dilemma remains that the state's consent is a significant factor by which international 
law may be made. 
2.2.4.6. The process of international law – international legal system & domestic 
legal system politics and consent 
With each milestone reached so far on this expedition to understand the concept of 
international law and its process, the earlier mentioned position of Sir Frederick Pollock 
comes again to the fore – in that a necessary condition for the existence of law is the 
existence of a political community.86 Hence, 'politics' was included in this thesis to the 
traditional sources of law stipulated under article 38 of the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice. The inclusion of politics is because of the pivotal role 'consent' plays 
the process of international law, and consent is essentially an act reserved for the 
politicians at the helm of the affairs of the state.  Politics is arguably the single most 
valuable underlying factor that lubricates the engine of the international legal system.  
Within the national legal system, the laws are legislated by parliament and 
adjudicated by courts, in order to avoid too much power concentrated in one arm 
of government. However, though the political class makes the laws and creates the 
legal system, there are checks in place within the states which maintain the integrity 
of the national legal system. Hence, the independence of the legal institutions and 
their operations vis a vis the politically elected officials ideally is sacrosanct within the 
states, to the end that an overt interference on the juridical process would be an 
attacked upon fundamental principles and ardently contested.87  
In contrast, in the international legal system, the primary arbiters of the world orders 
are states who make the laws, interpret and enforce them. However, there are 
secondary organs, such as international organisations.88 The implication is that politics 
then stands at the heart of the international legal system.89 There appears to be a 
vacuum in the international legal space which opens it up to the risk of 'regulated' 
arbitrariness, heavily influenced by political figures and factors. The divide between 
politics and law in the international space is very blurred, and this in itself is the 
predominant weakness of the system. However, this blurred divide could be the 
unique strength of the international legal system. It is a system that thrives on the 
equality of states and the concept of sovereignty, and as a result, can best function 
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by international cooperation, inclusion and acknowledge of the plurality of legal 
processes in the international plane. It underscores the argument for a 
reconceptualisation of international law in a way that best reflects the 21st-century 
realities.   Remaining static to the Westphalian international legal system and its state-
centrism does not take into cognisance the other influential players on the 
international plane, such as multinational corporations or non-governmental 
organisations. It follows that states ought to distil elements of their sovereignty as they 
give their consent on various matters, bearing in mind the influence of the other actors 
and the impact their decision will have on the other actors and their activities.   
NGOs seem to be the keen and ready solution resource spring for most of the global 
challenges of the international community and is increasingly inching closer to the 
centre of the international legal system. NGO's influence in international space should 
be acknowledged. Their increasing visibility and role in the 21st-century international 
legal system should be legitimised. There is a consensus of the global citizenry as to 
the international political and social ascendancy of diverse NGOs due to 
globalisation. International law should be reconceptualised in that states' consent, or 
sovereignty correlates with the global consensus that the 21st-century international law 
should undergo a paradigm shift which accommodates other players in its processes.  
2.3. The problem with the Westphalian notion of International Law 
It is argued that traditional Westphalian-inspired assumptions about power and 
authority cannot facilitate a contemporary understanding of international law in 
practice. As a result, there is a growing disjunction between theory and practice of 
the global system. It has been argued that the increasing misfit of the Westphalian 
notion of international law for the practical purposes of the 21st-century is becoming 
more acute.90 The actors, structures and processes identified and theorised as the 
core players in the international plane have ceased to be of singular importance.91 
Cutler has said that the Westphalian inspired notions of state-centricity, positivist 
international law, and 'public' definitions of authority are incapable of capturing the 
significance of non-state actors, informal normative structures, and private, economic 
power in the global political economy.92 It is because of the state-centric nature of 
the Westphalian concept of international law, which ordinarily governs the 
relationship between states and not between non-state actors. So, there is a 
disconnect which plays out in the operation of a state-centred system on a global 
                                                             





reality that involves influential non-state actors. In reality, there has been a 
fundamental reconfiguration of power and authority in the global space. The current 
conceptualisation of international law has not adequately considered this 
reconfiguration. So the lack of asymmetry between the Westphalian notions of 
international law and the purposes for which it exists in the 21st century is worthy of 
note.  
The peace of Westphalia brought an end to the Thirty Years' War93 and is generally 
regarded as providing the constitutional foundations for the emerging state system – 
classical international law. The 1648 event is, to many international legal scholars, the 
source and inception of the subject of their scholarship.  In this regard, Kennedy94 
observes as follows –  
'International legal scholars are particularly insistent that their discipline 
began in 1648 with the Treaty of Westphalia closing the Thirty Years' War. 
The originality of 1648 is important to the discipline, for it situates public 
international law as a rational philosophy, handmaiden of statehood, the 
cultural heir to religious principle…Before 1648 were facts, politics, religion, 
in some tellings a 'chaotic void' slowly filled by sovereign states. Thereafter, 
after the establishment of peace, after the 'rise of states,' after the 
collapse of 'religious universalism', after the chaos of war, came law—as 
philosophy, as idea, as word.'95 
As can be gleaned from the statement above, there were some specific impacts 
that the Westphalian peace treaty had in the concept of international law. They 
include – 
The emergence of the concept of sovereignty 
The rise of the nation-state as the dominant subject in international law 
The importance attached to consensual law-making in international law –e.g. 
treaties 
The introduction of Westphalian international law placed state and the concept 
of sovereignty as the fundamental ordering principle of the state on the 
international plane. It set the state at the centre as the unambiguous locus of 
authority on the international plane. The 1648 events were pivotal to international 
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law as is known today. It could be described as the birth year of modern 
international law, which heralded the transition from natural to positive law 
conceptions more in keeping with notions of sovereignty.96  
The entire edifice of modern international law rests squarely on the Westphalian 
foundation of positive acts of sovereign consent, evidenced explicitly in treaty 
law and implicitly in customary international law. Treaty and customary law 
came to be regarded as the primary sources of law, while states became its 
'subjects'.97 Indeed, since the inception of modern international law following the 
Westphalian peace treaty, states have been considered to be the sole 
legitimate subject of international law. The intriguing fact which stands the risk of 
being overlooked is that other actors were recognised as having some legal 
personality. Non-state entities like the Holy See, chartered companies, and 
belligerents have been treated as having some legal capacities. However, 
regardless of any such recognition, the general orientation of the law has been 
state-centred.  
Some scholars like Stephen Krasner argued that Westphalia did not provide an 
unambiguous determination of the state as the sole or exclusive locus of 
authority.98 He argued that the position that the Westphalian system implies that 
sovereignty has a taken-for-granted quality is wrong. In Krasner’s view, the actual 
content of sovereignty, the scope of authority that states can exercise, has 
always been contested. The primary function of the state or the expression of its 
sovereignty was the exclusive territorial autonomy. This defining attribute of the 
state, according to Krasner, is increasingly being challenged by the creation of 
new institutional forms that better meet specific needs.99 
The arguments on the viability of Westphalian international law is beyond the 
question of the state’s claims to authority on the international plane. Instead, it is 
a question of the status of the state as the only 'subject' of law and politics, and 
other actors in the international plane as mere objects. The implications of 
treating other non-state actors, in particular NGOs, like individuals, as objects and 
not as subjects, is problematic empirically and normatively. The increasing 
visibility of these actors, especially NGOs, underpins the argument of this thesis. 
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Although these non-state actors are classified as objects at law (de jure), they 
are, in fact, operating as subjects (de facto).   
The exclusivity of states as the subjects of international law is problematic when 
looked through the lenses of the 21st-century developments which is 
reconfiguring state-society relations, leading to increasing contraction of state 
authority on the one hand and expansion of non-state actors’ authority in the 
21st-century world on the other hand. 
Culter had argued as follows -   
"All constitutional orders require some degree of fit between their 
principles and practices. Whether one focuses upon the symmetry 
between law and practice through 'rules of recognition' or the 
'convergent expectations' of the participants, the legitimacy of a 
constitutional order is associated with some measure of conformance 
of the actual practices of participants with its founding legal/ 
constitutional theory and principles. A disjunction between 
constitutional theory and the practices of participants, more often 
than not, portends a crisis of legitimacy. When the participants fail to 
recognise the legitimacy of law through their practices, the law's 
claim to authority is challenged and potentially undermined."  
It is true also with regards to the international constitutional order. For 
international law to have legitimacy, according to Art 38 of the Statute of the 
international court of justice100, the international custom and treaties are pivotal. 
Determining international custom is usually achieved through state practice, 
while treaties are primarily the giving of consent. Traditionally, state practice 
constituted the state as the 'subject' of the constitutional order, and it is the states 
that are primarily able to enter into treaties. However, custom or state practice is 
increasingly attesting to the growing influence of NGOs and other non-state 
actors as a de facto 'subject' in the international plane.  However, legal theory 
has not kept in step with this changing practice. The resulting disjunction 
between legal theory and state practice is part of a larger disjunction associated 
with globalisation more generally.101  
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2.4. Rethinking the Westphalian concept of International Law vis à vis the 
proliferation of actors on the international plane and the pivotal role of 
NGOs 
The choice of the NGOs as the focal point of this thesis stems from the viewpoint that 
the international community will benefit more from a ‘governance-driven’ system, 
rather than a ‘government-driven’ system. The position of the state as the central 
arbiters of political authority and governance in the international community remains 
necessary. However, their role needs to be augmented by other actors who are more 
representative of the ‘flagless’ or ‘passpostless’ nature of the international community 
and the 21st-century global challenges. In the international plane, as has been 
pointed out, has seen the proliferation of other non-state actors. Among these are 
multinational corporations and inter-governmental organisations. However, this thesis 
has its thrust in the direction of NGOs.  
The choice to focus in the direction is inspired firstly by the essential characteristics of 
NGOs; some of which could be gleaned from the definition of Peter Macalister-Smith 
as pointed out in chapter 1. His definition underpins the choice of this subject of 
research. In defining non-governmental organisations, he explained as can be 
gleaned from their name are not established by a government, nor by an 
international agreement102.  Although they are inherently private organisations and 
operate within the private law context of the legal system under which they are 
founded, their activities, objects and purposes must essentially be outward-looking 
and for the benefit of the public or a section of the public. There are not essentially 
profit-seeking like the MNCs or promoting the interests and agenda of the states like 
the inter-governmental organisations. So NGOs is the fulcrum of this because of their 
fundamental characteristics. 
On the one hand, because they exist for the furtherance of a variety of causes, and 
on the other hand, they exist without the encumbrance of government. The former 
point is the reason why MNCs are not preferred as the non-state actor, and the latter 
is the reason why international organisations are not preferred.  These core 
characteristics set NGOs at a vantage position of being considered as the social 
conscience of the society because they have no government agenda nor personal 
agenda driven by profit. 
The second rationale for focusing on NGOs follows on from the first - the extent of the 
representative capacity of NGOs, and it is why they are considered the social 
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conscience of the society. NGOs interfaces across all the strata of the international 
legal system. It engages with all players in the global space. NGOs are characterised 
by their apparent diversity. They encompass a broad range of organisations, social 
movements, and pressure groups which are the pivot of activism in various fields of 
public concern.  
The emphasis of NGOs as having some moral currency or a social conscience is more 
in relation to the robustness of their representative capacity. Along that line, the 
expression of social conscience should be construed within the context of the Ancient 
Chinese philosophy of yin and yang, i.e. the concept of dualism. It describes how 
seemingly opposite or contrary forces may actually be complementary, 
interconnected, and interdependent in the natural world. In simple terms - to take the 
good with the bad103. This is the reason the reference to ‘moral’ or ‘conscience’ is not 
qualified as good or bad because the universality or objectivity of good or bad morals 
or conscience is a complex and controversial concept. It follows the argument of 
morality being determined by statistics. Hence, if statistically, more people on a 
subject matter attest to such matter as good moral standard, then it is a good moral 
standard, not because it is inherently so, but because it is predominantly perceived 
as such. Examples like abortion, or the LGBT movement, hitherto was considered 
immoral; today, it is considered immoral to consider it as immoral. So the reference of 
NGOs as the moral or social conscience of the international community is not in 
relation to the subjective nature of conscience or morality, but that they are 
representative of conscience of the global space. So for every pro-life NGO, there is 
a pro-choice NGO.  This counter views may not be palatable, but it is preferable, and 
it forms one of the rationales for focusing on NGOs and their role in the 
reconceptualisation of international law.  
2.5. Chapter 2: Conclusion 
This chapter set out to assess the Westphalian concept of international law and its 
processes. In an attempt to gain a better understanding of ‘law’ and international 
law, it established the intrinsic role of law to the existence of any society. Having 
established that the continued relevance of the Westphalian concept of international 
law is hinged on the prominence of state on the international plane; It exposes the 
inadequacies of that concept in the 21st-century international plane where non-state 
actors are increasingly taking a more prominent role. In providing a systematic 
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account of the process of international law, it identified key elements of state practice 
and opinion-juris. 
Additionally, concerning international law, in general, it identified the concept of 
consent and politics in the expression of sovereignty. Along these lines, it went to 
examine the international legal system. It sought to draw on the similarities and the 
differences between the domestic legal systems and the international legal systems 
to test the hypothesis of the proposed paradigm shift. Furthermore, the argument on 
the viability of Westphalian international law is centred on the question on the status 
of states as the only subjects of international law at the detriment of other actors on 
the international plane as mere objects. Against the background, it established that 
although non-state actors are classified as objects at law then de jure, they are, in 
fact operating as subject de facto. The preceding establishes the legal theory has not 
kept in step with the changing global practices. Consequently, results in a disjunction 
between the Westphalian international law and the 21st-century international legal 
context. These go to the very basis for this thesis. The thrust of this work is to proffer an 
argument for the reconceptualisation of international law as well as an argument for 
a paradigm shift in the perception of the central role of NGOs to this shift. Along these 
lines, the next chapter considers factors that highlight the deficits of the Westphalian 
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3.1. Chapter 3: Introduction 
Following on from the findings of the previous chapter around the workings of the 
Westphalian international legal system and some of the challenges it faces, this 
chapter examines the deficits of the Westphalian concept of international law with a 
particular focus on the concept of sovereignty. Secondly, it goes on to objectively 
measure the impact of globalisation and assesses the question of the “fitness for 
purpose” of the international Westphalian legal framework in the 21st Century.  
Concerning sovereignty, it acknowledges the importance of the concept, and its 
enigmatic nature, having been a subject of controversy since its inception. It embarks 
on an analysis of Haass elements of sovereignty- internal authority, border control, 
policy economy and the right to be acknowledged and not interfered with as 
undergoing unique challenges in the 21st Century. 
In examining these challenges, it identifies factors of globalisation that defy the 
boundaries of sovereignty. Of the many factors, three are examined in considerable 
detail- failed state, global health and the internet.  
After that, it progresses to examine the impact of globalisation, focusing on the 
centrality of interdependence to global behaviour and the pivotal role of NGOs in 
that process. 
3.2. Factors calling for a rethink of the Concept of Sovereignty  
The concept - ‘sovereignty’, is one of the most important concepts in international 
law, but also certainly one of the most enigmatic. The term sovereignty has many 
connotations.  It is perceived to be about the monopoly of power for the highest 
authority of the nation-state.104 Its meaning has been the subject of controversy.105  
Haas106 identifies four characteristics of sovereignty. Firstly, sovereignty entails the 
possession of ‘supreme political authority and monopoly over the legitimate use of 
force within its territory’ (internal authority). Secondly, sovereignty entails the power to 
regulate movement across defined borders by a state (border control). Thirdly, 
sovereignty entails the freedom to make foreign policy choices (policy autonomy). 
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Finally, sovereignty entails recognition by other entities and freedom from external 
interference. 107 
Haass notes further that all the elements of sovereignty identified above - internal 
authority, border control, policy autonomy and the right to be acknowledged and 
not to be interfered with - are currently under challenge.108 As will be depicted later, 
all of these elements have been supplanted by a myriad of factors of globalisation. 
Factors like global health, the internet, terrorism, environmental matters, economic 
matters, religion, et cetera. Some of these are considered further down in this chapter.  
Jackson argues that sovereignty has been depicted as only being relevant as a tool 
for hypocrisy or oration and persuasion, with no further relevance of value to science 
and law.109 The complexity of the concept and its meaning or its relevance has 
reached a heightened point today. It plays out in the increase of these factors of 
globalisation and the dilemma that the term ‘sovereignty’ has faced in international 
discourse. As a result, sovereign independence of states is increasingly giving way to 
interdependence, and there is an inception of new players to the international plane. 
This issue with the concept of sovereignty needs a clear and decisive 
reconceptualisation. Indeed, the concept is relevant, particularly with regards to the 
way states relate with each other. The inter-state relationships seem to be the extent 
of its relevance. 
Nevertheless, the Westphalian concept of sovereignty is largely inadequate in a 
globalised world, where global issues need a global response from global actors and 
not just states. However, it must be noted that the argument of this thesis is not for the 
concept to be undone or discarded; rather, it should be reconceptualised.  While the 
concept of sovereignty has been incessantly critiqued, it remains pivotal to 
international relations and international law.110 In alignment with Jackson’s opinion111 
on the inadequacies of the traditional Westphalian concept of sovereignty, the 
opinion of this thesis is that the traditional Westphalian concept of sovereignty could 
be more fit for purpose in this 21st century. The conventional Westphalian notion of 
sovereignty could be perceived as anachronistic when viewed with the lenses of the 
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factors of globalisation, as mentioned earlier. Some of these factors are considered 
hereunder.  The various leaders at the helm of affairs at the United Nations mooted 
the point on the inadequacies of sovereignty. In the 1990s, during the tenure of the 
former United Nations secretary-general Boutros Boutros-Ghali, he stated in a 
statement to the Security Council – 
"Respect for [the state's] fundamental sovereignty and integrity [is] crucial 
to any common international progress. The time of absolute and exclusive 
sovereignty, however, has passed; its theory was never matched by 
reality."112 
Along the same lines, his successor, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan admitted in a 
1999 annual report to the General Assembly stating that the post-war institutions were 
modelled for an inter-national world, which is different from the reality of the current 
‘global’ world.113 The current position of global affairs is that the world has moved on 
from the state of national centrism to a more global orientation, and to that extent, a 
global era requires global engagement. The import of this is that there are more 
players on the international plane than just states. These new players have a claim of 
ownership of the global community, and to that extent, feel a sense of responsibility 
in protecting the world.  
The outworking of the concept of sovereignty is that only entities regarded as having 
sovereignty could play a significant role on the international plane as per the 
Westphalian model. Treaties were negotiated and entered into by states. Only states 
can avail themselves of certain rights in international law. Territorial power appeared 
to be a crucial element in who qualifies to act or speak legitimately on the 
international plane. Today, the influence of other actors on the international plane 
across various other sectors beyond the remit of territory has earned them a voice on 
the international plane. Economic and social matters now transcend territorial 
limitations. 
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As a result, there are many instances of global players, predominantly, NGOs, who 
consider themselves custodians of the world. So they are burdened with the 
responsibility for its environment, values system and its socio-economic state. They feel 
a need to keep it a state in safety and profitability for the majority of the global 
citizenry. 
Given this premise, it is no surprise that inter-governmental organisations, in partnership 
with non-governmental organisations, can challenge criminal behaviour by states. 
States no longer have the convenience to mete out atrocity under the shield and 
expectation of the sovereign immunity of the states, thereby escaping the relevant 
consequences for untoward actions. Previously, the concept of sovereignty has been 
so limited to the concept of a monopoly of power, so national leaders and politicians 
readily reverted to the notion of sovereignty, cleaving onto it as a crutch, to forestall 
needed debate on questionable matters or avoid complex thinking114. Today, while 
this status quo is still prevalent to some extent, there is a growing revolt against the 
right of states to do as they will because they are sovereign. However; it has been 
criticised that intergovernmental organisations are no more than the big country clubs 
or associations, and they would expense justice at their convenience115. This criticism 
of the intergovernmental organisation gives more credence to one of the positions of 
this thesis. On the premise of this criticism, it is argued that NGOs, not states or 
intergovernmental organisations, are better placed to act as conduits of fairness and 
equity in the international plane. It is because, unlike intergovernmental organisations, 
NGOs ought not to have any affiliation to any government. The activism on the civil 
affairs on the international plane has been replete with several activists NGOs in the 
areas of the environment, animal rights, human rights, religion, et cetera. To this extent, 
non-governmental organisations play a significant role in guarding the social 
conscience of the global space; collectively abhorring cruelty, and rejecting 
injustice.116  
It is observed that issues relating to weapons of mass destruction, genocide, 
environmental dilemma, failed states, global health, the war against flagless 
organisations unified by terror, et cetera, all pose a significant problem for the doctrine 
of sovereignty. NGOs may be credited with activism and advocacy on these issues. 
However, the substantive and enforceable actions on these issues are still driven by 
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states. Non-state actors do not have the capacity to deal with most of these crucial 
issues. These issues, sometimes need a response of force or the threat of the use of 
force and the rhetoric of sovereignty. The position of this research to this view is that 
coercive and brutish response has not had much positive result. Frequently violence 
has bred more violence, and coercion has led to more dangerous resistance, putting 
more innocent and helpless people in harm's way. 
Hence, perhaps, there should be a complete change of paradigm on the ways to 
deal with these global issues. Some are of the view that the presence of humanitarian 
organisations, most of which are NGOs, have had a more positive impact in war-torn 
areas, than boots on the ground.117   
The rhetoric of sovereignty is where the term is used as a tool of political convenience, 
hinged on the traditional definition of the term. The traditional conceptualisation of 
the term is not fit for the 21st-century purpose. It is the notion of a state’s absolute 
power and authority over its subjects and its territory, unfettered by any higher rule.  
This rhetoric hinged on this definition is problematic. 
John H Jackson stated in this respect as follows –  
‘It could be characterised as the nation-state's power to violate virgins, 
chop off heads, arbitrarily confiscate property, torture citizens, and engage 
in all sorts of other excessive and inappropriate actions. Today, no sensible 
person would agree that this antiquated version of sovereignty exists. A 
multitude of treaties and customary international law norms impose 
international legal constraints (at the least) that circumscribe extreme forms 
of arbitrary actions even against a sovereign's own citizens.’118 
There are many reasons why the current notion of sovereignty is inadequate in 
today’s globalised world.  These include the occurrence of failed states, terrorism, 
global environmental challenges, global health challenges, and the volatile 
global impacts of a financial crisis in a state as well as the advent of the 
phenomenon of the internet. From all of these, this thesis considers only three of 
these endless issues.  
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Firstly, the element of failed states is considered, mainly because of the significant 
role sovereignty and the failure of the concept plays in the failure of states and 
how it is central to the core the thesis.  Secondly, global health is considered as 
another example of the need to reconceptualise international law. The socio-
political and economic importance of global health to a thriving international 
community and its relevance due to the current prevalent coronavirus are some 
of the factors that influence the choice of global health. Finally, the internet and 
its governance are considered because it is the gateway of globalisation. From 
all the above factors, the internet appears to be the factor the best illustrates the 
diminishing fit of the territorial attribute of the Westphalian international law of the 
21st-century international community.   
3.2.1. Failed States  
When a state on the international plane has been seen to have too little of 
‘sovereignty’ that it cannot transform their nominal sovereignty into effective 
governance, it could be referred to as a failed state. Barma defined a failed state as 
one that is unable to perform the two fundamental functions of the sovereign nation-
state in the modern world system. In essence, it cannot project authority over its 
territory and peoples, and it cannot protect its national boundaries. 119 It has led to a 
myriad of activities within many states, which have threatened their continued 
existence. When a state is failing, it could be described that their sovereignty element 
is faulty. When the element of sovereignty is attenuated, then the symptoms play out 
in crumbling infrastructures, faltering utility supplies, unstable educational and health 
facilities, and deteriorating fundamental human-development indicators, such as 
infant mortality and literacy rates. The government barely functions, while the law-
makers, courts, civil service, and military lose their capacity and professional 
independence.120 
For example, at the end of the 20th century, Somalia descended into state collapse 
under rival warlords, and Afghanistan, a failed state under the Taliban regime, 
harboured the terrorist group Al-Qaeda. State failure leads to increasing humanitarian 
activities and likely emergency relief usually delivered by NGOs.121 There have been 
instances where states have been overtaken by insurgents or militants seeking to 
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overthrow a government or secede without due process. Instances of violent guerrilla 
warfare or protest and promotion some ideological stance. They were plagued by 
incessant corrupt and nonconscientious practices. These activities lead to a state of 
unrest, ultimately gives rise to the breakdown of law and order of the states, leading 
to sabotage,  deaths, poverty, lack of the basic social amenities and even the 
intrusion of neighbouring states to exploit these vulnerabilities to foment rebellion or 
secessionist movements.122 Under these circumstances, the needed rebuilding 
responsibilities fall to the international community. Accordingly, understanding the 
dynamics of state failure and strengthening weak nation-states in relation to the role 
of NGOs is imperative.  
Where the sovereignty of the state is sabotaged internally or externally, it leads to dire 
impacts on the citizens of the states. The grim state of the citizens of these failed states 
has often piqued the moral conscience of the states around the world. An example 
of this was seen in the case of the chemical weapons attack during the Syrian crisis.123   
The impact of failed states, whose’s sovereignty has been impeded by a myriad of 
forces, could include a severe challenge to peace, life, property and national security 
across the globe in another sovereign state.  
Another example of this is the unrests that plagued Afghanistan in the 1990s. The 
international community paid little attention to beyond the random lip service until 
what culminated in the 9/11 attack in the United States in 2001. The 9/11 attack 
changed the outlook of the international community to failing states. The failing states 
could be breeding ground for extremism and havens for criminals, drug traffickers, 
and terrorists. Such lawlessness in one state can bring devastation to another state.  
Hence, it has become in the interest of the international community to prevent 
today’s troubled states from becoming tomorrow’s failed states. In doing so, it implies 
that the international community then assumes the responsibility of the sovereign 
government, which is counter-intuitive, as this further impedes on the sovereignty of 
the troubled state. These international military interventions are said to be motivated 
by a “responsibility to protect,” such as the Kosovo and Libya interventions. It is a claim 
that the international community, in line with the principle of jus cogens,  can bear 
responsibility for minorities or civilians in sovereign states, especially if these minorities 
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are threatened with genocide.124  It played out in the invasion of the Afganistan by 
the United States.125 The question that arises is whether the narrative could have been 
different if the international community responded to the failing of Afghanistan that 
played out in usurping of the sovereignty of State by the Taliban in the 1990s. The US 
response to the failing state of Afghanistan after the 9/11 attack led the US to take up 
some of the responsibility of the sovereign state. Mr Haass pointed out that –  
‘In Afghanistan alone, over twenty U.S. agencies operate on the ground, 
delivering $840 million worth of aid that we have committed to 
humanitarian and reconstruction efforts. Working with Afghan and 
international partners, we are helping local authorities resettle refugees, 
restore physical security, build government institutions, and jump-start 
economic activity.’126  
This illustration further buttresses the argument of this thesis - the concept of 
sovereignty in the 21st century is not as sacrosanct or absolute as it perceived and 
needs to be reconceptualised. Perhaps, the concept has never been sacrosanct, not 
even at the initial stages of its emergence; there were always entities which struggled 
to meet all the elements of a functioning, viable state.  
There have been different approaches taken by the international community in their 
intervention to deal with an impending international crisis. Some have been active 
incursion by the big states, who are usually the permanent members of the United 
Nations Security Council. Other times by other states, who may have formed a 
peacekeeping coalition force or a monitoring group.127 However, these are often 
reactive measures rather than proactive measures. With this approach, the losses, 
both to life and property, are hardly mitigated.  Hence, this thesis opines that it is in 
the interest of the international community to engage a preventive approach, rather 
than a reactional approach, in dealing with a potential international crisis. This opinion 
transcends beyond just failing states and extends to other facets of the international 
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community, including an impending environmental calamity, global health 
challenges or other like matters. As Haass pointed out,  
“the old adage rings true - an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of 
cure.”128  
The United Nations estimates that eight of the most expensive cases of failing 
states in the1990s cost the international community in excess of $250 billion. It 
could have been much cheaper to support in building up state capacities 
before they fall apart, rather than trying to pick up the pieces.129  
So, there are instances of technological, economic and military camaraderie 
between states, enhancing the strength of the weaker states, while mitigating a 
potential international crisis. To this end, there has been the emergence of exchange 
programmes between states, international development banks, international justice 
systems, et cetera.  The challenge with these approaches arises when trying to 
reconcile it with the sacredness of the traditional notion of the doctrine of sovereignty, 
of which one of its most sacred tenets is the principle of non-interference. The question 
that arises is whether the failing states which welcome this interference, albeit, 
positive, do so voluntarily, or whether consent, in dire circumstances, becomes no 
more than a luxury of sovereignty. Whichever is the case, it is observed that some of 
the sovereign power of the state is delegated. It could be delegated vertically to 
NGOs who provide the relevant humanitarian or advocacy support or horizontally to 
other states who provide the relevant military or financial support needed at the time.  
The import of this is that the concept of sovereignty should be reconceptualised to 
accommodate instances of the delegation of such sovereignty. This point is discussed 
further in the subsequent chapter. 
3.2.2. Global Health 
Another reason for the inadequacy of the doctrine of sovereignty is global health 
standards with particular reference to infectious diseases which have culminated in 
epidemics and pandemics globally. The advantages of economic globalization, such 
as increased connectivity and interdependence, also give rise to risks, such as the 
transmission of viruses. 130  Examples of these include the occurrence of Ebola and the 
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recent Coronavirus – COVID 19. Much like the financial crisis of 2008, the recent global 
health crisis has set the world in a panic state. Such as has not been seen in over 
decades. Stock markets are at a record low, and the global economy is once again 
on the brinks of collapse. Here is an incident which occurred in Wuhan China but has 
had such global impacts, which has damaged the livelihood of citizens other far parts 
of the globe. Talks about the prospects of the disease irrepressibly spreading are 
prevalent in social corners. The Wall Street has suffered the fastest reversal since 1933 
during the depths of the Great Depression. The Dow lost more than 10% of its value in 
a week from record-breaking highs to the lowest point since 2016. More than $5tn 
(£3.9tn) has been wiped off the value of global markets, and the pandemic is causing 
the most significant disruption in decades to economies across the world.131 The FTSE 
100 is not immune, plunging the most in a week since the 2008 crash. Markets are 
expected to fall further as long as the disease remains.132 Pundits have argued that 
world growth could collapse into a recession for the first time since 2009, primarily 
because the priority of the global community and the nations is to preserve life, which 
in this case, will have a knock-on economic impact and enduring consequences. In 
order to inhibit the spread, nations have taken drastic measures, such as travel bans, 
school closures, cancellation of business conferences, et cetera. The Chinese city of 
Wuhan has been under lockdown for weeks after it was identified as the centre of a 
deadly coronavirus outbreak, and a typically bustling city of 11 million people now 
appears to be a ghost town.133 Indeed, given the global outlook of this disease, it will 
require a concerted global effort to effectively respond to it as opposed to a 
nationalist or a protectionist approach. Globalisation, technology and climate 
change make the spread of viral disease easier and incubate many other social and 
economic ills. Lurching headlong into a protectionist and luddite world will not provide 
adequate and lasting solutions. The scale of our collective problems demands 
international coordination.134 However, a valid argument against these points could 
be that there is an evident resurgence in nationalism with states closing their borders. 
For a moment, even the EU undermined their basic principles of freedom of 
movement, with EU states shutting their borders to each other. States are asserting 
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internal powers to shut down places where people congregate. Countries like China, 
Italy, the UK, the US are setting out different national responses.  
 These reductions in travel and locking down of people have led to complex 
outcomes for nationalist paradigm as well as the globalisation paradigm. While these 
policies are effective at containing the virus, the world is witnessing real problems of 
supply as the global flow of goods is cut off or reduced. Car manufacturers throughout 
the world have had to pause production because of the lack of component parts 
from China. The number of computers and phones being produced has plummeted. 
Major suppliers of generic drugs, like India, are unable to continue production 
because 80% of the active pharmaceutical ingredients on which these drugs are 
based must be imported from China.135  It is argued that due to the density of the 
economic interdependence; the pandemic will not lead to the collapse of 
globalisation. Instead, countries need to adapt and manage interdependence.  
The global nature and impact of the pandemic on various facets of the international 
community call for a concerted global response. The bio-medical professionals across 
the globe have responded to the ongoing coronavirus pandemic with a vast, high-
quality global research effort to find a treatment for COVID-19.136  If a Vaccine is 
found, talks are ongoing on how to invest now in global infrastructure. To ensure the 
distribution of the vaccine globally on an equitable basis when it is proven safe and 
effective.137 Also, Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance138, has is another evidence of a global 
effort championed by NGOs in dealing with global issues. Since its inception in 2000, 
it has a record of addresses vaccine equity and helps vaccinate nearly half of the 
world’s children. Over the last two decades, it has supported 496 vaccine programs 
in the 73 poorest countries and helped supply them with 600 million vaccine doses 
every year.139  
Weintraub et al. have argued that around 1 billion people in the world — 
predominantly residents of developing countries — lack formal identities; many are 
mobile. It is the view of these scholars that the lack of formal identity presents a 
massive challenge for governments trying to reach a critical mass of dispersed 
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people. The more significant concern regarding the COVID-19 is that without reliable 
IDs, there will be difficulties in knowing who has received vaccines.140  The Scholars 
argue that there could be the emergence of digital IDs.141 It follows that if the purpose 
of these IDs is to monitor the distribution of global vaccines for the pandemic, then 
there is a chance that this could lead to global digital IDs for the global community. 
For example, Simprints142 has deployed biometric IDs on health and humanitarian 
projects across 12 countries, which have increased health care visits and quality while 
preventing fraud.  It is yet another global response to a global challenge, driven by 
NGOs.   
3.2.2.1. Global Harmonization and Global Health 
As far back as 1995, the World Health Organization has asserted that emerging 
infections present a global threat which will require a concerted global effort to 
respond to it effectively.143  The rationale behind this assertion is that there could be 
an upshot of these infectious diseases anywhere in the world, and they could spread 
uncontrollably across national borders through the continuous movement of people 
and capital in the name of trade/business or just travel for pleasure. These have severe 
consequences for international law because the monopoly of a state in dealing with 
these issues is mostly non-existent. After all, the microbes do not respect internationally 
recognised borders.144 The pursuit of a national health policy which does not take into 
cognizance the global impacts on national health is no longer viable. 
Moreover, this challenge has been the case for decades. Hence the need for 
cooperation is no longer just a good idea, but it is a necessity for the survival of the 
global citizenry. Problems abound with the onslaught on globally infectious disease, 
mainly if attempts to address this global challenge engages a state-centric 
international approach alone. Aman has pointed out145 that the need for global 
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harmonization is increasingly becoming more relevant. After highlighting some global 
problems such as the global environment, Aman argued that global problems require 
global strategy.  It is observed that this is the case across other spheres of public policy 
and the relevance of the traditional distinctions between national and international 
political, social and economic activities have been eroded and paled out of 
significance because of globalisation.146  He added that the increased number of 
environmental issues would expectedly necessitate a solution which demands global 
cooperation for years to come. Aman was of the view that, ultimately, the interaction 
across the various spheres at the international and domestic levels will lead to a new 
perspective in the way law is conceptualised both on a national and an international 
level. 
With the growing emergence of infectious disease, the public health sector becomes 
more denationalised. The root cause is even more deeply rooted in the norms of the 
21st century, such as the increase in international travel, the increasingly global nature 
of food handling, processing and sales. Beyond the current threat of coronavirus, 
there have been infectious diseases such as tuberculosis, ebola, sars, cholera, and the 
list could go on. These diseases have spread to new regions through global travel and 
trade.147  
However, on the other hand, the trajectory of public health response to these diseases 
is also global. With the increase of health-related NGOs and the support of the WHO, 
there have been global medical advancements. One of the major success stories is 
the eradication of the poliovirus. The poliovirus is an example of how the effort of a 
partnership between the non-governmental organisations and inter-governmental 
organisations were far more effective in combating the global health terror than 
states could have been if states have acted exclusively. In 1988, the wild poliovirus 
was present in more than 125 countries and paralyzed 350,000 people every year, 
primarily young children. At that point, the World Health Assembly set a goal to 
eliminate the disease, and the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) commenced. 
It is instructive to note that the impact of the concerted effort at immunization across 
various sectors through the Global Polio Eradication Initiative, there has been a 
significant reduction of the number of cases by more than 99 per cent, saving more 
than 13 million children from paralysis. India stopped the virus in 2011, and today, polio 
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is found only in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Nigeria. In 2016, there were fewer than 40 
cases reported globally.148 The Global Polio Eradication Initiative is a public-private 
partnership led by national governments with five partners – the World Health 
Organization (WHO), Rotary International, the US Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), Bill & Melinda Gates 
Foundation and Gavi, the vaccine alliance. Its goal is to eradicate polio worldwide.149 
Of the five major partners of the Initiative, three are NGOs; one is an inter-
governmental organisation and the other as a department of the state. It is 
noteworthy that through the concerted efforts of NGOs, and the states who were 
primarily providing the hard infrastructure for the NGOs agenda to thrive, the initiative 
has been one of the most successful global health initiatives. Beyond these 
organisation, attention should be paid to the volunteers of various NGOs who work 
tirelessly to bring about the objectives of these NGOs. At the Polio 2012 summit in New 
Delhi, the former prime minister of India, Manmohan Singh said the following – 
“This [India’s removal from the list of countries with active transmission of 
endemic polio] gives us hope that we can finally eradicate polio not only 
from India but from the face of the entire mother earth… The real credit 
goes to the 2.3 million volunteers who repeatedly vaccinated children 
even in the most remote areas, often in very bad weather conditions […]I 
commend each one of them for their dedication, commitment and 
selfless service.”150 
Another example of where a concerted global effort has had a tremendous impact 
was the worldwide eradication of smallpox in 1977. Smallpox has existed for at least 
3,000 years and was one of the world’s most feared diseases until it was eradicated 
by a collaborative global vaccination programme consisted of the World Health 
Organization and other non-governmental organisations. The last known natural case 
was in Somalia in 1977. Since then, the only known cases were caused by a laboratory 
accident in 1978 in Birmingham, England, which killed one person and caused a 
limited outbreak. Smallpox was officially declared eradicated in 1979.151  
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As can be seen from above, the solution to global health threat relies to a great extent 
on the international cooperation between states and non-state actors – particularly 
NGOs. Often, the research carried out for the cure of some of these global health 
concerns are done by universities and other NGOs. A typical example is the 
continuous efforts made by Cancer Research UK to bring about a solution for cancer. 
The same has been the case for other matters, including the global efforts to come 
up with the needed vaccines for some of the worlds most feared infectious diseases. 
However, it is noteworthy that the solution propounded by these non-state actors 
could only thrive if there is cooperation from the sovereign states.  Put another way, 
the proposed solutions to the threat of the emerging infection rely on the potency of 
the sovereign state. However, ironically, the threat feeds off the impotence of the 
state in addressing global disease problems. When it comes to public health activities, 
globalization erodes sovereignty, but the proposed solution makes sovereignty and its 
exercise critical to dealing with the threat of emerging infections.152  It feeds into the 
core theme of this thesis which is that there should be a paradigm shift in the way 
sovereignty is perceived. Sovereignty ought to be seen as a tool that states pool 
together in order to achieve the 21st-century objectives. If the concept stays static to 
the Westphalian connotation of sovereignty which refers to the monopolised or 
exclusive control of states on the international plane, then there could be no good 
solution to the threat of global infectious diseases or other health concerns. The 
success of WHO in globalizing disease control programs suggests that the defects of 
the Westphalian notion of international law have not hobbled its effectiveness in 
improving health care worldwide. One of the core strengths of WHO is its approach in 
engaging extensively with the NGOs in delivering its objectives. 
3.2.2.2. WHO and NGOs 
As found in later chapters of this thesis, the relevance of article 71 of the UN charter is 
similar to the provisions of article 71 of the WHO’s constitution. The WHO’s constitution 
also provides under article 71 authorisation for the organisation to make suitable 
arrangements for consultation and cooperation with non-governmental organisations 
and, with the consent of the Government concerned, with national organizations, 
governmental or non-governmental". The Organization's early interest in this 
collaboration was shown by the vote of a resolution by the First World Health Assembly 
                                                             
152 David Fidler, 'Globalization, International Law, And Emerging Infectious Diseases' (1996) 2 Emerging Infectious Diseases 
77, p. 79. 
63 
 
in 1948 defining the "Working Principles Governing the Admission of Non-
Governmental Organizations into Official Relations with WHO".153  
The NGO’s eligibility concerning consultation with WHO depends on its competence 
area. It should mainly be driven by health or health-related objectives. 
Furthermore, the NGO should be international in its structure and its reach and should 
not be commercially orientated or profit-driven. The applicant NGO must align with 
the spirit, purposes and principles of the WHO constitution, which primarily seeks to 
achieve health for all.154  
The ECOSOC155categorises NGOs into three categories, i.e. general consultative 
status, special consultative status and the roster status. The World Health Organisation 
only categorises NGOs into one category - official relations. At the moment, the NGO 
would usually apply for admission into official relations with WHO, after a period about 
two years of informal relational and interactions. The application will consist of a 
structured plan detailing collaborative activities for a three-year period agreed to by 
both the NGO and WHO. Thereafter, a decision is reached by the WHO executive 
board, and its standing committee on NGOs will review the collaborative plan every 
three years.156  
If an NGO enters into official relations with WHO, then the NGO will enjoy participatory 
rights in meetings and committees which also entitles the NGO with the right to make 
statements at the invitation or with the permission of the meeting chairman. However, 
it should be noted that the NGO does not have the right to vote. Also, the NGO enjoys 
access to non-confidential information. Moreover, it can submit a memorandum to 
the Director-General, who reserves the prerogative to determine whether or not to 
circulate; considering the nature and scope of such circulation.  
Today there are about 217 non-State actors in official relations with WHO further to the 
decisions of the 146th session of the Executive Board in February 2020.157 These entities 
represent a wide range of activities including emergency and humanitarian relief 
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organizations, trade and consumer associations, parliamentary and professional 
medical societies, the association of women, young people, the elderly, 
occupational health specialists and research organizations et cetera.158 Beigbeder 
elaborated on examples of how they cooperate stating as follows -  
‘They cooperate, for example, in emergency relief operations, in [the] 
training of personnel, workshops on blood safety and epidemiology, as 
well as education programmes for young surgeons and midwives. Other 
activities include exchanges on bioethical issues and developments in 
medical law, the application of the results of research on such subjects 
as nutrition, human reproduction and the prevention and treatment of 
accidents.’159 
NGOs may also engage in global health by trying to gather as much support for WHO 
policies and programmes, while influencing what the policies are. They could also 
exert pressure on the WHO to see that NGOs furthers their objectives or interests. NGOs 
could be actively engaged with WHO in providing operational assistance, competent 
and specialised advice, relevant training, and facilitating implementation.  
The relevance of NGOs and the impact of their participation with WHO initiatives 
cannot be overemphasised.  This point was underscored by former Director of the 
WHO Programme on AIDS, DR Jonathan Mann, in 1989 –  
"There is an [sic] increasing recognition of the power and importance of 
community-based organizations. These community organizations have 
often been pioneers, leading the way for more timid or reluctant 
governments [...] In AIDS programmes, there is a direct relationship between 
the strength, diversity and involvement of community-based and non-





                                                             






3.2.2.3. Global Health as a Human Right?  
Article 25(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) provides that  
‘Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and 
well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and 
medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the 
event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other 
lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.’161 
 Although the UDHR is not a treaty and is not legally binding, the global efficacy of its 
provisions cannot be undermined. The protection of the rights and freedoms set out 
in the Declaration has been incorporated into many national constitutions and 
domestic legal frameworks. As its title suggests, universal – meaning it applies to all 
people, in all countries around the world. It stipulates the fundamental human rights, 
which are to be protected and shared by all members of the international community 
and has had a significant influence on the development of international human rights 
law.162 Hence, the provisions of article 25 cannot be disregarded.  
The importance of global health is both a legal concern as well as a practical 
concern.  Similar provisions to article 25 of the UDHR have been made in other 
international legal instruments and treaties.  For example, article 12 of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights163 (ICESCR) provides that  
‘The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of 
everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical 
and mental health.’164 
The ICESCR was adopted by General Assembly Resolution 2200 A (XXI) of 16 
December 1966. It is an international human rights treaty and to that extent creates 
legally binding international obligations to those States that have agreed to be bound 
by the standards contained in it.  
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However, the arguments remain as to whether or not international law creates a “right 
to health” and whether the provisions of article 12 of the ICESCR makes a demand on 
the global community to take necessary steps to preserve this right. Article 12 (2) (d) 
provides –  
‘The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant to 
achieve the full realization of this right shall include those necessary for[…] 
the prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, 
occupational and other diseases.’ 
Although the UDHR is not a treaty and is not legally binding, the global efficacy of its 
provisions cannot be undermined. The protection of the rights and freedoms set out 
in the Declaration has been incorporated into many national constitutions and 
domestic legal frameworks. As its title suggests, universal – meaning it applies to all 
people, in all countries around the world. It stipulates the fundamental human rights, 
which are to be protected and shared by all members of the international community 
and has had a significant influence on the development of international human rights 
law.165 Hence, the provisions of article 25 cannot be disregarded.  
The importance of global health is both a legal concern as well as a practical 
concern.  Similar provisions to article 25 of the UDHR have been made in other 
international legal instruments and treaties.  For example, article 12 of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) provides that  
‘The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of 
everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical 
and mental health.’166 
The ICESCR was adopted by General Assembly Resolution 2200 A (XXI) of 16 
December 1966. It is an international human rights treaty and to that extent creates 
legally binding international obligations to those States that have agreed to be bound 
by the standards contained in it.167  
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However, the arguments remain as to whether or not international law creates a “right 
to health” and whether the provisions of article 12 of the ICESCR makes a demand on 
the global community to take necessary steps to preserve this right. Article 12 (2) (d) 
provides –  
‘The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant to 
achieve the full realization of this right shall include those necessary for[…] 
the prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, 
occupational and other diseases.’ 
Effectively, states are legally obligated to ensure the full realisation of the right to 
health by taking steps to prevent, treat and control infectious diseases. By extension, 
states are legally obligated to distil their sovereignty by empowering the NGOs on the 
frontline, who are better positioned to respond to some of these global health issues.  
It should be stated that the human right in contention here is not a right to be healthy, 
as that cannot be enforced. Instead, according to the general comments issued by 
the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights – General Comment No 
14, in paragraphs 8 and 9 stated that the right to health that is contemplated is not to 
be understood as a right to be healthy. It is mainly because a state cannot ensure 
good health, nor is it possible for a state to provide requisite protection against every 
possible cause of human ill-health. Hence a right to be healthy is a myth that cannot 
be enforced. The genetic factors,  the peculiarity of each individual and their unique 
susceptibility to ill health and the adoption of unhealthy or risky lifestyle is 
predominantly within the purview of the sovereignty of the individual. To that extent, 
the states cannot interfere. Rather, the focus concerning the right to health should be 
on the entitlement of the individual to enjoy a variety of facilities, goods, services and 
conditions which are necessary for the realization of the highest attainable standard 
of health.168  
Therefore, the right to health, according to the general comments, contains both 
freedoms and entitlements. So, an individual is free to control his health and body, 
and that right should be free from interference. Interference could include torture, 
non-consensual medical treatment and experimentation. Also, the individual is 
entitled to a system of health protection which provides equality of opportunity for 
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people to enjoy the highest attainable level of health. It puts a heavy burden on 
states, and by extension, the international community to provide the necessary 
systems to protect against global infectious diseases. These systems cannot be 
adequately put in place without a reconceptualisation of international law. The 
concept of sovereignty and international law should be revisited to the end of 
legitimising the role of NGOs as critical influencers of the global health legal 
framework.169  
On the other hand, it has been argued that the right to health is not a direct human 
right. It is only indirectly considered a human right, under article 3 of the European 
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). Article 3 of the ECHR provides that no one shall 
be subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. To this 
extent, where the denial of the state’s opportunity for the highest attainable standard 
of health amounts to inhuman or degrading treatment, then one could imply that the 
right to health is by extension a human right contemplated under article 3 of the ECHR. 
Arnell referred to health, examing whether it was sufficient to satisfy the human rights 
bar as a ground to considerer when determining extradition.170 He stated that ill-health 
as a legal ground was difficult to satisfy and could entail judicial consideration of 
different factors. He pointed to the leading article 3 physical ill-health case of N v UK 
which demonstrated the high bar.171 In that case, the UK wanted to deport N to 
Uganda. At the time, she was undergoing treatment for AIDS, the Grand Chamber of 
the ECtHR held that aliens could not in principle claim any entitlement to remain in a 
state party in order to continue to benefit from medical, social or other forms of 
assistance and services. It was held that even if the deportation would lead to a 
hindrance of the treatment and lead to a deterioration in health or increase 
morbidity, article 3 will still not have been violated.172  The argument that could be 
made here is would deportation in the circumstances be in contravention of article 
12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights? 
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3.2.2.4. Global Health Challenges and the Sovereignty of States 
 Further to the provisions of article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, the states are under some legal obligation to provide the 
necessary system of health protection which provides equality of opportunity for 
people to enjoy the highest attainable level of health. The threat of infectious diseases 
poses some challenges to international law: first, the emerging infections problem 
exacerbates fundamental weaknesses in the law in that there is no practical way of 
enforcing it. Again, the root cause of this is the limited conceptualisation of 
sovereignty, which gives states absolute power and control of their territory and 
citizens. So, while states are free to agree to treaties, it has hard to enforce 
compliance with the terms of those treaties, as a state cannot be told what to do. The 
effectiveness of international law depends on the consent of states, which means that 
sovereignty and its exercise determine the fate of international legal rules.173   
As mentioned earlier, the irony of it all is that global infectious diseases undermine the 
sovereignty of a state. However, the sovereignty of states stays relevant in determining 
the concerted global response of the states to the global infectious diseases.  In other 
words, the problem by-passes the state. However, the solution has to rely on the state 
through the medium of international law.174  Hence, the sovereignty of the state and 
its pivotal relevance to international law constitutes the core strength and weakness 
of international law, at least, concerning dealing with global infectious diseases. 
International rules that are made, often reflect the compromises that are made by 
states in reaching such international legal rules. 
In contrast, the lack of implementation of these rules reflects the rigidity of states. 
States hold onto the concept of sovereignty, thereby expressing their unwillingness to 
restrict their freedom to act as they wish. Fidler has stated that the alleged failure of 
the International Health Regulations may be due to the failure of WHO member states 
to fulfil the duties they accepted. Neither the regulations nor WHO has any power to 
enforce compliance.175 The question of enforcement is a perennial problem of 
international law. 
The global scope of global infectious diseases such as ebola, coronavirus et cetera,  
necessitates agreement by most states to control infectious diseases. The control of 
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these infectious diseases is paramount because the failure of one state in meeting the 
minimum standards of global surveillance and control network puts at risk the efficacy 
of the entire global state effort. Hence, the role of the international NGOs emerges in 
this process, in that, their constituents are globally situated, and their efforts are more 
globally orientated than just state orientated. There is a natural incentive to approach 
surveillance and response from a global perspective. It is particularly so for 
international NGOs.  
Under Article 21 of the WHO Constitution, the World Health Assembly can adopt 
binding regulations in sanitary and quarantine requirements and other procedures to 
prevent the international spread of disease.176 The World Health Assembly adopted 
the International Health Regulations under Article 21. While Article 21 and the 
regulations are relevant to infectious disease control efforts, it is doubtful whether the 
regulations are enough.  One of the key challenges is that nothing in the existing 
regulations give the authority to require WHO member states to strengthen their public 
health infrastructure or the access to it. NGOs play a significant role here, as they tend 
to fill in the gaps that exist where the states do not have the requisite infrastructure to 
prevent control or respond to such global health challenges.  Good public health 
infrastructure is pivotal to the global health balance. 177For example, one of the key 
ways to deal with these health challenges is the quick identification of the outbreak 
of the disease and notification to the rest of the international community. However, 
the identification and notification are hinged on sound public health infrastructure. It 
is found that most states that have thrived in this area have heavily relied on public-
private partnership of state and non-state actors, including NGOs in providing the 
relevant public health infrastructure. 
3.2.3. The Internet 
Another example of how dispersed governance is in the 21st century is the internet. It 
is one of the few enigmatic developments of the 21st century. It is one of the foremost 
catalysts of globalisation. It is essential to understand what the internet is.  
Two key features of the internet are essential to an understanding of the internet. 
Firstly, it is software and not hardware. As a result, it appears that soft law seems more 
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likely in providing the needed legal framework for it. Secondly, it is derived from the 
term internetwork and not merely network.178  
The implication of these two is, firstly, being that it is not hardware; it does not consist 
of the physical infrastructure of wires, radio waves, cables, or terminals. However, it 
may depend on those physical media for implementation.179 Essentially, the internet 
is a standardised set of software instructions known as protocols for sending data over 
a network and a global set of unique addresses so data could be directed to specific 
addresses. These protocols can operate over any technology.180 Secondly, due to 
internetworking, internet protocols can communicate with each other across a global 
network of addresses. As a result, these networked data across addresses are not 
restricted to any physical or state territory or border. Also, these networks on which 
data is travelling, are owned by individual organisations, public or private, that either 
operate their own networks for internal users or sell their network access to external 
users. Mueller described it as follows - 
‘The internet is the global data communication capability realised by the 
interconnection of public and private telecommunication networks using 
internet protocols (IP), Transmission Commission Protocol) and other 
protocols required to implement IP internetworking on a global state such 
as DNS and packet routing protocols.’181  
These facts, as stated above, are such that could not have been contemplated at 
the inception of modern international law.  
 
3.2.3.1. The non-territorial attribute of the Internet 
Communication of data and information via the internet is done in a non-territorial 
way. Completely removed from the contemplations of the Westphalian idea of 
international order which was a question of territorial control and state autonomy. 
However, with the internet, web names and addresses create virtual spaces that are 
essentially independent of geography. By implication, it is independent of political 
jurisdiction, and the question of distance is abridged and irrelevant to the workings of 
the internet. There is now increased traffic of human digital interaction. This interaction 
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cannot be practically tied to any territory and as a result, creates a problem for 
governance and policy which emanates from any territory. 
At the inception of the internet, there might have been a chance for connectivity 
arrangements to be structured to conform to national boundaries if it was primarily 
driven by agents of the states rather than a provider-based address assignment, 
which is independent of the state. As a result, global top-level domains such a .com, 
.net and .org could have been avoided, and more control could have been given to 
the state, and country codes like the telephone could have been adopted.182 The 
challenge is that the influence of the internet has exponentially grown. If that foresight 
had been at its inception, perhaps things might have been done differently. At this 
point, it is unlikely that the internet could be forced to be remodelled back to a 
territorial model. So the internet is de facto non-territorial.  
So the question arises as to how the internet is governed. A model of successful 
internet governance must be legitimate. Its legitimacy derives from determining if the 
parties who define its governance are considered the key stakeholders of the 
industry.183 This thesis argues that democracy at the finest is where governance is as 
close to the constituents as possible. In this case, a system of governance that is 
accepted by the entire information society. Given the situation of the internet, 
consideration needs to be given to the global digital divide, ensuring that there is 
equal participation from all the countries in the world on a common platform if the 
objectives of democracy could be achieved in the governance of the internet. 
However, one sure thing is that the governance of the internet is not one that could 
be effectively nor efficiently be done when it is driven by the state. It is because of its 
antecedents in the private sector and the extent of its fluidity and anonymity 
tendencies. This fact is a further attestation to the argument of this thesis that the 21st 
century needs to explore new ways of global governance, and the role of NGOs in 
this process is central and in keeping with the realities of the 21st century. The issue of 
Internet governance is an aspect of globalization and needs international 
cooperation and regulation and harmonization of international legislation.184 Internet 
governance has a global dimension characterized by multiple territorial links. Given 
the fact that the Internet does not take into account national borders of States, it is 
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clear that issues caused by this phenomenon cannot be solved but by cooperation 
between States.185 
The construct of the internet is non-territorial. Therefore it is removed from the 
Westphalian construct of society. So any attempt for territorial governance will result 
in some anomaly.  
John Perry Barlow186wrote the following poem in 1996 –  
‘Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh and steel,  
I come from Cyberspace, the new home of mind.  
On behalf of the future, I ask you of the past to leave us alone[...]  
You have no sovereignty where we gather.[…] 
Governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed.  
You have neither solicited nor received ours. We did not invite you.  
You do not know us, nor do you know our world.  
Cyberspace does not lie within your borders.[…] 
Cyberspace consists of transactions, relationships, and thought itself, arrayed like a 
standing wave in the web of our communications.  
Ours is a world that is both everywhere and nowhere, but it is not where bodies live. 
Our identities have no bodies,  
So, unlike you, we cannot obtain order by physical coercion.  
We believe that from ethics, enlightened self-interest, and the commonwealth, our 
governance will emerge.  
Our identities may be distributed across many of your jurisdictions.’187 
3.2.3.2. The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) 
There have been several attempts to have a global coordination and policymaking 
framework evolve, which would ultimately govern the internet. Since the mid-90s, 
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there has been much work in reaching this objective. There have been several loci of 
activity: the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), the 
International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO), and the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS).188 
However, there has been hardly any consensus reached in arriving at a collective 
agreement. ICANN does perform technical coordination, but the organization did not 
win formal international recognition at the UN's WSIS.  
It is important to note that ICANN was established as a non-profit public corporation 
in 1998. Its creation was invoked by the US Department of Commerce during a public 
proceeding in 1997-1998 that invited international participation. ICANN was set up as 
a multistakeholder governance organization which operated outwith the public 
sector, even though it engaged some governmental input through its Governmental 
Advisory Committee (GAC). When the Clinton administration contemplated some 
policy framework for the internet and electronic commerce, the key stakeholders of 
the sector, including information technology executives at firms like IBM, MCI and AOL 
raised concerns about the likelihood of electronic commerce being undermined by 
widespread assertions of territorial jurisdiction.189 They were worried that state 
governments could impose on the naturally global arena of the Internet a patchwork 
of inconsistent or conflicting national laws and regulations.190  
To this end, the policy of the Clinton administration was to persuade governments to 
establish a predictable and straightforward legal environment based on a 
decentralized, contractual model of law rather than one based on top-down 
regulation. The non-state governing authority would enter into "private contracts" with 
industry stakeholders that would be global in scope, rather than subject themselves 
to a welter of different laws based on territorial jurisdictions.191 
The US nursed some concern with the creation of a charter for the regulation of the 
internet by governments. The concern was particularly with an internet charter that is 
driven by European leadership. This point is a cogent one to note concerning the US 
policy on the regulation of the internet. Therefore, the white paper from the US 
commerce department, which served as the founding document for the ICANN in 
                                                             






1998,192 deliberately avoided direct involvement of government. At the same time, it 
extended an invitation to the international community, but not the states, to be 
engaged with the governance of the internet. In so doing, it delegated its authority 
to a new not-for-profit corporation formed by the private sector Internet stakeholders 
to administer policy for the internet name and address system.193 As a result, the ICANN 
regime was a governance regime steered primarily by NGOs with some participation 
from the US government.  
The US policy attracted some criticism, in that the US government willingly delegated 
its authority for the regulation of the internet to a non-governmental organisation. 
However, it retained its authority acting as a contractor to ICANN and also asserting 
"policy authority" over the domain name system's root, reserving to itself the right to 
review and approve any changes to the root zone file proposed by ICANN. This US 
indirect control was initially premised on the impression that its authority would be 
temporary. However, it later retracted that position and retained its unilateral authority 
over the DNS root. 
Hence, during the first WSIS summit,  the governments of South Africa, China, and 
Brazil, backed by several other developing countries and the ITU,  expressed their 
concerns with the regulation of the Internet as being entirely within the remit of ICANN 
and by extension the United States. There was an evident dissatisfaction on the fact 
that a non-governmental organisation could make global public policy 
independently from national governments or even international agreements. At this 
summit, there was a clash between two groups. On the one hand, there were the 
dissatisfied nations alongside the ITU. They were for that traditional international 
model, which involved a multilateral decision by national sovereigns to confirm or 
amend the existing arrangements. On the other hand, there were the private sector 
and supporters of the ICANN, the Internet Society and the US government. They 
downplayed the very need for any "governance of the Internet". They claimed that 
the existing patchwork quilt of governance arrangements affecting the Internet -
extending across ICANN, WIPO treaties, the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and 
ITU standards, and other conventions-was fundamentally sound. Hence, there was no 
need for the existing NGO-driven model of governance to be tinkered with, following 
the principle – if it is not broken, then there is no need to fix it. Notably, the very entity 
– NGO is a creation of the laws of a state. There is the argument that If the rein of 
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NGOs were independent of the control of the state, then NGOs will simply be an 
opportunity for rich and powerful states to take over, albeit indirectly, and run the 
‘global economy’. This is certainly a possibility, hence the need for a framework that 
legitimises their role. Legitimising their role is essential because with legitimacy comes 
the requisite checks and balance.  
3.2.3.3. Governing the internet 
The governance of the internet does not fall exclusively within the remit of one 
particular section of the international community. Indeed, governments have realised 
that it is not possible to approach the governance of the internet in the same way 
that they approached other matters which are primarily territorial. Internet 
governance consists of intentional decisions made by the collectivity of the Internet 
community.  
The internet community consists of the owners, operators, and users of the networks 
and interconnection protocols, et cetera. An insight into the workings of decision 
making on internetworking processes will broaden the horizon of one's approach to 
internet governance.  
Governments will, of course, also play a critical and probably decisive role in the 
governance of the internet, which is one of the world's most vital global services. 
However, it has been said that policymakers need to take one step back if they hope 
to take more steps forward. There should be a paradigm shift concerning 
governance. One that moves away from the exclusive control of government to a 
more inclusive approach. One that recognises and legitimises the role of the non-
governmental organisation in the function of the internet. One of the foremost 
governers of the internet remains the ICANN - a non-profit organisation, which could 
also be referred to as an NGO. 
3.3. The Impact of Globalisation and a question of the ‘Fitness-for-Purpose’ of 
the Westphalian international legal framework 
There is some academic commentary on the concepts of sovereignty and 
globalisation.194 A paradigm shift in the way sovereignty is perceived is 
fundamental to the core of this thesis. It seeks to lead an analysis that reveals the 
reconceptualisation of international law as fundamental to a complete 
perception of the notion of sovereignty. A conception of sovereignty which 
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acknowledges the act of voluntarily subjecting oneself to the order of another is 
not an abdication of sovereignty. Rather it is an expression of sovereign will in its 
full essence. It is counter-intuitive to consider the latter act of being subject to 
another as a taint on sovereignty, without first considering the former act of 
voluntarily making that decision to further one’s interests. Hence sovereignty and 
globalisation can indeed work hand in hand when considered in its fullness and 
completeness.  
 
3.3.1. Interdependence: An added case for the reconceptualisation 
Unfortunately, both concepts – sovereignty and globalisation, are prone to 
polarised controversy across many quarters. This discussion and the polarisation 
became increased in recent times. The core reason for it becoming prevalent 
lately has been the increasing meshing of the international community into one 
global village and the mixed bagged outcomes. As a result, national boundaries 
have been blurred. Many citizens have more than one nationality. There has been 
an emergence of digital stateless currencies such as the bitcoin, which exist 
beyond traditional state boundaries. People’s financial behaviour is a good 
barometer for social trend. If people are tending towards stateless currencies, then 
there is an argument that the global society is willing to live by a new concept of 
international law that traverses the states. Attah holds the view that with the 
invention of Bitcoin and the proliferation of other cryptocurrencies, the unrestricted 
interaction of economies and complete financial inclusion is a possibility for the 
entire world.195  Also, the cost and time for transportation and communication 
have been grossly reduced. Economic turmoil in one state engulfs the immediate 
region or even the globe. Security has become more than the concern of a single 
state but more global concern. Ultimately, interdependence has come to the 
forefront of the daily lives of members of the international community; whether 
individuals, corporate persons or states. The consequence of the 
interdependence outlook of the international community is that across various 
sectors of the international community, the kind of issues that arise are such that 
cannot be sufficiently dealt with by a single nation-state. The issues arising from a 
predominantly interdependent outlook require the concerted joint effort of various 
members of the international community.  
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Essentially, interdependence breeds interdependence. Non-governmental 
organisations are significant arbiters of interdependence or some institutionalised 
‘coordination’ mechanism.196 Expectedly, this reality is at variance with the ageing 
Westphalian model of sovereignty, which is perceived to be primarily about the 
exclusivity of the sovereign state and is at odds with the concept of globalisation. 
As has been pointed out, the concept of globalisation hinders the ease with which, 
states hitherto could control their borders. Today, it is in the interest of states to 
trade the sanctity and rigidity of the concept of sovereignty and its territorial 
restrictions for the benefit of multi-lateral cooperation. There is a strain on the will 
and capacity of the sovereign states to exercise their sovereignty concerning 
control of their borders.  This strain exists regardless of whether it is physical borders 
or other impalpable borders, such as technological, environmental or financial 
borders.  
This global interdependence is the fulcrum of globalisation. The persuasion of 
globalisation is that it is in the interest of states to allow the freedom of movement 
of various ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ assets or resources across state borders. This freedom 
comes at the expense of rigidity on the stance of traditional sovereignty and 
restriction on the borders. On the other hand, the dissuasion is that globalisation is 
the cumulation of a diverse mix, whether positive and negative, including – 
political, economic, social and cultural. It abridges the geographical and 
ideological distance while increasing the likelihood of access beyond traditional 
territorial boundaries, ultimately leading to an increased flow of goods, capital, 
people, ideas, and information.197 The argument is that the reality of it is more than 
just the increased notion of interdependence as discussed earlier, but rather the 
torrential increase of international flow of assets or resources, and ideologies 
largely defiant of traditional territorial boundaries. These are primarily driven by 
non-state actors who frequently straddle between the fields of home and host 
states, with the international space as their core playing field. The fact is that these 
actors are outwith the effective control of national governments. The import of all 
of these is that the flow across borders is not selective of just good assets or 
resources and ideologies but broadly includes negative assets or resources and 
ideologies.  
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Expectedly, therefore, it is observed that the same network that channels through 
it, significant investment capital between states can also transmit financial 
contagion leading to the global financial crisis. Similarly, the same network that 
channels through it, global infrastructural and industrial advancement and which 
holds the potential of alleviating poor regions out of poverty could also lead to 
inter-state environmental pollution. Such pollution could even creep to other states 
who are not immediate beneficiaries of such infrastructural development or 
industry production. The same world-wide-web that shrinks the distance between 
continents, facilitating commerce and exchange of information and ideas, could 
also be a medium for criminal enterprise. As has been seen in recent years, the 
web could influence political choices of individuals within states in the voting of 
their electoral candidates. The same scientific expertise that has advanced global 
medicine and provided a cure for some age-long infirmity is used to exterminate 
thousands for global citizens in the hands of terrorists. So, although there are many 
good offshoots of globalisation, there have been some significant negative 
offshoots of globalisation as well. The negatives include issues such as terrorist 
networks, global drug trade, trafficking in human beings, the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction, the spread of infectious diseases, and the 
destabilizing impact of rapid financial flows. 198 However, these negative 
challenges that are posed by globalisation are best resolved through the channels 
of interdependence and not by an exclusively state-centric disposition.  Some of 
the most significant and active agents of change and solution within these global 
channels of interdependence are NGOs.  
 
3.3.2. The NGOs and Interdependence 
The thrust of this thesis is legitimising the active role of NGOs in global engagement 
and shifting the paradigm on the concept of sovereignty. It buttresses the point of 
the reconceptualisation of international law. The integration of the global space 
and even the possibility of a single supranational supreme entity is increasingly 
becoming more plausible with the increasing influence of global non-state actors 
to the regionalisation of various international communities of states. Indeed, the 
Trump or Brexit dispensation of a rise in nationalist rhetoric has posed a significant 
challenge to this possibility. However, the global challenge to the evolution of a 




state-centric status quo to a more integrated global space is not by any stretch a 
victory for staying with the status quo. Instead, it has been argued that the contrary 
winds have only served to make the notion of a single supranational entity soar 
even higher. More regional pacts are being signed simultaneously with significant 
withdrawal from some significant regional pacts.  For example, the United 
Kingdom pulled out from the European Union in January 2020, while only less than 
a year earlier in May 2019, The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) was 
created by the African Continental Free Trade Agreement among 54 of the 55 
African Union nations. This trade pact is so far the largest trade pact since the WTO. 
The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa estimates that the agreement 
will boost intra-African trade by 52% by 2022199.  
Furthermore, Robert Howse argued that states had relinquished their influence and 
sense of control of global affairs to global markets.200 The principle of non-
interference in the affairs of a sovereign state is shaken by global instances of 
where actions taken in one state (especially when it is an act of state which is a 
global financial power), have a tremendous impact in the internal affairs of 
another state.  Today is a globalised world that is underpinned by a political-
economic theory of oneness, where one incident in one part of the world often 
has a significant economic impact in another part of the world. 
So, there is an increased need for the United Nations to wield its strength and 
relevance more to cater to the increasing oneness of the international community. 
To more effectively further its initiatives, particularly in the face of diverse global 
challenges, from poverty to global health concerns, from the extant need to 
maintain global peace, to the global war against terrorism, from the quest for the 
safeguarding of human rights and the equality of states to the curbing of the 
purification of nuclear weapons.  
In this mix, the role of non-governmental organisations is made more germane to 
the balancing out of the conflicting state’s interest with the overall global interests. 
It is more so because of the predominantly neutral nature of the NGOs, with their 
more apparent affiliation being to the causes that they pursue. The uniformity of 
the causes that these NGOs pursue are mostly the same globally, at least in 
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principle. Although, this may be debatable because at times the causes are 
conflicting with the interest of other NGOs with a different set of value system. A 
typical example is a conflict between NGOs on the issue of abortion. While the 
pro-choice and pro-life camps are on opposing ends, the principle of their causes 
is alike – the human rights of either the mother or the unborn child.  
However, amidst this increasing influence of NGOs on the global space, there is 
the convergence of sovereign states as well. However, this state’s harmonisation is 
facilitated by technology, trade and also the uniformity of causes. These causes 
include matters such as the protection and prosperity of her citizens. It also 
includes maintenance of peace and order within the states. However, states find 
that non-sates actors best foster their agenda, and in particular, NGOs.  Again, 
these increase the likelihood of a redefinition of the concept of sovereignty. A 
paradigm shift in the concept of sovereignty with more focus being placed on the 
cooperation of states and non-state actors, within their various regions and 
globally. A reconceptualisation of international law to a paradigm which 
encompasses the distilling of certain powers and responsibilities to non-state actors 
who are increasingly more in the frontline in tackling these global challenges. 
3.4. Chapter 3: Conclusion  
This chapter was undertaken to explore the deficits of the Westphalian concept of 
international law, evaluate the concept of sovereignty and its ensuing challenges. It 
embarked on a journey to objectively measure the impact of globalisation vis-à-vis 
the “fitness for purpose” of the Westphalian international legal framework for the 21st 
Century. In evaluating the concept of sovereignty, it establishes sovereignty as the 
possession of as supreme political authority and monopoly over the legitimate use of 
force within its territory. It depicts it as a concept that empowers the state to regulate 
movement across defined borders. It is also described as an attribute that behoves 
on the state the freedom and responsibility to make foreign policy choices which are 
acknowledged by other states. Finally, it shows sovereignty as a concept that serves 
as a deterrent to external interference by other states. 
Furthermore, it explored how these attributes of sovereignty have been supplanted 
by the myriad of factors of globalisation, with emphasis on only three. i.e. failed states, 
global health and the internet. In analysing the notion of failed states, it likened it to 
faulty sovereignty in that sovereignty is attenuated and plays out in crumbling 
infrastructure faltering utility supplies, unstable education and health facilities, the 
deteriorating human development indicators such as infant mortality and literacy 
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rate, and the barely functional government where the lawmakers, courts, civil service 
and the military lose their capacity and independence. It highlighted instances in 
Somalia, Afghanistan and Syria where the failure of state could be a breeding ground 
for extremism and lawlessness.201  These outcomes of a failed state have a devastating 
impact on other states; as a result, requires external intervention, thereby usurping the 
sovereignty of the failed state. The challenge with this positions is, at what point Is it 
okay for a foreign state to interfere—drawing from the position of the united nations 
which estimated that eight of the most expensive cases are of failing state in the 1990 
cost the international community over $250 billion202. Is there justification for earlier 
intervention before a state fails? The challenge with this approach is in trying to 
reconcile it with the sacredness of the traditional notion of sovereignty. Notably, the 
principle of non-interference is sacrosanct to the traditional notion of sovereignty. This 
dilemma feeds into the core of this thesis.  
In examining the notion of global health, it identifies the impact of global infectious 
diseases and their relativity to economic globalisation which plays out and includes 
connectivity and interdependence giving rise to transmission of diseases. It highlights 
the fact that the upshot of the infectious disease anywhere in the world would spread 
uncontrollable across national borders through the continuous movement of people 
and capital in the name of trade or pleasure. These instances highlight the 
inadequacies of sovereignty in that microbes do not respect internationally 
recognised borders.203 It acknowledges that the solution to global health threat relies 
extensively on international cooperation between states and non-state actors -
particularly NGOs. As pointed out, the majority of research carried out for the cure or 
prevention of this global health concern are primarily done by universities and NGOs. 
 However, the solution propounded by these non-state actors could only thrive if there 
is cooperation from the sovereign states. It acknowledges the irony of it in that the 
threat feeds off the impotence of state in controlling national boundaries. However, 
the solution relies on the potency of the sovereignty of the state in consenting to 
global cooperation and internal implementation of proposed solutions. So It reiterates 
the points of the thesis that sovereignty should not be done away with but should be 
reconceptualised in a way that it is ‘pooled’ together in the achievement for 21st-
century objectives. 
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About the internet, it emphasises the non-territorial attribute of the internet in a way 
that is completely removed from the contemplations of the Westphalian idea of 
international order. It revealed the increased traffic of human digital interaction which 
are intrinsically non-territorial, therefore creating a problem for governance. The 
internet has a global dimension characterised by multiple territorial links, and as a 
result, issues caused by this phenomenon cannot be solved but by cooperating 
between global states.204 It highlights the emergence of Internet Cooperation for 
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) as the multi-stakeholder governance 
organisation for the internet, which is essentially an NGO.  
These three factors of globalisation highlight interdependence as central to the 
effective operations of the international community. Moreover, NGOs are significant 
arbiters of interdependence. 
The preceding culminate into a call for a rethink of the concept of sovereignty. 
Ultimately, leading to a justifiable argument for a paradigm shift in the 
conceptualisation of international law. Along these lines, the next chapter engages 
in a forensic examination on the concept of sovereignty in order to appraise potential 
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4.1. Chapter 4: Introduction 
The findings of the preceding chapter call for a paradigm shift in the 
conceptualisation of international law. So, this chapter follows on and carefully 
reviews the idea of reconceptualisation. It explores the potential of 
reconceptualisation by evaluating the notion of sovereignty and its 
reconceptualisation.  
To achieve this objective, it examines the principles of subsidiarity and conferral to 
determine whether or not a delegation of sovereign powers will impede the integrity 
of the concept of sovereignty or facilitate an understanding of the concept in its full 
essence.   
Additionally, in examining the notion of subsidiarity and the ensuing delegation of 
sovereignty, it will explore the concepts of dissolution in Scotland and federalism in 
Germany. It seeks to extrapolate the workings of these concepts to the hypothesis of 
a reconceptualised international law. 
Furthermore, in a bid to critically appraise the notion of sovereignty in its full essence, 
it will investigate the multi-faceted nature of sovereignty in relation to the increasing 
influence of NGOs internationally. 
Finally, this chapter will critically examine the compelling principles of Jus cogens and 
the compelling case of Van Gend en Loos case. This principle and case will underpin 
the argument that even the traditional concept of sovereignty is not absolute due to 
its limitation in certain aspects of international law as a result of the principle of jus 
cogens. Moreover, further to the Van Gend en Loos case, non-state actors could be 
granted ‘subject status’ in international law as individuals were granted ‘subject 
status’ in European law. Thereby validating the crux of this thesis that international law 
could be reconceptualised in a way that takes into cognisance 21st-century global 
realities. In particular, attention should be given to the need to legitimise NGOs as 
subjects on the international plane. 
 
4.2. The concept of Sovereignty and the question of Reconceptualisation 
Given the realities of interdependence and the role of NGOs as discussed in the 
preceding chapter, it is the position of this thesis that state sovereignty has been 
strengthened rather than ceded. Some ‘realist’ hold the opinion that the state has 
and should continue to have the right to monopolise the exercise of power 
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concerning its territories and citizens. Moreover, this right of sovereignty, in their view, 
should deter foreign or international powers and authorities from intermeddling with 
the affairs of the state.205  Indeed, this is the case, and may very well be the case for 
decades to come.   
It is a common knowledge that the traditional Westphalian notion of sovereignty has 
made and continue to make essential and timeless contributions to the international 
community, particularly concerning its stability and peace. It is a concept that is, like 
a thread, deeply intertwined into the drapery of international law and is so germane 
to global existence. To suggest that it should be done away with would require a 
strong case for a substitute to fill the vacuum that such a proposition would create if 
considered and affirmed.   
However, this position does not adequately respond to the argument that sovereignty, 
in its traditional context, is not sufficiently fit for purpose in the 21st century. 
Nevertheless, the argument should be clear; the old Westphalian doctrine of 
sovereignty is of limited value but is undoubtedly of some indispensable value. The 
value of the concept is so fundamental to the fabric of the world order. Often, 
because of how embedded it is to the order of the global society, there is a tendency 
to undermine the pivotal role that the doctrine plays. Hence, one of the thrusts of this 
thesis is to disentangle the embeddedness of the concept to international law, in 
order to explore other ways the concept of sovereignty could be perceived in its full 
essence.  
At times the value of the concept of sovereignty could best be appreciated by first 
considering what was obtainable before the inception of the concept. Before the 
inception of the concept of sovereignty which endowed the states as the primary 
subject of international law in the 17th and 18th centuries, the power and authority in 
the international space were contested between empires, kingdoms, duchies and 
city-states. Additionally, there was a heavy influence of religious authority over secular 
authorities, which blurred the divide between religious and secular authority.206 
Hence, there were contentions between the Pope and the Kings over the same 
people and territory. It, with time, escalated and led to the wars of religion at the time 
of the Reformation.207 
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The Westphalian treaty of 1648 was a culmination of the long unending religious wars. 
The emergence of sovereignty was Europe’s response to the anarchy of the 
international space. It sought to bring a level of order to a disorderly international legal 
context, which was predominantly pluralistic.  It was a way to maintain an order that 
acknowledged the inherent rights of states to have exclusive jurisdiction within their 
territory. It guaranteed the political independence, and equality of states with their 
counterparts on the international plane. It preserved the state’s ability to determine 
their policy on their relations with other foreign nations. It ultimately meant that 
interference with the internal affairs of states was no longer condoned by the 
international community.208 
The occurrence of the Westphalian treaty of 1648 ultimately led to the stabilisation of 
Europe. Then the doctrine of sovereignty extended to most of the rest of the world, 
including China and Japan.209 It followed that the recognition of the sovereignty of a 
state by other states became fundamental to the attainment of statehood. This 
recognition was one of the underpinning factors of decolonisation activism after the 
Second World War.210 
Over the past three and a half centuries, sovereignty has been pivotal to the world 
order. So, there should be a general presumption in favour of respecting it.211  There is 
no gainsaying in establishing that the concept has been fundamental to the stability 
of the international community for centuries. It is the cornerstone of legal protection 
against the external intervention, the premise for negotiation of treaties, the catalyst 
for the formation of international inter-governmental organisations, and the prime 
facilitator for the development of international law.212  
Although sovereignty continues to be relevant even in the 21st century as essential for 
international peace and security, the arguments remain that it has faced its greatest 
challenge since its inception – Globalisation.  
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4.2.1. Reconceptualising Sovereignty – delegation of sovereign powers  
Given the rise in interdependence and the diverse ways, it poses a benefit as well as 
a challenge. The argument that the benefits of interdependence outweigh the 
challenges is highly contested and polarised. However, there is a higher chance of a 
consensus that interdependence is inevitable. As a result, it is prudent to 
conceptualise the world order in a way that effectively accommodates globalisation. 
The point is reiterated over and again that states are more inclined to cross-
collaboration on the international plane across various strata of the international 
order.  
States are collaborating with states, intergovernmental organisation, multinational 
corporations, and non-governmental organisations to deliver the state’s objectives 
and to further common interests. Thus, there is an increasing trend of voluntarily 
pooling and delegating sovereign powers horizontally and vertically in the fostering of 
multilateral cooperation. The more this is done, the more the demarcation between 
the national and international boundaries blurs, leading to an amalgamation of 
people, interests, culture, global markets, et cetera, making it inconvenient and 
unlikely for states to work in silos.  
The question that has been posed over time is whether states cede their sovereignty 
by collaboration internationally? This argument is valid because international 
integration across state boundaries certainly has its implication for the citizens of the 
states and the various institutions of the state. Inadvertently, most of the institution in 
the states find themselves accountable to international institutions. At times, citizens 
of the states could employ international law against certain positions of the state. An 
example of this is seen in the Van Gen den Loos case, which is discussed later in this 
chapter. 
An instance of sovereign states ‘ceding their sovereignty’ is the European Union. 
Given that Europe is the heart of the Westphalian peace treaty of 1648, it could be 
described as ironic that the EU is a prime example of its states’ subjection to a 
supranational government. A few decades ago, it was inconceivable that the mark, 
franc, lira would give up their local currency for the euro. Although, it should be 
pointed out that this is not in itself a novelty, as the transformation of Europe is 
reminiscent of the transition of the United States centuries ago from a loose collection 
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of states under the Articles of Confederation to a federal union under the US 
constitution.213  
Ceding sovereignty and international collaboration is also seen with the advent of the 
African Union (AU), well underway, since the turn of this century. It is no wonder that 
the Sirte Declaration of 1999214 in constituting the African Union, replaced the erstwhile 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU). It is helpful to point out the contrast between the 
1963 OAU and the 21st century AU. The former was premised on non-interference as a 
cornerstone. The latter is committed to advancing the respect for human rights and 
good governance, as well as establishing a mechanism to monitor the compliance of 
member states with these commitments.215 Of note here is that the latter favours more 
integration and interdependence than the former. 
The core reason for these regional amalgamations is that states are faced with new 
challenges. The difficulty arises in determining whether to trade off some elements of 
sovereignty to enhance their capacity to determine their future. Even the powerful 
states, like the United States, have confronted this dilemma and at times, have 
delegated their sovereignty to international institutions to further particular interests of 
the states, which may otherwise be impossible to advance.   
These global and regional occurrences further buttress the factual behaviour of 
sovereign states in response to the inadvertent need to be interdependent, seemingly 
at the expense of the concept of sovereignty. The question is whether the voluntary 
subjection of one state to another entity actually compromises the essence of 
sovereignty?  
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4.2.1.1. Understanding sovereignty & delegation: The similarity between the 
individual and the state 
The similarity should be drawn between the individual or the citizen and the state, 
particularly concerning the doctrine of sovereignty. The doctrine of sovereignty could 
best be described as the complete independence of the state, absoluteness of 
power and authority to determine its affairs within its territory and its foreign relations. 
It is the same with individuals or the citizen and their freedom in a free state. An adult 
individual or citizen of a free state has complete independence from the control of 
anybody and has absolute power and authority to determine his/her affairs. However, 
the individual may consider it in their interest to be subjected to some higher authority 
to maintain law and order in society. Alternatively, to be subject to another parallel 
authority in order to carry on a bilateral contract. It will be complete anarchy if such 
an individual, decides in the elation of his/her independence to be completely 
lawless. Essentially, the act of lawfulness is intrinsically a compromise of the absolute 
liberty of the individuals. The liberties are curbed to the extent that the citizen is free 
to do whatever he/she wishes to do as long as it is lawful. Though the individual may 
be free to drink, the ‘freedom’ is curbed when it comes to drinking and driving. Also, 
though the individual is free to contract, the ‘freedom’ is curbed as soon as the 
contract is reached. After the contract, the individual must abide by any obligation 
that arises out of the terms of such contract. Also, though an individual is free to marry 
whomever they wish, their ‘freedom’ is curbed when the marriage lawfully occurs. 
After a lawful marriage, the individual, in certain states, will not be allowed to break 
out of the marriage without the permission of the law, nor marry two wives/husbands 
at the same time. These choices are subject to another law, sometimes higher (as in 
drunk driving) and other times parallel (as in a contract). However, it does not 
necessarily mean that they curb the independence of the individual; it only curbs how 
that independence is expensed, in the interest of social order and progress.  
This process mirrors the laws of obligation, which are a construct of the social order of 
most societies. For example, in Scotland, the legal obligations are either arise ex 
voluntate or ex lege.216  The former refers to obligations that arise voluntarily with 
consent, and the latter refers to those obligations of which there is hardly the choice 
                                                             
216 William W McBryde, 'THE LAWS OF SCOTLAND: STAIR MEMORIAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA, VOL 15 Edinburgh: The Law Society 




to be obliged by it.217 However, they exist because of law, and citizens are simply 
compelled to fulfil such obligations by law.218 Thus, the restriction on drinking and 
driving arises under an ex lege obligation, to which a ‘sovereign’ citizen, i.e. a free 
and independent is obliged to observe and obey. However, it must be pointed out 
that even the ex lege obligations are also by the indirect choice of the sovereign 
people, reflected in the principle of the sovereignty of the parliament219; also referred 
to as the principle of popular sovereignty. It is a doctrine in political theory that 
government is created by and subject to the will of the people, i.e. the rule of the 
people. 220 So, the state and its government are empowered by the consent of its 
people. The consent of the people is reflected in their representatives in parliament. 
The classic social-contract theorists of the 17th and 18th centuries221 held that the 
state’s existence and powers are generally defined or circumscribed by, the rational 
agreement of its citizens, as represented in an actual or a hypothetical social contract 
among themselves or between themselves and a ruler.222  This concept is deeply 
entrenched in the history of the United States of America, and Benjamin Franklin 
described the concept as follows –  
"In free governments, the rulers are the servants and the people their 
superiors and sovereigns".223 
It is a principle that is also shared in almost any democratic nation. The principle is 
underpinned by the fact that the parliament epitomises the people - having been 
independently elected by the sovereign will of various constituents to represent their 
interests in the legislation of laws in the state.   
So, further to the ex lege obligations, the citizens are subject to the laws of the land. 
These laws emerge as a result of the consent of the citizens through their elected 
representatives.  
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Besides the ex lege obligations, there are other obligations, to which the ‘sovereign’ 
individual is subject. These obligations arise because of their choice to be bound by 
that obligation in a contract with another individual. So unlike the social contract just 
discussed from which ex lege obligations arise, there are personal contracts in which 
an individual might be engaged. These kinds of contracts give rise to ex voluntate 
obligations. After contracting voluntarily, the parties lose their freedom to undermine 
their duties under the terms of that obligation. For example, a contract to sell a car to 
another party gives rise to ex voluntate obligation. Once validly concluded, the 
contract robs the seller of the freedom to use the car at will in exchange for some 
agreed consideration. However, the ‘sovereignty’ of the seller is not impeded in any 
way. Also, the buyer is constrained from driving the car from the dealers without first 
having obtained the statutory third party insurance. It is because both parties have 
delegated their powers to other powers. Firstly, to the law of the contract or and 
secondly to the law of the land. So, the delegation of powers can put the delegator 
of such powers, under some sort of subjection and yet still retain their sovereign will 
and independence. 
The argument for reconceptualising international law is similar to the situation of the 
individual. When sovereign powers are delegated by a state, the delegate subjects 
the delegator to the extent of the mandate. However, it should not be perceived as 
a compromise of the sovereignty of the delegator. It is merely a subjection to the rule 
of law and not that of another entity.  The international order should reflect the realities 
of these domestic social orders. When states serve the interest of the international 
order, their subjection to an international social contract should not adulterate the 
essence of the sovereignty of the state, in the same way as the sovereignty of an 
individual is not tainted by being subject to various obligations, whether horizontally 
or vertically.  
Hence, the concept of sovereignty should be reconceptualised to incorporate in its 
meaning the value of an international social contract. This social contract theory 
accentuates the concept of power and sovereignty in a way that underscored the 
multifaceted way the concept of sovereignty should be interpreted; with the most 
important attribute of sovereignty being the element of consent or the freedom to 
choose. The states, empowered by sovereignty, have the powers to choose to 
delegate, where appropriate, some of their sovereignty to alternative entities in the 
international plane. These decisions to delegate are often reached to meet the needs 
of the state and the global community at large. It does not suggest that the unit 
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delegating loses control. Instead, the delegating unit expends its control by 
consenting and making that choice to delegate. Then, the unit engages restraint of 
continued control and abides by the respect for the rule of law.  
4.3. Delegation of Sovereignty: The principles of Subsidiarity and Conferral, 
Federalism and Devolution 
This act of delegation or conferral of certain sovereign powers to an international 
subsidiary goes to the root of what sovereignty is in its essence - the choice to 
determine governance. Instances of this have been seen in the EU and the inception 
of the principle of subsidiarity and conferral. Other examples of these delegations of 
power include legal systems that operation federalism, or states where the central 
government devolves power to the subunits of the states. These concepts will be 
explored to illustrate ways by which they could be extrapolated to fit the argument of 
the reconceptualisation of sovereignty in the light of delegating sovereignty. 
4.3.1. Principle of Subsidiary and the Principle of Conferral 
Essentially, the principle of ‘subsidiarity’ which is applicable mainly in the EU is an 
example of the delegation of sovereignty. The principle of subsidiarity suggests that 
the central authority should perform only those activities that cannot be performed 
at a more local level. In trying to reconcile this principle with the concept of 
sovereignty and state, it is noteworthy that the principle of subsidiarity primarily serves 
the purpose of complementing the notion of sovereignty rather than substituting it. 
This principle does not adversely affect the essence of the sovereignty of the state 
that is conferring, delegating or allocating authority downwards. Instead, it facilitates 
the understanding of the concept of sovereignty in its completeness. The principle of 
subsidiarity will be considered in general terms and primarily to draw similarities. It is 
acknowledged that the principle may not be identical to the core theme of this thesis, 
but it is relevant enough to make certain inferences as to its similarities.  
Professor Daniel Halberstam described the principle of subsidiarity as follows-   
“the central government should play only a supporting role in governance, 
acting only if the constituent units of government are incapable of acting 
on their own.   The word itself is related to the idea of assistance, as in 
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subsidy, ‘and is derived from the Latin subsidium‘, which referred to auxiliary 
troops in the Roman military.”224  
The principle of subsidiarity goes as far back as classical Greece. Then it is later taken 
up by Thomas Aquinas and medieval scholasticism. Subsequent talk on the principle 
can be found in the thoughts of political actors and theorists as varied as 
Montesquieu, Locke, Tocqueville, Lincoln, and Proudhon.225 
In modern Europe, the principle of subsidiarity came slightly into the narrative and 
political thought due to the Catholic teachings in the 1930s. They primarily focused on 
the importance of the individual as a rights bearer in an era of fascism and 
communism.226  The papal encyclical Quadragesimo Anno (1931) provided:  
“Just as it is gravely wrong to take from individuals what they can 
accomplish by their own initiative and industry and give it to the 
community, so also it is an injustice, and at the same time, a great evil and 
disturbance of right order to assign to a greater and higher association 
what lesser and subordinate organizations can do.  For every social 
activity ought of its very nature to furnish help to the members of the body 
social, and never destroy and absorb them.”227 
The Catholic Church’s sentiments on subsidiarity as shown in its Catechism had been 
that a community of a higher order should not interfere in the internal life of a 
community of a lower order. The communities closer to the constituents should not be 
deprived of their functions.228  It states as follows – 
‘Excessive intervention by the state can threaten personal freedom and 
initiative. the teaching of the Church has elaborated the principle of 
subsidiarity, according to which "a community of a higher order should not 
interfere in the internal life of a community of a lower order, depriving the 
latter of its functions, but rather should support it in case of need and help 
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to coordinate its activity with the activities of the rest of society, always 
with a view to the common good.”’229 
Notably, the principle of subsidiarity has been subject to diverse connotations. 
Recently, it has mostly been known for its existence within the European Union. It is 
provided under the (Treaty on European Union (TEU)) 1992 & 2007 - Maastricht Treaty 
and the amended version which came into force in 2009 – the Lisbon Treaty 2007. 
These provided for the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. 
It is designed to serve the purpose of creating a closer union among the peoples of 
Europe. So, decisions are to be taken as closely as possible to the citizen per the 
principle of subsidiarity.230  The focal point of the principle of subsidiarity is primarily to 
encourage a level of participation in governance by the local authority under the 
central government.231  The principle, generally speaking, stands for the proposition 
that governmental functions should be allocated downwards, hierarchically, to those 
that are most proximate to the concerned constituents.  
On the other hand, there is the principle of conferral.  It is provided for under the 
provisions of Article 5(2) of the Treaty on the European Union. It stipulates that the 
Union shall act only within the limits of the competences conferred upon it by the 
member states in the Treaties (Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union(TFEU)232) to attain the objectives set out therein. 
The import of this suggests that the supranational institution has no overriding powers 
over the member states except those conferred upon it by the member states. It 
implies that the sovereignty of the member states remains sacrosanct even though 
practically it appears that they are subject to some supranational institution. Such 
subjection has been entered into voluntarily, and competences not conferred upon 
the Union in the Treaties remain with the member states because the European Union 
cannot exercise competencies by right.   
The preceding reiterates the point that the delegator does not lose control. Instead, 
the delegator simply expends its control by making that choice to delegate. After 
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that, the delegator engages restraint of continued control and respect for the rule of 
law. Also, the delegate upon whom control is voluntarily conferred exercises such 
control only within the remits of the conferral of such control.  
It should be pointed out that the principle of subsidiarity has been criticised by some 
scholars and politicians as being no more than a mirage. Philippe Kiiver referred to it 
as having no more value than a sugar coat of a bitter pill. He stated as follows –  
“[…] we know that sugar coatings must under no circumstances interfere 
with the chemical properties of the prescribed substance itself: it is just to 
facilitate intake, not to change the composition of the pill proper.” 233 
In essence, the principle of subsidiarity, in general terms, does not change where the 
power actually lies. As pointed out earlier, the presence of these principles does not 
negatively impact on the essence of the sovereignty of the state in questions, whose 
authority has been conferred, delegated or allocated downwards. Instead, in the 
estimation of this thesis, it enhances the notion of sovereignty in the completeness of 
its essence. Therefore, the reconceptualisation of international law should consider this 
principle in shifting the paradigm in the understanding of the concept of sovereignty.  
Therefore, one of the key ways that the concept of sovereignty could be appreciated 
in its completeness is extending its meaning to include the power to delegate it. In the 
21st century, this is even more pertinent, as the concept will take on more relevant 
meaning for the international community if states, by it, empower relevant actors in 
various industries. For instance, empowering NGOs internationally by voluntarily 
delegating powers by the sovereign state. Along this line, it is noteworthy that some of 
the critical global causes across various sectors are fostered by NGOs. Most political 
and social positions held in various sectors of the international polity such as the 
economic sector and the societal value systems are influenced or fostered by the civil 
society's position on the environment and human rights, et cetera. These are some of 
the poignant examples of the allocation of sovereign power from the states to 
international organisations. Some of these international organisations and their 
activities are driven by international NGOs and their activities. These are some of the 
ways that the concept of sovereignty could be reconceptualised to incorporate 
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within its meanings the current global realities, which at times, require the effective 
delegation of their sovereignty. 
4.3.2. Devolution & Federalism  
It is noteworthy that of the G20 countries which have the most influential economies 
in the world, about 12 of them have a federal constitutional structure and the others 
are practising some level of federalism and the devolution of power. The first group 
includes the United States, the European Union, India, Germany, Brazil, Argentina, 
Canada, Indonesia, Australia, Russia, Mexico, and South Africa.234 The latter group 
includes the United Kingdom, Spain, Belgium, Italy, and Japan. Of the ten countries 
with the highest GDPs in the world, only two – China and France – lack any semblance 
of a federal structure.235  
Furthermore, of the world‘s ten most populous countries, eight have federal or 
devolutionary structures – every country except for China and Bangladesh. Also, the 
only top ten countries by territorial size to lack a federal structure are China and 
Sudan, which recently experienced a secession. The major countries in the world have 
some federal structure except China and France (a member state of the European 
Union).236  
On the other hand, states worldwide are being persuaded to align themselves to 
some international entity or international pact the other. Examples of these include 
entities like the EU, AU NAFTA or the upcoming USMCA, GATT, NATO, the WTO and 
other regional entities. Hence, it is found that the EU member states have to some 
extent surrendered power to the confederal supranational body concerning matters 
like trade, commerce, and even the control of their border with respects to the 
movement of persons, capital and goods237.  
While this is going on from the top, there is the increasing pressure facing these same 
countries to devolve power to their national subunits. Hence, there are examples such 
as the UK, although having left the EU in January 2020, it had devolved power to 
Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland some decades earlier. Also, Spain has 
devolved power to Catalonia and the Basque region.  Belgium has devolved most of 
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its power to ethnic subunits in Flanders, Wallonia, and Brussels.238 In North America, 
Canada has surrendered some economic power to NAFTA – a transnational free 
trade association – while surrendering other powers to the increasing assertive 
province of Quebec.239  In September 2018, the United States, Mexico, and Canada 
reached an agreement to replace NAFTA with the United States–Mexico–Canada 
Agreement (USMCA). NAFTA will remain in force, pending the ratification of the 
USMCA.240 
We find that in recent times, there is the strain on states to delegate their sovereign 
powers both upwards and downwards.  
 
4.3.2.1. Federalism & Devolution Distinguished. Which is a better fit for 
Reconceptualisation? 
Theoretically, devolution differs from federalism in that the devolved powers of the 
subnational authority are political decisions premised on the choice of the central 
government. Devolution powers might be temporary and are reversible as they 
ultimately reside with the central government. Thus, the state remains de jure unitary. 
While, under federalism, the subunits have their autonomy as of right, as provided by 
the constitution. The subunits have a lower degree of protection under devolution 
than under federalism. It has been argued that federalism is much more effective than 
devolution because political liberty is enhanced if power is constitutionally 
fragmented rather than being merely decentralized at the grace of a national 
government.241 
4.3.2.2. Devolution and Federalism at work 
4.3.2.2.1. Devolution in Scotland 
An example of these two systems at work will be what is obtainable in the UK, 
particularly Scotland, and what is obtainable in Germany. In November 1998, the UK 
Parliament in Westminster passed the Scotland Act, which established the Scottish 
Parliament, and devolved certain powers to Scotland. It was the first time since the 
early 18th century that the people of Scotland were to be exclusively represented and 
be able to hold their representatives to account. The last Scottish parliament was 
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dissolved following the Acts of Union in 1707. However, the devolved powers of the 
current Scottish parliament are extant only to the extent that the parliament continues 
to enjoy the good graces of the UK parliament. It is so because the Sottish Parliament 
is existent under the Scotland Act of 1998. The Act could be abolished by the UK 
parliament, and as a result, the parliament will cease to exist.  
Essentially, the Scottish Parliament is established through a general devolution of 
powers subject to express exceptions.  The exceptions referred to are areas of law 
which have been specifically reserved for Westminster Parliament, and they include 
matters like a particular foreign policy, defence, constitutional law as well as 
citizenship and immigration law.242 Generally speaking, the legislative authority of the 
Scottish parliament which extends to a broad range of matters which may be similar 
to that of the German Länder243. However, the noticeable difference is that the UK 
has not been changed into a federal system due to the devolution and the various 
nations of the United Kingdom are not states; unlike the German Länder which, as a 
subunit is a state operating a federal system.  
In the UK, the understanding is that the Scotland Act of 1998 is an act of the UK 
Parliament. To that extent, the UK Parliament could repeal the Scotland Act, or even 
legislate on matters which are within the powers devolved to the Scottish parliament. 
In other words, the Scotland Act 1998 has not in any way impacted on the sovereignty 
of the UK Parliament. However, section 28 (7) and (8) of the Scotland Act 1998 
provides that  
‘This section does not affect the power of the Parliament of the United 
Kingdom to make laws for Scotland. But it is recognised that the 
Parliament of the United Kingdom will not normally legislate with 
regard to devolved matters without the consent of the Scottish 
Parliament’244 
It is noteworthy to mention that section 28(8) is a more recent addition, which was 
made pursuant to the Scotland Act 2016.245 The Scotland Act 2016 was an outcome 
of a compromise between the ‘NO’ campaign of the Scottish Independence 
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Referendum in 2014 and the then Prime Minister of the United Kingdom – David 
Cameron.  
Before the provisions of the Scotland Act of 2016, the devolution of powers to the 
Scottish Parliament led to the possibility that both houses in Edinburgh and London 
may seek to promote legislation on the same topic. This possibility was recognised 
earlier, and there was a consensus from both governments in an accord named after 
Lord Sewel. Under this accord, the UK government pledged that it would not seek the 
passage of legislation at Westminster on matters which have been devolved to the 
Scottish Parliament without the consent of the Parliament.246  
This consent is obtained through a motion called the Sewel motion, and it requires the 
Scottish Executive to submit to the Scottish parliament for a vote which effectively 
invites the Westminster Parliament to impinge on the Scottish Parliament 
competences. There are some reasons why this is done, and they include –  
 occasions when it makes sense to legislate on a UK-wide basis;  
 where there may be a suitable legislative vehicle available at Westminster 
which would save legislative time in the Scottish Parliament;  
 where legislating at Westminster could be an appropriate means of dealing 
with issues which straddle both devolved and reserved matters;  
 where it would be helpful to make minor and technical changes in devolved 
areas, for the effective operation of legislation in non-devolved areas;  
 where an operational role is proposed for Scottish ministers in reserved.247  
The fact about the Sewel motion and devolution as a whole is that while the central 
government approaches its policy from the standpoint of preserving political stability, 
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the subunit approaches it as a progressive step in reaching the ultimate aim of 
independence.248 
The Scottish government progressed with the devolution, and it culminated with the 
independence referendum in 2014, which then led to the establishment of the 
Scotland Act 2016. It is noteworthy that Section 1 of the Scotland Act 2016 provides 
that the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Government are a permanent part of 
the United Kingdom’s constitutional arrangements. Although it is said that the UK has 
no written constitution, it is trite knowledge that the constitution of the United Kingdom 
is spread over different legislation, such as the Bill of Rights 1689249, and the Scotland 
Act 1998 et cetera. The provision of the Scotland Act 2016 indicated the commitment 
of the parliament and the government of the United Kingdom to the Scottish 
Parliament and the Scottish government. This commitment was made in somewhat of 
a constitutional document.250 By an act of the UK Parliament, it curbed its extent of 
sovereignty by taking away the powers of the parliament to abolish the Scottish 
parliament or government by repealing the 1998 Act or the 2016 Act. The way the 
Scottish Parliament could be abolished was based on a decision of the people of 
Scotland voting in a referendum.   
However, reconciling the provision of the Scotland Act 2016 with the principle of 
parliamentary sovereignty, the question that arises is which law of the parliament is 
sovereign? Is it all laws of the parliaments, including the past laws that are sovereign? 
Or is it the new and current law of the parliament? If the current law is sovereign, then 
the Scottish government could still be abolished by a new act of a current UK 
parliament, as old acts do not take precedence over new acts of parliament.  Dicey, 
one of the leading constitutional experts on the UK constitution (although writing in 
the 19th century) contends that the doctrine of UK parliamentary sovereignty means 
parliament has unlimited legal power. Dicey's definition of parliamentary sovereignty 
was that  
‘the principle of parliamentary sovereignty means neither more nor less 
than this; namely, that parliament has the right to make or unmake any law 
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whatever; and, further, that no person or body is recognised by the law as 
having a right to override or set aside the legislation of parliament’.251   
Additionally, the case of Ellen Street Estates Ltd v Minister of Health252  supports this 
position that no Acts can be entrenched and protected from repeal. It stated that 
the position of the constitutional position is that Parliament can alter an Act previously 
passed, and it can do so by repealing the previous Act, or by enacting a provision 
which is inconsistent with the previous Act. Scrutton L.J. referred to the academic 
discussion of previous cases in which Parliament had enacted a provision which was 
inconsistent with a previous provision, without using the word “repeal.” Maugham L.J. 
added that the constitution does not permit Parliament to bind itself as to the form of 
subsequent legislation.253Whether it is politically viable that the parliament can indeed 
abolish the Scottish parliament by repealing the Scotland Act 1998 and 2016 is 
another question altogether.  
The point which this thesis seeks to make from the preceding paragraphs is to reiterate 
the position that while sovereignty could be distilled or delegated to other subunits, 
under the principle of devolution or subsidiarity, its essence can stay intact with the 
original custodian of that sovereignty. So, while the UK Parliament has distilled element 
of its sovereignty to the Scottish government, due to the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty, it is still empowered with sovereignty in its full essence. It also legally retains 
its power to recall powers devolved to the Scottish Parliament. Understandably, this 
may not be a political possibility, and its legality could be highly contested due to the 
provisions of Section 1 of the Scotland Act 2016. 
 
4.3.2.2.2. Federalism in Germany 
With federalism, on the other hand, a federal system requires that the competences 
of the various levels of government be balanced in such a way that the nation as a 
whole and the constituent states remain viable and complement each other. The 
Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany 1949 (Last amended 2019), which is 
the German constitution, makes explicit provisions for this. According to Article 70, the 
Länder254 retain legislative authority, provided that the Basic Law has not reserved this 
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legislative authority to the federal government.255 A legal situation comparable to 
Scotland, in which both the federal legislature and the individual state legislatures 
may pass acts regulating the same matters, does exist under the concurrent legislative 
authority. Article 71 of the Basic Law states that the division of authority between the 
Federation and the Länder shall be governed by the provisions of this Basic Law 
concerning exclusive and concurrent legislative powers.   
Matters which are reserved under the exclusive legislative power cannot be legislated 
by the Länder, except when and to the extent that they have been expressly 
authorised. Concerning the matters where the concurrent legislative powers exist, 
Article 71(1) of the Basic Law states that the Länder shall have the power to legislate 
so long as and to the extent that the Federation has not exercised its legislative power 
by enacting a law. However, subsection 2 suggest that the federal government shall 
only legislate on these matters only when it is necessary to ensure comparable living 
conditions throughout the national territory or to preserve legal and economic unity 
in the interest of the nation as a whole.256  
Although the matters reserved for the federal government as provided in Article 73 of 
the Basic Law far outweighs those that are devolved or for which concurrent 
jurisdiction is enjoyed as provided for in Article 74 of the Basic Law, the Länder have a 
broad scope for its independent legislation. The federal government gives the Länder 
sufficient participatory rights which are protected under Article 79 (3) of the Basic Law, 
concerning the legislative function of the Länder as provided for in Articles 50 and 77 
of the Basic Law. As a result, the federal legislature should obtain the consent of the 
Bundesrat, or Federal Council (of which the Länder is a part of under Article 50 of the 
Basic Law) before it passes legislation on some issues. Some of which include Article 
84(1), 87(3) 105(3) of the Basic Law. Should the Federal Council withhold its consent to 
a bill on such a matter, the Federal Parliament cannot then enact it (no matter the 
level of support for it within the Federal Parliament).257 
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4.4. Criticism of the principles behind Subsidiarity and Conferral, Federalism and 
Devolution 
There is the criticism that the distilling of sovereign power downwards could lead to 
the creation of rogue powers closer to the constituents which could ultimately lead to 
a rebellion or a divergence from the initial objective of the arrangement. Further to 
the previous discussion, some other examples include the rebellion of the US against 
England in the eighteenth century. Another is the decolonisation of most of Africa. 
These instances exist, to a great extent, because of the closeness of power to the 
constituents. Two questions come to bear in this situation –  
Firstly, whether or not it is good that the ultimate decisions made are those that are 
actually needed by the constituents and not those merely handed down by sovereign 
power. Secondly, whether the proposed distilling of power has to be done only 
downward? Concerning the first question, one can hold the view that it reflects the 
true principles of democracy, where the wish of the people ought to be given more 
credence. Concerning the second question, although the principle of subsidiarity 
suggests an allocation of power downward, the context in which this thesis suggests 
this principle here opens up the option for allocation of powers horizontally and 
vertically. 
As mentioned earlier, the principle of subsidiarity prescribes that the making of law 
should be as close to the constituents as possible. It ultimately leads to less intrusion 
from the government at centre or top of the ladder and more ownership at the 
grassroots of each constituency. It is preferred to a situation where leadership only 
emanates from the centre. Where leadership is centre-driven, it ultimately leads to a 
disconnect between the formulation of the laws and the realities on the ground. Those 
at the centre of government are removed from the pinch of the people at the bottom 
of the ladder. 
In a federal system of government, the local governments, being closer to the 
grassroots, tend to be more relatable and in touch with the individual citizens of their 
localities than their counter-parts up the ladder in the federal government.  
As mentioned earlier, it could be held that the principle of subsidiarity, federalism and 
devolution are similar, although not identical, in their essence. However, another 
challenge with these concepts is that the local government are not always as efficient 
as theoretically suggested.  There have been arguments that the divergent, and at 
times, petty, views and disagreement within smaller units are harder to manage than 
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that of larger regions.258 It becomes apparent where the divergence of views is 
between the locals in the local government and the political stance of the federal 
government. As a result, there is an intrusion into the prerogative of one or the other. 
It often leads to a policy quagmire, where political will plays a significant role. Thus, to 
that extent, it could be simplistic to suggest that local control is simply preferable to a 
unitary system-based control, or the control of the central government in a federal 
system.259 
A case in point is with the state of California in the United States. There was incessant 
defiance of the policy on immigration from the Federal Government of the United 
States. Governor Jerry Brown signed a bill, California Sanctuary Law SB54, on the 5th of 
October, 2017. The law makes California a "sanctuary state", barring local and state 
agencies from cooperating with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 
regarding illegal migrants in California.260 Although, the powers to regulate on a 
subject matter as immigration and naturalisation were exclusively reserved for the 
federal government, the Trump policy was at odds with the reality of the state of 
California, being home to at least 2.3 million illegal immigrants. A policy quagmire was 
therefore reached when the said bill was approved by the Governor, and the 
California Attorney General Xavier Becerra has threatened to prosecute California 
employers who cooperate with federal immigration authorities conducting 
enforcement sweeps. There was a myriad of suits between the locals, the local 
government and the federal government, even though there is a supremacy clause 
in the US constitution which renders any inconsistent state laws a nullity and should 
have no legal effect.261  
The critics of the principle of subsidiarity, have argued that risks abound if the locals at 
the grassroots are allowed to function as their own fiefdom. Critics say that it will 
inevitably lead to some level of anarchy. Consequently, local factions could be 
incentivised to impair local governments for the benefit of their self-interests. Their 
interests could be economical, political or ideological.262 
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Hence, it is imperative, if local control should be palatable, then there must be 
measures that ensure its consistency, fairness, justice, inclusion and efficiency. 
4.5. The relevance of these concepts: Subsidiarity, Federalism & Devolution 
The preceding criticisms suggest that neither of these concepts – subsidiarity, 
federalism, or devolution is infallible. They all have their shortcomings. However, they 
are generally preferred to the absolute centralisation of power. Hence, they could be 
used as a model for a reconceptualisation of international law by fostering a 
paradigm shift in the way sovereignty is perceived. The three terms- subsidiarity, 
federalism or devolution, though might be significantly distinct, are quite similar, and 
all need the active participation of government, at different levels to thrive. Perhaps, 
it is one of the reasons for their shortcomings.    
Federalism and subsidiarity deal with a fundamental question that arises from 
democracy. The question is, although it is generally accepted that democracy is the 
rule of the people, the question is from which demo or territorial unit of the people 
can the ‘rule’ emerge? What will be the best representative of the people? Is it the 
government representative of the people or is it merely the people and the entities 
that arise from the people.  
This question points out the significant role of the NGOs in this process which is yet to 
be fully appreciated. For example, people are persuaded to pay taxes to the 
government in order to have a society run well. NGOs, on the other hand, are also 
sponsored by the people, only that the people voluntarily make donations to causes 
that they consider important. The leadership or the representative element of the 
NGOs are not elected like the state and its government parastatal. Instead, the NGOs 
are simply voluntarily endorsed by the people. It gives a little more credibility to the 
representative capacity of the NGOs.  
As pointed out earlier, the principle of subsidiarity requires that matters should be 
decided at the lowest or least centralized competent level of government. It 
emanates from the position that individual rights exist as a matter of natural law. Rights 
belong naturally to only individuals. So, if social entities should legislate, they should 
do so only to the extent that individuals or smaller social units lack competence.  
Going back to the modern roots of subsidiarity; consideration should be given to the 
views of the papal encyclical Quadragesimo Anno (1931) which says  
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‘it is an injustice, and at the same time a great evil and disturbance of right 
order to assign to a greater and higher association what lesser and 
subordinate organisations can do…For every social activity ought of its very 
nature to furnish help to the members of the body social, and never destroy 
and absorb them[…] therefore, those in power should be sure that the more 
perfectly a graduated order is kept among the various associations, in 
observance of the principle of ―subsidiary function,‖ the stronger social 
authority and effectiveness will be the happier and more prosperous the 
condition of the State’.263 
The value of having significant state decisions made from as near the constituents as 
possible is noteworthy, and much in tune with the values of democracy. It could be 
argued that, if done well, could very well be looked at as democracy at its finest. It is 
observed that where the government of the state or an inter-governmental 
organisation is near enough its constituents, there is a lesser chance of the 
government or its representatives being out of touch with the realities on the ground. 
There is a higher chance that the government can better reflect the subtleties, 
necessary complexity, and detail embodied in its decisions in a way that most benefits 
those constituents.264  The NGOs are the closest to the constituents that they represent, 
and they exist primarily for the causes for which they were constituted. Also, there is a 
better chance that there will be more sense of ownership of any policy in question 
and as a result, more sense of accountability. To that end, the role of NGOs in the 
reconceptualisation of international law is certainly a valid argument to be carefully 
considered. It should be considered in the light of empowering the NGOs and 
legitimising their processes. Ways by which this empowerment could be done could 
be gleaned from the concepts of subsidiarity and federalism. Consideration of ways 
by which aspects of these concepts could be extrapolated to the international space 
to the end of empowering NGOs. 
4.6. Delegation of Sovereignty and the compelling force of Jus cogens 
Hence, it has been established that whether in the 19th, 20th or the 21st century, 
sovereignty has not quite been considered absolute. The reason is that where states 
act with impunity in contravention certain international norms which put at risk the 
safety and security of life and property or other nations, then the privileges of 
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sovereignty will be curtailed.  Jus cogens is a peremptory norm. A fundamental 
principle of international law that is accepted by the international community of 
states as a norm from which no derogation is permitted.265 
It is essential to bear in mind that this position of the extent to which sovereignty could 
be curtailed is also that of the traditional Westphalian concept of international law at 
its inception. Although the Westphalian concept of international law is hinged on the 
twin principles of sovereignty and territorial control, it also entertains the help of the 
international community via the UN and the Security Council, in ensuring that 
peremptory norms are observed. It further buttresses the point that a complete 
understanding of the concept of sovereignty will go beyond the mere enjoyment of 
territorial control and finality in decision making within the boundaries of a state. It will 
extend to the collaboration of the international community to stay prosperous, safe 
and maintain the order of the international community. It was for them, a collective 
effort to protect their sovereignty and the peace and order of the international 
community.  
There is a concern with the position that the United Nations is the vehicle by which this 
order is maintained, with the Security Council acting as the international law 
enforcement agency. The argument is that there is a democratic deficit in the way 
the UN is structured. The particular concern is with the structure of the Security Council. 
So, the question that comes to bear is who enforces the law against the international 
law enforcement agency? Who polices the international police? Are there sufficient 
checks in place? So, the role of the non-governmental organisations becomes very 
germane to the needed refurbishment of the international legal framework. Hence, 
there is the needed reconceptualisation of the way international law is perceived, 
which gives legitimacy to the social conscience of the international community as a 
necessary check as represented by the various NGO groups which are more 
representative of the international community.  
Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan had declared that states who are bent on 
criminal behaviour do not have the unbridled defence of their frontiers, and the 
massive and systematic violations of human rights must be never be condoned.266 The 
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campaign against human rights abuses by the United Nations, states and particularly 
non-governmental organisations cannot be over-emphasised. Worthy of note is that 
the fight for the preservation of the fundamental human rights of global citizens has 
been underpinned by a myriad of international and domestic legislation. 
Nevertheless, more importantly, these human rights, animal rights, environmental 
rights, and so on have been mostly advocated, protected and advanced by NGOs 
around the world. 
4.7. Reconceptualisation: Accommodating the multi-faceted nature of 
Sovereignty and the relevance of ‘consent’. 
One argument of the thesis is that the conceptualisation of sovereignty should evolve 
to include the many facets to the concept of sovereignty. One expression of the 
concept does not diminish the relevance of another expression of the same concept. 
For example, the fact that a sovereign state voluntarily subjects itself to another entity 
should be considered as just another expression of a facet of sovereignty. The same 
way another expression of sovereignty could be seen in a state determining who is 
allowed through its physical borders. Thus, the position of this thesis is that the notion 
of sovereignty ought to be reconceptualised. Although it should be added that the 
reconceptualisation is not to add to the meaning of sovereignty, what was not there 
before. Instead, it is to reveal in its completeness what the concept entails.  
The instructive part in the illustration above is that ‘the sovereign state voluntarily 
subjects itself’. That single act of voluntarily doing something or the consenting to an 
act is the very element that constitutes the principle of sovereignty. The aftermath of 
that consent or voluntary action does not cancel out the sovereign will of the state to 
choose the first place. Hence, it is the ability to consent that forms the basis of 
sovereignty. If a state, after consenting, is under the control of another entity, it does 
not change the fact that in the first instance, the conferring of control was an act of 
control in itself. If Sovereignty is reconceptualised to accommodate this legal position, 
then the distilling of sovereign powers horizontally or vertically should just be seen as 
the many sides of the expression of sovereignty. Therefore, if NGOs are empowered 
by the consent of a state to regulate certain aspects of international life, because 
they are best positioned to do so, it should not be considered as a compromise of the 
sovereignty of the state who have empowered the NGOs. It should just be considered 




Is the state’s consent to external control is all that is relevant to the authenticity of the 
essence of sovereignty?  Is it in all circumstances that the state has the option of 
consent? Is it not the case that, at times, the option for the state to consent is actually 
a veiled mandatory request to which there could be no reasonable dissenting, and 
not to consent may find the state inadvertently subject to a myriad of social, political 
and economic pressures?  Indeed, at times, circumstances may present themselves 
with scenarios where consenting is the only viable option and not to consent will lead 
to various adverse outcomes. Even at these times, consent is what determines 
sovereignty, even if there was no other viable option than to consent. The exception 
to this position is only in circumstances where the consent is coerced by armed force.  
If consent is coerced by armed force, then it will be against the principles of 
international law. Art 2(4) of the UN Charter provides that   
“All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or 
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United 
Nations.”  
Although, it could be argued that the use of force contemplated in Art 2(4) comprises 
other forms of force, such as political or economic coercion. Para 7 of the Preamble 
to the Charter states as one of the goals of the United Nations - ‘ that armed force 
shall not be used, save in common interest’ and Art 44 of the Charter supports the 
view that he Charter uses the term ‘force’ where it clearly means ‘armed force’. 
Finally, the travaux preparatories of the UN Charter illustrates the fact that only military 
force is the concern of the prohibition of the use of force. At the San Francisco 
Conference, a proposal by Brazil to extend the prohibition of force to economic 
coercion was explicitly rejected.267 Therefore, save for the coercion by armed force, 
consent is still consent. 
Regardless of the extent of the efficacy of consent, should the mere necessity of it in 
the dealings among state be sufficient in understanding sovereignty?  In other words, 
the ability to consent by the state in the international plane is fundamental to the 
essence of sovereignty and should be acknowledged as such. Where the state has 
indeed consented, it should not be considered as a let-down of sovereignty, but quite 
the opposite. The paradigm that this thesis hopes to foster is that by the consent or 
sovereign will of the state, it can distil its powers across various structures in the 
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international plane, and enhance a refurbished pluralised legal framework while 
retaining its essence as a concept. It is the premise for the argument for a 
reconceptualisation of the notion of sovereignty. The concept of sovereignty should 
be reconceptualised to acknowledge the pivotal role the element of ‘consent’ is to 
its essence. Where such consent is expressed to the extent that it subjects the 
consenting state to the control of another entity, it should not be considered as a 
compromise of sovereignty. Instead, it should be considered as an expression of 
sovereignty.  
A known facet of the notion of sovereignty is the exclusive power and authority of the 
state over its affairs in the international plane. The challenge with this is the limited 
perception of the concept as it does not include other facets of the concept of 
sovereignty. Today, there are a handful of supranational bodies. These bodies are 
products of the state.  Moreover, their positions in the international plane have been 
legitimised by the consent and participation of the states. Going by the commonly 
accepted facet of sovereignty that states have exclusive power and authority of the 
state over its affairs in the international plane. It will lead to the position held by states 
that there is no higher power in the international plane than that of the state. 
Therefore, international laws that emanate from these supranational bodies, and 
indeed the institutions themselves, have no validity or legitimacy except the states 
have consented to their existence. The focus here should be on the steps of 
consenting as the beginning of the expression of sovereignty.   
However, a dilemma unfolds, as the consenting states are obligated to the mandate 
of an intergovernmental or supranational organisation. Especially where such 
organisation has propounded a law or international rule to which this state is 
reluctantly beholden to observe. A prime example of this in action is the creation of 
international treaties. The concern is with the potential offshoot of a treaty many years 
later.  When such a treaty might have led to the creation of some intergovernmental 
body, and then, such intergovernmental body may then obligate member states to 
actions, under the provisions of the treaty, which was not anticipated at the time of 
reaching the treaty. This occurrence was replete in the uproar from many African 
states, when their erstwhile leaders were subject to trial at the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) for war crimes, genocide, et cetera, primarily because the states were 
signatories to the Rome Statute from 1998 onwards. 
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Moreover, this was, disproportionate to the number of other states from the rest of the 
world which were subject to the ICC jurisdiction. Hence, the ICC, like many other 
intergovernmental organisations, which have been presented by key promoters as a 
legal bastion immune from politics, has been criticised as being is inherently political 
and a tool of influential states to control ‘less influential’ states.268 The question that 
arises is whether, indeed these bodies have become political, or are they naturally 
living out to their full potential as empowered by the sovereign states via the treaties. 
Also, whether the ‘less influential’ states consented to the proxy control of the more 
influential states through the intergovernmental institutions. These questions place the 
notion of sovereignty in somewhat of a quagmire. It further underpins the argument 
of this thesis that the notion of sovereignty should be reconceptualised. The principles 
of subsidiarity, federalism and devolution should be considered. These principles 
should be adapted to fit global realities in a manner that advances fairness, 
inclusiveness and justice. 
 A clear way this can be achieved is if NGOs are brought into consideration, firstly 
because they are intrinsically ‘non-governmental’. It absolves them from the potential 
criticism of being used as proxy agents for the control of the ‘less influential’ states and 
secondly because they are more in touch with the causes that they represent than 
their political counterparts. Therefore, their independence from governments, their 
proximity to the issues, and the fact that they a predominantly not driven by profit 
make them more acceptable than their inter-governmental counterparts or the 
multinational corporations. Unlike inter-governmental organisations and multinational 
corporations, NGOs represent the interest of causes which are the prime concern of 
the grassroots of the international community.  
Hence, the principle of subsidiarity, if applied as a means of reconceptualising 
international law, should be extended to delegate sovereign powers to entities at the 
lowest levels. The principle of subsidiarity should be considered beyond the context of 
the EU or Federalism or some international institution. The principle should be extended 
to the community or sub-nations of the grassroots, which are represented by NGOs. 
As can be gleaned from above, the locals tend to be more in-tune with the currents 
of their localities. It is more so with the various factions of industry and social clutters of 
the international community, which have created artificial localities. These localities 
are spread around the globe, held by a common interest and culture. They could be 
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described as a depiction of the social and industrial-nations of the 21st century. Each 
one of them has an NGO which furthers its cause. Examples of these include nations 
of religion, nations of environment, nations of information technology, nations of 
entertainment, nations of financial markets, nations of commerce, and the list goes 
on.  
These nations, though geographically spread about, are intrinsically one and are 
proximate one to the other, due to the aid of technology, globalisation and the 
enthusiasm of the NGOs on the international plane.  In these many areas of existence 
in the 21st Century, neither the supranational, federal or local governments are 
equipped enough to make the laws that govern their existence and operations. The 
remit of these sovereign government should be the creation the soft infrastructure and 
international legal environment which acts as an enabler rather than be another 
bureaucratic impediment for the 21st-century existence. The governing apparatus of 
these sovereign governments should be extended to these peculiar nations of the 21st 
century, and these nations of like-norms should be empowered to govern via the NGO 
that fosters their interest.  
4.8. A case for Reconceptualisation of International Law - The implications of the 
Van Gend en Loos case269 
The Van Gend en Loos brought about a real revolution in European law, which also 
should prod the status quo in international law if the similarities in the two legal systems 
(that is the European legal system vs the International legal system) were to be drawn. 
The Van Gend en Loos case is primarily known for two things - firstly, the lack of the 
uniform application of European Law by national courts across the six-member states 
at the time, and secondly, the lack of the primacy granted by to international law in 
the member states.270 Therefore, this thesis opines that the implication of this case is 
the fact that the courts pointed out that an individual was to be classed as a direct 
subject of European law and the European legal system. As a result, such individual 
could directly apply European law, even against a state, and would have the requisite 
loci standi to do so, even as an individual. This argument gives credence to the crux 
of this thesis that, if non-state actors, whether multinational organisations, individuals 
or non-governmental organisations, have such sway in the way the 21st-century global 
affairs are determined then they should be recognised as such. More so, if the courts, 
as can be seen in the Van Gend en Loos case, could recognise an individual as a 
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subject of some level of international law, i.e. the European Law, of which, the loosed 
and arbitral way by which individuals operate on the international plane. Ordinarily, it 
should make it less likely for individuals to acquire such a recognition compared to 
NGOs which have some measure of regulated behaviour and are more organised. 
Hence, there is a valid argument for the reconceptualisation of international law in a 
way that takes into cognisance 21st-century global realities. This argument should be 
considered.  Particularly concerning the need for the institutionalisation of NGOs on 
the international plane and their actions on the international plane. 
David Edwards pointed out that the decision in the case merely brought to light or 
theorised the core doctrines which were in existence before the judgment was 
reached.271 Some of these doctrines included the fact that treaties should be 
interpreted objectively and not subjectively.272 As a result of the Treaty of Rome 1957 
and other case law, there was the primacy of the European law vis-à-vis national legal 
orders.273 It is noteworthy that the ECJ went progressed on along these lines in 1964 
where the primacy of EU was more clearly established in the Costa v E.N.E.L 
judgement.274 Furthermore, Joseph H. H. Weiler stated as follows –  
“Van Gend en Loos and its progeny are not the result of a new 
hermeneutics and that the decision would, or at least could, be the same 
under the traditional rule of interpretation of public international law…275 
[The key step towards establishing what the court would term] “…a new 
legal order of international law”.276 
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It is essential to bring to the fore one of the core issues in the Van Gend en Loos case. 
It was whether Article 12. of the European Economic Community  Treaty has direct 
application within the territory of a Member State, in other words, whether nationals of 
such a State can, based on the Article in question, lay claim to individual rights which 
the courts must protect. Article 12 of the treaty provided that member states shall 
refrain from introducing, as between themselves, any new customs duties on 
importation or exportation or charges with equivalent effect and from increasing such 
duties or charges as they apply in their commercial relations with each other. 
To provide a little context to the case, Van Gend en Loos, a postal and transportation 
company, imported chemicals from Germany into the Netherlands and was charged 
an import duty that had been raised since the entry into effect of the Treaty of Rome. 
Although the tariff was paid, a refund was sought before the Dutch Tariff commission, 
stating that the tariff was in breach of Article 12. The commission asked the ECJ 
whether the provisions of Article 12 were directly applicable within member states, in 
such a way that citizens of the member states could leverage its provisions directly. 277 
 The ECJ argued held the view that the interpretation of Article 12 should be such that 
takes into consideration the spirit and wording of the Treaty of Rome. As a result, the 
provisions of the Treaty of Rome was indeed directly effective in national legal orders. 
It is important to quote directly from the judgement the following –  
“The conclusion to be drawn from this is that the Community constitutes a 
new legal order of international law for the benefit of which the states have 
limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and the subjects of 
which comprise not only Member States but also their nationals.”278 
This provision is of such legal relevance to the current international legal order. It 
confers on individual the status of subjects of international law, and such conference 
was premised on the pronouncement that the judgement should be considered as an 
introduction of a new legal order of international law. 
This case established the Principle of Direct Effect for the provisions of the EC Treaty, 
and it set a precedent for the future determination of Direct Effect application in any 
given legislation. Notably, the Treaty of Rome did not clearly state how national courts 
were to implement the Treaty within a sovereign state. However, the ECJ, without the 
engagement of politics and legislators, interpreted the Treaty in a way that a new law 
                                                             




was thus created. Hence, an individual can invoke the community’s law within the 
national courts, and this was achieved without the Member States agreeing expressly 
on this point. Hence, where there is a conflict between national legislation and EC law, 
the EC law now takes precedence. 
Another typical example of the EC having powers to overrule national legislative body 
is the Factortame279 case. Here, the UK courts held that they had the power to restrain 
the application of an act of parliament pending trial and ultimately to dis-apply the 
act when it was found to be contrary to EU Law. 
It leads to the question as to whether this is at variance with the provisions of Article 
2(7) of UN Charter which reserve domain of domestic jurisdiction into which 
intervention is not permitted. 
As pointed out, it becomes clear that it has already been established in international 
law that there is a new international legal order which accommodates individuals as 
direct subjects of international law. It gives further impetus to the argument that NGOs, 
who play a very significant role in the affairs of the international community could, in 
the same vein, be recognised as such. Moreover, beyond such recognition, which is 
to some extent in existence today, their activities and role should be endorsed to give 
it more legitimacy. The consent of the state in reaching this position does not 
compromise the sovereignty of the state; it only evolves international law 
accommodate 21st-century realities and make it better fit for purpose. Hence, the 
relevance of the Van Gend en Loos case to this thesis is to bolster the need for a 
reconceptualisation of international law, being that the ECJ had already entertained 
such paradigm shift in international law. 
4.9. Chapter 4: Conclusion 
This chapter engaged in a careful review of the idea of reconceptualisation. It 
explored its potential by evaluating the notion of sovereignty and a rethink of that 
notion. To this end, it engaged in a critical analysis of the notions of subsidiarity, 
federalism and dissolution of powers and their common attribute of the delegation of 
sovereignty.  
 It sought to resolve the question of whether collaboration of the sovereign state in the 
international plan is tantamount to the ceding of their sovereignty. In resolving this 
question, this chapter draws on the sovereignty of the citizen and the state. It poses 
the same question as to whether the sovereignty of the citizen is curtailed by the 
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citizen being subject vertically to the laws of the land or horizontally in contracting 
bilaterally with fellow citizens.  
Along these lines, it highlighted the pivotal role of consent to this social transaction 
between the individual and the state. Then it opined that at the very core of 
sovereignty is the element of consent which aides in providing an accurate 
perception of sovereignty in its full essence; revealing its multi-faceted nature.  
Against this backdrop, the principle of subsidiarity, federalism and dissolution are 
critically examined and argued as principles that do not negatively impact on the 
essence of the sovereignty of a state whose authority has been conferred, delegated 
or allocated whether downwards, horizontally or vertically. Instead, in the estimation 
of this thesis, these concepts are considered to enhance the notion of sovereignty in 
the completeness of its essence. To this end, these concepts were explored as possible 
prototypes of a reconceptualised international law, whereby some aspects of the 
sovereignty of state are delegated to non-state actors, particularly NGOs.  
Finally, in exploring a pathway to reconceptualisation, it examined existing compelling 
concepts and examples such as concepts of Jus cogens and the Van Gend en Loos 
case. Concerning Jus Congens, it established that as far as international law is 
concerned, the traditional notion of sovereignty had never been quite absolute 
because states cannot, even under the Westphalian legal context, derogate from a 
Jus cogens law. Concerning the Van Gend en Loos case, it highlighted the 
pronouncement of the European court which concluded that European Community 
constituted a new legal order of international law where a subject of international law 
comprises of not only the member states but their nationals.  
This chapter concludes that these examples and various existing concepts discussed, 
give credence to the focal point of this thesis. Thus, there should be a 
reconceptualisation of international law in a way that aligns with the 21st-century 
global realities.  There should be a paradigm shift in the perception of international 
law in a way that acknowledges the influence of NGOs. Per the above findings, it is 
observed that the quest for reconceptualisation is not only aspirational but practical. 
Having reached the position that the reconceptualisation of international law is not 
only a possibility but also a practical probability, the next chapter approaches this 
quest by honing in on NGOs, its emergence, its operations and its place and growing 
influence on the international plane. The core rationale for this is to begin to 
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5.1. Chapter 5 Part A: Introduction 
Having engaged in a conceptual analysis of the concepts of international law, factors 
that call for its rethink, and consideration of ways the concept of sovereignty could 
be reconceptualised, this chapter underscores the second ambit of the research 
question and commences a journey to highlight the applied relevance of this 
exposition. It does this by focusing on NGOs and their existing influence and 
operational status on the intentional plane. This chapter is structured into two parts. 
This first part focuses on providing an understanding of non-governmental 
organisations. It embarks on an exposition of the emergence of NGOs and explores 
the growth of their influence nationally, regionally and internationally over time. It 
acknowledges that NGOs have been allowed some level of visibility and evident 
participation in the process of the international legal order. However, it engages in an 
appraisal of the dilemma that NGOs face. This dilemma is seen in the fact that NGOs 
have experienced some level of political and social ascendancy on the international 
plane but lack the corresponding legal ascendancy. Consequently, this lack of 
correlation between their socio-political stance and their legal stance on the 
international plane results in a legitimacy deficit. 
In order to provide a systematic analysis of NGOs, including their construct, their 
growth and increased relevance in today’s 21st Century, the chapter explores an 
exposition on the description, classification and function of NGOs.  
It further examines other general considerations, including the foundational legislation 
regarding the emergence and the ensuing relationships of NGOs in the international 
community. Consequently, article 71 of the UN Charter and ECOSOC resolution 
1996/31 on the Consultative Relationship between the United Nations and Non- 
Governmental Organisations, are evaluated. 
Furthermore, a critical examination of the findings of the Cardoso Report of the Panel 
of Eminent Persons on United Nations-Civil Society Relations of 2004 vis-à-vis the 
cardinal objectives provided by Kofi Anan to the panel is carried out. The report’s 
submissions on ways to enhance the relationship between NGOs and the United 
Nations are considered. 
Finally, the UN Economic and Social Council is meticulously assessed. This assessment 
should shed light on the various categories available to NGOs in participation with the 
United Nations. These categories – general, individual and roaster statuses, are then 
critiqued. This critique examines the inadequacies of the status quo for eligibility in 
contrast to the global realities of the increasing influence of NGOs.  
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5.2. The Emergence of Non-Governmental Organisations 
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) have become even more pivotal to the 
organisation of society today. Their impact is increasingly felt nationally, regionally and 
internationally. NGOs have indeed been allowed some level of visibility and evident 
participation in the process of international cooperation. They are vital to the opening 
up of states and other international actors to scrutiny on the adherence to 
international law. However, they are still, at best, spectators on the international 
scene, to whose chants and rants, the current legitimate primary actors act on the 
international scene.  
There has been sufficient discourse on the political and social ascendancy of NGOs 
on the international plane. However, the challenge lies in the lack of a corresponding 
legal ascendancy. The lack of correlation of socio-political stance with the legal 
stance of NGOs results in a ‘legitimacy deficit’. The phenomenon of globalisation has 
made the traditional Westphalian based decision-making representations in 
international relations less relevant when considered in the light of post-modern 
politics. The various facets of the 21st-century international space, such as economics, 
trade, communication, culture, et cetera, are global. Some of the most vital decisions 
that affect the daily lives of people on the international plane are primarily reached 
by international organisations that represent these sectors.280 The Cardoso Report on 
the United Nations relationship with civil society described the situation as follows – 
‘Representative democracy, in which citizens periodically elect their 
representatives across a full spectrum of political issues, is now 
supplemented by participatory democracy, in which anyone can enter the 
debates that most interest them, through advocacy, protest and in other 
ways.’281 
NGOs have been one of the foremost channels by which people voice their views on 
the international plane. The role of NGOs on the international plane tends to 
supplement the role of the elected representatives and institutions within the legal 
system of the state. 
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Additionally, other factors have contributed to the increased visibility and relevance 
of NGOs on the international plane. For instance, the growth of multinational 
corporations across the national boundaries has the corresponding effect of its 
stakeholders extending beyond national boundaries as well. These stakeholders 
include a wide spectrum of groups, most of which find expression through the vehicle 
of NGOs, trade unions, cultural groups, human rights groups, consumer groups, 
environmental organisations, et cetera. 
Furthermore, with the exponential advancement of technology and seamless global 
communication, information is freely dispersed globally. The import is that local 
interests and advocacy quickly becomes global interests and advocacy, vice versa. 
These interests, whether global or local, are expressed mainly through the channels of 
NGOs. 
Generally speaking, the increasing integration and interconnectivity of people and 
interests across the world today have added to the proliferation of NGOs globally.282  
The broad spectrum of issues that are contended with locally and globally today tend 
to be more effectively and efficiently resolved through the actions of international 
organisations, with the significant help from the NGOs’ operation in such sectors. It is 
debated that the NGOs are more responsive, efficient and effective than some states. 
For instance, where there are issues which are related to matters of environment, war, 
consumer protection, children and youth, family, refugees, et cetera, it is sure to find 
an NGO whose primary objective is to deal with that specific issues. Often the NGOs 
are first responders in such circumstances. Then they become the voice of the victims 
and the pressure on the parties concerned (whether states or other international 
actors) for the right actions to be taken.  Another reason for the quick response  
This increasing relevance of NGOs on the international plane, have made it impossible 
for NGOs to be ignored. The other actors on the international plane are pressured to 
adapt to the reality that NGOs are significant global stakeholders who have 
systematically encroached unto the erstwhile ‘state-only’ activities on the 
international plane.283 
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5.3. NGOs - A Paradox of Legitimacy 
The apparent paradox plays out in the undeniable informal acceptance of NGOs by 
the citizenry and actors in the international community and the seeming reluctance 
of the same actors to formally accept NGOs as legitimate actors of the international 
community. The certainty of the continuous growth in influence by NGOs in this 21st 
century and beyond is irrefutable. The Cardoso  Report stated as follows -  
‘Effective engagement with civil society and other constituencies is no 
longer an option – it is a necessity in order for the United Nations to meet its 
objectives and remain relevant in the twenty-first century.284 
Regardless of the consensus that NGOs and international intergovernmental 
organisations should work in partnership, uncertainty remains with the question of how 
the actors can formally work together with legitimacy and defined legal authority 
underpinning their relationship? This question leaves a vacuum that needs to be filled. 
NGOs continue to deal with this dilemma of being needed but not being 
acknowledged as needed in the international space. This dilemma is the paradox of 
their legitimacy as they could very well be described as a legitimate, illegitimate non-
state actor on the international plane. 
It has been observed by John Gamble and Charlotte Ku that,  
‘NGOs have had difficulty finding a seat at the table of authoritative 
decision-making’.285  
Hence, regardless of how significant their influence has become on states, and other 
actors on the international scene, including international organisations, they still have 
not attained the function of an authoritative decision-maker. The essence of this point 
is not to suggest that NGOs as they are, should become ‘the’ authoritative decision-
makers. NGOs as ‘the’ authoritative decision-makers may not be plausible. Indeed, 
there is a broad acceptance that civil society bodies and global governance 
institutions, including states, should have relations with each other. However, there is 
far less clarity, let alone agreement on how these relations should be conducted and 
to what ends.286 These concerns are not new. 
Additionally, perhaps one of the biggest challenges of NGOs today, which 
incidentally, is one of the focal points of this research is the international legal status 
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of NGOs in the international space. NGOs remain one of the few actors on the 
international plane who do not have any legal status, nor is there a known uniform 
regulation under international law which governs the registration, requirements and 
the legal status of NGOs. It has been pointed out that attempts have been made over 
time to reach some multilateral agreements, which have all reached the same 
unsuccessful fate as preceding proposals. Interestingly, some of the chief antagonist 
to this elevated status are states.287 
Persons, natural or juristic, make up NGOs and they are initially registered in their 
homeplace, under such dispersed criteria, differing from country to country around 
the world. Hence, the various NGOs around the world would be governed by the 
domestic laws by which they had been initially created. The effect of this is that due 
to the apparent lack of a uniform legal regime for international NGOs, their legitimacy, 
rights and duties are coloured by the diverse legal regimes across the various states. 
 
5.4. What is an NGO? 
An impasse encountered in this exposition is the simple yet complex question -  what 
is an NGO, and how is that term easily distinguished from other like-bodies? Is there a 
difference in the meaning of the terminologies associated with it and like bodies, or 
should the body of terminology in this field be used interchangeably? Unfortunately, 
there has been a myriad of definitions that may have obscured the term even further. 
To this end, some scholars have veered off the path of looking for a precise definition 
for NGOs. Most scholars have sought to describe NGOs rather than to define it. The 
rationale behind this is the fact that there is no universally accepted definition of 
NGOs, and the term ‘NGO’ is used, often interchangeably with other terms, which 
may connote a different meaning in a different context. For instance, the use of the 
terms such as NGOs, Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), Not For Profit Organisations, 
The Third Sector, or Voluntary Organisations or Charities, could mean different things. 
Still, the distinguishing factor of all of them remains blurred. Their objectives and 
activities are often interwoven. Hence, it is argued that there should be a precise 
determination of these terms, distinguishing one from the other, would be one of the 
crucial steps in legitimising the status of NGOs in the international community. On the 
journey to a precise definition, it may be helpful to investigate how it has been 
described. 




Firstly, the phrase Non-Governmental Organisations commences with the negative– 
‘non-governmental’, which implies that any governmental organisation or entity is 
excluded from what can be referred to as a Non-Governmental Organisation. The 
current definition adopted under the resolution of the Economic and Social Council – 
Res 1996/31 in describing a Non-Governmental Organisation, stated thus – 
‘any such organisation that is not established by a government entity or 
intergovernmental agreement shall be considered a non-governmental 
organisation for the purposes of these agreements.’288 
This further buttresses the point that NGOs are not government entities, but it extends 
further to distinguish NGOs from bodies or groups which are an offshoot of an 
intergovernmental agreement. Hence, the position that is being held out is that an 
NGO should not be a creation of government or an intergovernmental agreement. 
The United Nations have been one of the foremost actors that have endeavoured to 
define an NGO. The glossary to the Cardoso Report on the UN and the Civil society 
suggests that -   
‘an NGO is any organisation of relevance to the United Nations which is not 
a central government and was not created by intergovernmental decision, 
including associations of businesses, parliamentarians and local 
authority’.289  
Interestingly, it acknowledges that there is a confusion with trying to get a clear 
definition of NGOs that is distinguished from civil society. The problem with the 
definition contained in the glossary is the fact that it also contains a separate definition 
of civil society, which suggest that both terms are different and by implication, ought 
not to be used interchangeably. It refers to civil society as follows –  
‘[a]ssociations of citizens (outside of their families, friends and businesses) 
entered into voluntarily to advance their interest, ideas, ideologies, such as 
trade unions, professional associations, social movements, indigenous 
people organisations, religious and spiritual organisations, academe and 
public benefit non-governmental organisations’.290  
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Generally, NGOs have either been construed NGOs to be a type of CSO or used 
synonymously with CSOs.  However, civil society could be described as that sphere of 
the society that is not occupied by the government or the business actors.291 On this 
premise, the term - civil society organisations could be reasonably accurate when it 
is shown to be non-governmental, a non-profit, a voluntary organisation consisted of 
people in the civil society sphere of society. This sector so described, expectedly, 
encompasses a broad spectrum of people, movements, faith-based groups, 
organisations and interests, which composition could be formal, informal, long-term, 
ad-hoc or cause-specific based.  
Likewise, NGOs have been described as a non-governmental, non-profit, voluntary 
organisation also consisted of people or organisations in the civil society space.  
However,  NGOs can be distinguished from civil society groups in that NGOs are 
restricted to being composed of the various stakeholders formally and in most cases, 
are registered. In contrast, not all CSOs have to be formalised.292 
The import of this is that all NGOs are civil societies, but not all civil societies are NGOs. 
However, it should be noted that a caveat was stated in the Cardoso Report, 
acknowledging that there is no correct definition of the term civil society, and the 
boundaries between both terms – Non-Governmental Organisations and Civil Society 
Organisations are porous. It is argued that the actions and obligations of these related 
bodies are more similar than they are not, and the differences are blurred.  
Hence, the distinction between these terms is universally important but practically 
needless because, in an applied sense, the terms could be used interchangeably. This 
position was reaffirmed by the Secretary-General to the United Nations, who, in 
response to the Cardoso panel, stated that he would discuss NGOs following the 
traditional United Nations parlance and by using civil society and NGOs 
interchangeably293. It remains a conceptual dilemma in the understanding of NGOs, 
and related bodies and their dealings with the local and global community.  
5.5. Further Description, Classification and Functions of NGOs 
As pointed out in chapter one,  the rationale for focusing on NGOs is primarily because 
their interests are not for profit like their MNCs counterparts, but firstly, for the 
furtherance of a variety of ‘worthy causes’. Secondly, they exist without the 
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encumbrance of government like inter-governmental organisation, and so they can 
execute their mandates independently. It was pointed out that the defining 
characteristics of NGOs being for causes and without any government influence,  
should result in  NGOs being considered as the ideal custodians of the moral 
conscience of the international community. However, this position should be 
meticulously analysed. 
 
5.5.1. Description of NGOs 
Given the dilemma of reaching a definition, it suffices to attempt an accurate 
description which may, in essence, have the semblance of a definition. The following 
position has been argued by scholars294 – 
Firstly, NGOs are voluntary organisations not established by states which are consisted 
of actors from the civil society sphere.  They represent the interests of actors, such as 
private persons, natural persons and juristic persons.295  
Secondly, from the first component of the compound term – Non-Governmental 
Organisation, it is apparent that an NGO is an organisation intrinsically independent 
of the government and the influence of the government.296 
Thirdly, NGOs represent interests, whether public or private. The common 
characteristic of NGOs in their representative capacity is that most of the interests that 
they represent are topical and would ultimately benefit the public or a section of the 
public. So public interest and public benefit is paramount to the construct of an NGO. 
However, some NGOs represent a more narrow set of private interests like industry or 
business associations such as the ICC.297         
Fourthly, though NGOs may, at times, need to run on profit, profit-making cannot be 
an object of an NGO, and they are constrained from making a profit for the benefit 
of the owners. Somewhat, where profit is made, it is expected that such profit should 
be re-injected into the NGO with the ultimate aim of advancing the objectives of the 
NGO.   It is this feature that distinguishes an NGO from a  corporation, whose primary 
objective is to make a profit for its stakeholders. 
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Fifthly, as Non-Governmental Organisations are not supposed to transform into 
governmental organisations or political parties, NGOs are constrained from being 
involved in political parties or canvass for political power. This restriction is what 
distinguishes it from other CSOs or political parties which are neither governments nor 
businesses but exist to assume political power in the future. 
Lastly, NGOs are expected to be law-abiding. This feature distinguishes it from like-
groups, which are neither political nor profit-driven but are also driven by causes, 
except that these like-groups are driven by sinister unlawful causes, such as terrorism 
or other forms of criminal behaviour.298 
The preceding notwithstanding, giving the diversity NGOs across the world, and their 
differing mandates, constitution, representative capacities, size, et cetera, it becomes 
a challenging task to attempt a unified definition or some form of generalisation.  
James Paul has argued that the reach of NGOs in today's 21-st century extends to the 
length and breadth of the globe across various industry sectors. He explains it thus –  
‘In addition to the great [non-governmental] organisations dealing with 
human rights, environmental protection and humanitarian assistance, there 
are NGOs representing industry associations like soap and chemicals, 
narrowly zealous religious organisations and advocates of obscure causes 
like Esperanto and space colonisation. While some NGOs are fiercely 
independent, others are known as the creatures of the government, 
businesses or even criminal interests. Some have hundreds of thousands of 
members around the world, while others speak for only a handful of people. 
Some have large central secretariats, and some are very decentralised. 
With such diversity, generalisation about NGOs can be difficult.’299 
 
5.5.2. Classification of NGOs 
To aid a better understanding of NGOs and to determine how they operate and are 
perceived, this thesis classifies NGOs. This classification is made further to general 
observations of NGOs and their workings globally. They are as follows - 
Firstly, NGOs are classified by their mandates and the interests that they foster. Also, 
there could be business and industry-driven NGOs such as the International Chamber 
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of Commerce. There could also be sectoral safeguarding and advancements NGOs 
such as professional associations, trade unions, religious groups. All of these examples 
fall into the first classification, which is a mandate or interest-driven NGOs.  
Secondly, NGOs could be classified based on where the NGO is situated, including 
the extent or reach of their objectives and representation. Examples of this could 
include NGOs which are grassroots NGOs, local or community-based, or it could be 
NGOs which have a national interest, or it could be an international NGO with a global 
reach. The focal point of this work is predominantly international NGOs. These have 
been described as NGOs who have members or branches in more than one state, or 
if their objectives are not limited to one state. It is the international NGOs that mostly 
transact on the international plane on significant international matters and to that 
extent are relevant to the refurbishment of the international legal system.  
The third classification of NGOs is activity-driven NGOs. Here, there could be 
demarcated into two broad categories; the service-based NGOs or the advocacy 
NGOs. The service-based NGOs are those NGOs that provide services, such as health 
services, food, housing, legal services, education to the rural communities, 
humanitarian relief materials for emergencies or crisis, et cetera. The advocacy NGOs, 
on the other hand, are engaged in lobbying and campaigns around topical issues 
related to the interest focus of the NGOs. Hence, one could have some advocacy 
NGOs campaigning for the preservation of the wildlife, climate and other 
environmental concerns, human rights issues et cetera. The objectives of the 
advocacy NGOs are primarily to effect significant policy changes by pressuring the 
political system with the opinion of the public regarding a particular policy change 
that is tied to the sector in question. 
5.5.3. Functions of NGOs 
In a bid to further describe and classify NGOs, a simple tabular depiction of the 
functions of NGOs is helpful. To this end, the final report by Dr Sebastian Oberthür et 
al. on the Participation of Non-Governmental Organisations in International 
Environmental Governance is referenced. Although the report is quite specific to 
environmental governance, its relevance is readily transferable across various strata 




Table: Functions, Activities and Channels of Influence of NGOs in International 
Environmental Co-operation Functions: Illustrative List of Activities and Channels of 
Influence300 
Functions An illustrative list of Activities and Channels of 
Influence. 
Enhancing the knowledge 
base (science, policy and law) 
 
• gather, compile and disseminate information 
• conduct and publish studies and reports 
• distribute information and organise side-events at 
major conferences 
Advocacy and lobbying  informal contacts with government delegates (side 
events, workshops, conferences, in the corridors, 
modern telecommunication technology) 
•formal participation in inter-governmental 
negotiations (official written submissions, unofficial 
written position papers, statements in meetings) 
• provision of advice to “friendly” delegations 
• campaigns outside the negotiating arena (e.g. 
media and public information, protests) to enhance 
influence. 
Membership in national 
Delegations 
 receipt of inside information about governmental 
negotiations 
• provision of advice to governments 
• negotiate on behalf of governments 
Contribution to compliance 
review and enforcement as 
well as dispute settlement 
procedures 
• submission of amicus curiae briefs 
• provision of information on implementation/alerting 
delegations and institutions of noncompliance 
Ensuring transparency • reports from negotiations 
• ‘naming and shaming’ of laggard countries 
• public relations work (media) 
• reports on the effectiveness of implementation 
Supporting international 
Secretariats 
• provide Secretariat functions 
• provide advice and expertise to Secretariats 
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Broader functions of NGOs in 
international environmental 
governance 
• shaping the opinions of individuals and groups 
(campaigns and training) 
• co-operation between environmental groups and 
business and industry 
• networking, including integrating levels of 
governance 
• ‘globalisation’ of values and preferences objects of 
the NGOs. 
To the end of adequately describing what an NGO is and what they do, the above 
table effective serves to that end.  
5.6. NGOs – Other General Considerations 
The emergence of NGOs as is known today dates back to the nineteenth century with 
the advent of organisations such as the Anti-Slavery International. For instance, the 
anti-slavery society emerged in 1839, formed by Thomas Clarkson and Thoma Fowell 
Boxton and other abolitionist campaigners against slavery worldwide.301 
In the mid-20th century, NGOs were recognised as global players in some 
documented way during the formative stages of the United Nations (UN). Article 71 of 
the UN Charter and further to the provisions of the Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC) resolution 288(X) (1950), NGOs were referred to and were given 
consultative status. The implication being that NGOs were entitled to attend meetings 
and make written submissions and presentations during the meetings.302 Today there 
exist a list of over 4500 NGOs with consultative status at the UN.303  
However, this recognition, fall short of the functional role of being decision-makers; to 
have a more declaratory role than a mere participatory role. The rationale may be 
that NGOs have not, even among themselves, come to a clear consensus on who 
they are, how they are constituted, how they make decisions, or how their ideology 
can be tested against each other.  
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5.6.1. Early considerations on NGOs and the United Nations – ECOSOC 
The criteria by which NGOs are endowed with such consultative status with ECOSOC 
may be by itself problematic but does not erode the fact that the prominence of 
NGOs at the international space is on the increase. 
As stated earlier, the ECOSOC resolution 1996/31 considers as an NGO  
‘[a]ny such organisation that is not established by a government entity or 
an intergovernmental agreement'.304  
However, for an NGO to be eligible to have consultative status with the ECOSOC, the 
following must be considered –  
 The NGO must conform with the spirit, purposes and principles of the UN 
Charter, and it must be of sound reputation within its field.  
 Further to that, the NGO must have an established location and  
 The NGO must have a constitution derived democratically and a mode of 
operations and decision-making that is both democratic and transparent.  
 The NGO must have the authority to speak for their constituency, a set structure 
and a clear accountability mechanism.305  
The preceding acknowledges the necessity for NGOs to have an elevated status in 
international relations, but are concerned, and rightfully so, about stringent measures 
that must be met, if such status is to have any legitimacy in the global space.306  
Another criteria that may be considered problematic are the position held regarding 
whether or not, NGOs should be making profits or having political affiliations. 
5.6.2. NGOs & Profits  
The notion that NGOs are not for profit organisations is one idea that is subject to 
intense debate.307 The core of the debate rests on the fact that due to the extensive 
activities of NGOs, it is impossible to expect that NGOs would efficiently and 
effectively meet their objectives without funds. Distinguishing between for-profit and 
non-profit remains a hazy task. NGOs need funds to operate and often could be 
regarded, in terms of functionality, as for-profit organisations.308 The line of 
demarcation should be drawn between raising funds to meet an objective for which 
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the public are beneficiaries and raising funds for the benefits of its owners. This line 
becomes even blurrier when the question is posed regarding the expertise of the 
owners of NGOs. It plays out, primarily when the owner’s expertise is used in meeting 
the objectives of the NGOs. In such a situation, the question arises as to whether the 
owner should be remunerated or not. If so, then whether the NGO is a profit-making 
or not. It insinuates the clear need for integrity and transparent operation mechanisms 
for NGOs if they are to hold any global legitimacy.  
Another note of debate is the fact that NGOs are run and sustained by funds from 
members of the public aligned with their core objectives. Hence, funds are generated 
from individuals or other juristic persons. The concern here is the fact that such funds 
so secured may tag along with it the necessity to further the agenda of such 
individuals or bodies. To this end, it appears more apt for some NGOs to seek to 
generate funds from activities that are directly linked to the carrying on of their 
objectives, such as sales of publications or tickets for awareness concerts et cetera. 
However, the challenge to this position is that engaging in profit-making activities 
could be a distraction for NGOs, and could also be interpreted that NGOs are using 
their mandate as a cover for business activities. Hence, some would argue that it is 
preferred that such practices are limited or done away with altogether.309 
5.6.3. NGOs & Politics 
On the issue of NGOs having a political affiliation, it follows to align to the position that 
many NGOs wield strong political influence, and many of their members may be and 
often are, affiliated to certain political parties or ideologies.310 However, the distinction 
must be made between NGOs and political parties. Generally, political parties nurse 
the sole ambition of influencing in the political system and partaking in governance. 
NGOs on the other hand, as defined by Peter Willetts as follows-   
‘independent voluntary association[s] of people acting together 
continuously, for some common purpose, other than achieving 
government office, making money or illegal activities’.311 
Regardless of the many concerns as to what legal status NGOs may eventually 
occupy in the international construct, it remains evident that the influence and 
impact of NGOs in the international space across various sectors stays on the increase. 
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The activities of NGOs are numerous and varied, and usually have impacts on politics 
and government.  They cut across a variety of sectors; whether human rights activism, 
humanitarian activities, development campaign or environment protection. There is 
a myriad of impacting activities in which NGOs play a very prominent role, and these 
activities are sufficiently representative of the governance, global community and 
international relations.  
5.6.4. Internal challenges of the growing influence of NGOs   
Some of the most prominent NGOs had initially commenced pursuing a single 
agenda, but in so doing have increased in influence and have engaged in other 
activities which may be outside their initial mandate, but which may be ancillary to it. 
A typical example would be Amnesty International. When Amnesty International 
commenced in 1960, it had a single mandate which was the protection of the rights 
of peaceful political prisoners, but its mandate, since the turn of the century, has of 
necessity broadened to include economic, social and cultural rights. Today on their 
website, they describe themselves as ordinary people from around the world standing 
up for humanity and human rights.312 This description could not be broader than this; 
where ordinary people from around the world are standing up for humanity. They 
pursue a global mandate and see themselves as an organisation with the status as a 
‘global citizen’. This development is a similar occurrence with most influential NGOs 
globally. 
A concern with the growing influence of NGOs could be the need to define 
themselves clearly and stay consistent. It leads to the argument of whether or not 
NGOs would be considered legitimate in a fluid and fast-paced world. With the 
increase of influence, sometimes the thrust of some of the NGOs are diverted from 
their initial mandate. As they grow, they are influenced by a myriad of factors which 
are sometimes conflicting. Some of such factors include matters like the source of 
funding, the political climate, the media, the current overbearing circumstance or 
global debates et cetera.  
This haphazard nature and kneejerk disposition/reaction of some NGOs question 
whether or not they are deserving of such status of international legitimacy. Hence, 
though the mandate of an NGO is its crux, some challenges face the adoption of 
mandates by NGOs. These days, it could be said that NGOs are prone to act 'ultra 
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vires'. That is, they are regularly going beyond their mandates and are extending to 
carry on general goods that could be remotely close to their initial mandate.  
This fluidity of focus is at odds with one of its strength in comparison with states. For 
instance, this thesis argues that NGOs are focused on particular causes and as a result 
are more productive on those issues, unlike states, which naturally concern themselves 
with governance that extends to all strata of the society. The challenge with the broad 
reach of states is their engagement with too much could yield uneven and 
inadequate results across the board. It is why NGOs could stand a better chance in 
dealing with specific issues if sufficiently legitimised. It is similar to chat was obtainable 
in the earlier centuries where the social affairs of the states were left to the vestiges of 
the ecclesiastical domain under the authority of the church, and the government 
engaged only with inter-state affairs.313    
Mandates, by implication, circumscribe what an NGO should be doing and therefore 
defines its profile and its boundaries.314 Most mandates are very specific. However, a 
shift in the funding opportunities or a change in the political realities may cause NGOs 
to change or broaden their mandate expressly or just functionally. The transition from 
the initial mandate of the NGOs to a broader one could bring about some queries. 
Queries such as if the NGOs have compromised or overstepped their boundaries.   
The prevailing point to be taken from the above is that the global space is fluid, and 
various factors impact on NGOs and their objectives. These factors include matters 
such as funding, politics, environmental issues or even human rights matters. The 
likelihood for NGOs to stay static to their initial form and mandate is generally slim. 
NGOs have and would continue to transform and broaden their horizons. The onus is 
now on the global polity to accommodate the impending changes, and still find them 
deserving of legitimacy and enhanced status in the international space. NGOs have 
emerged as key players in various sectors, both internationally and domestically, and 
their increased influence should lead to some legitimacy for their causes. 
5.6.5. NGOs and Globalisation 
It has been argued that a significant reason for the emergence of the NGOs and their 
empowerment on the international plane remains the phenomenon of globalisation 
and the growing need to find global solutions for global problems315. States have had 
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to transcend beyond their traditional national boundaries and engage with other 
states to find mutual solutions to mutual problems. Governments have had to engage 
in more negotiation, policy formation and decision making at the international level, 
which, expectedly, has had a significant impact on domestic policy and legislation.316 
So, international legal development has been seen to sip back into the national legal 
framework.  
Also, nationally, NGOs have been at the forefronts of national campaigns. These 
national movements have resulted in international reforms, such as the fights against 
racial prejudice, acceptance of refugees, child abuse and trafficking or 
discrimination by the apartheid government in South Africa.317 It is worthy of note to 
state that the predominant facilitator of these movements, whether on the 
international or the national level have been NGOs. However, it remains a paradox 
when an attempt is made to compare the significant presence of NGOs across the 
international plane and the meagre formal recognition and acceptance of NGOs as 
a legitimate international actor and influencer of the international legal framework. 
The broad spectrum of the form and activities of NGOs is simply too broad to examine 
generally. To this end, it imperative that NGOs, conceptually and functionally,  be 
examined along with the lines of their participation across the various global sectors 
of today’s global community. The import of this is to ascertain a better understanding 
of NGOs. Moreover, beyond that, to establish more accurately the centrality and the 
growing influence of NGOs in the global polity. 
5.7. NGOs and the United Nations  
The increasing norm in the regulation of the international community has moved 
beyond just the remit of states and has extended to the supranational conceptual 
remit. The key drivers of this new norm are the sum of private interests, national interests 
and global interest, which are best epitomised by international organisations. The 
chief of which is the United Nations. Since NGOs became formally recognised as 
international players following Art 71 of the UN Charter in the mid 20th century, they 
have become pivotal to international policy-making and compliance monitoring.318 
It was pointed out by Kal Raustiala over two decades ago that the growth of NGO 
activities indicates an emerging transformation of the international socio-legal and 
                                                             
316 Ibid 
317 Fanyana D Mazibuko, 'The Role of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO’S) In Educational Advancement in Developing 
Countries: The South African Experience.' (2000) 3.1 Journal of International Cooperation in Education. 
318 Ripinsky and Bossche (n 280), p. 1 
138 
 
socio-political system. Raustiala stated that this transformation results in a decline in 
the importance of the sovereign state and the state system. He explained that at the 
same time, the transformation could lead to a rise of governance by a dynamic 
global civil society.319 Hence, it is not surprising, that a significant portion of 
governance of a broad spectrum of sectors and the people that deal in those sectors 
are now primarily a responsibility of the international institutions or organisations – 
representative of the international community. These international organisations or 
institutions are predominantly offshoots of the United Nations and groups by 
stakeholders within the various industry sectors. These organisations have seen an 
increased interface with NGOs.  
5.7.1. The Cardoso Report  
The Cardoso Report of the Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations – Civil Society 
Relations of 2004320 made a case for the civil society to be very engaged with the 
workings of the UN both nationally and internationally, and it centred its findings on 
three concepts.  
5.7.1.1. Cardoso report three core concepts 
Firstly, there is the concept of functionalism – being that NGOs are tailored to specific 
industries or facets of the international community; they are specialised and better 
positioned to attend to the challenges and growth of such industry or facet of the 
international community.  
Secondly, there is the concept of global corporatism which is hinged on the need to 
engage relevant stakeholders or vested interests.  
Thirdly, there is the concept of democratic pluralism which is fundamental to global 
policymaking.   
5.7.1.2. Kofi Annan’s objectives to the Cardoso group 
What is significant about the Cardoso report is its antecedents. Kofi Annan, the then 
Secretary-General of the United Nations, at his inception to office in 1997 had sought 
to drive the reform of the United Nations and engage the civil society as strategic 
partners in its work.  
Though the idea went through a tumultuous phase, in 2002  - facing much resistance 
from some states, the Cardoso panel was nevertheless appointed against the 
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backdrop of making the UN the focal point of the global political construct321.  The 
range of members of the panel was far-reaching and diverse, from different echelons 
of society. There has been criticism that although the people that constituted the 
panel were eminent persons, they were not experts in the dealings of NGOs and their 
relationship with the United Nations.322  
The objectives out by Kofi Annan for the panel were -   
First, to review existing guidelines, decisions and practices that affect civil society 
organisations’ access to and participation in United Nations deliberation and 
processes.  
Secondly, to identify best practices in the United Nations system and in other 
international organisations to identify new and better ways of interacting with non-
governmental organisations and other civil society actors from developing countries 
to participate fully in the United Nations activities. 
Thirdly, to review ways of making it easier for civil society actors from developing 
countries to participate fully in the United Nations activities, amongst others.323  
The need for this exercise by the panel was even more relevant due to the assumed 
responsibility of the UN to manage globalisation, which task could be better carried 
out by a more functional, inclusive and egalitarian approach. It could only be 
accomplished if the global community more faith in the UN and felt more included in 
the activities of the UN. Hence, the ultimate objective of the UN to the Cardoso panel 
was to see that the predominant perspective of the public on the United Nations is 
that the UN is an organisation which includes and engages governments, and more 
importantly,  the rest constituencies of the global community in global policy-making.   
The need for the UN to sustain its global relevance could more likely be accomplished 
if the ‘inclusion’ concern is effectively resolved. Although this concern is just one of a 
few concerns, it is a crucial one. Hence, these objectives that the UN  assigned to the 
Cardoso panel were crucial. It was crucial because, as repeatedly mentioned, the 
growing presence of other non-state actors in the global space could no longer be 
ignored. In particular, the influence and capacity of the non-governmental 
organisations globally are increasingly pivotal to the social construct of the global 
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community. The need for inclusion is, therefore, inevitable.  Hence, more traditional 
actors on the international plane face a necessity to reassert their legitimacy in the 
view of the public by including and acknowledging the existence and influence of 
non-governmental organisations. They also face pressure to align with or take into 
cognisance, in their decision making, the view or position of the non-governmental 
organisations. Willetts stated that the United Nations is engaging a policy-making 
characteristic that is marked by multi-stakeholder partnerships. A partnership that 
connects the local with the global, and supplementing the traditional 
intergovernmental process of decision making with a more inclusive global network 
of actors, including governments, civil society actors, firms, private persons and 
others.324  
5.7.1.3. The Cardoso panel's ‘centrality’ and ‘function’ dilemma: NGOs vs 
State  
The Cardoso Report likened the ‘global public opinion’ to a second global super-
power. It held the view that it would be strategic for the United Nations to be in tune 
with global public opinion/interests to enhance its legitimacy.325 NGOs are positioned 
to navigate the public opinion/interests on a myriad of issues and stir up what global 
issues should be brought to the attention of other international actors. For the most 
part, the state remains the only actor that can legitimately decide on these issues for 
them to have a country-level impact and affect real lives. 
It should be noted in response to the Cardoso Report, Kofi Annan sought to reiterate 
a vital point. He stated that although civil society has a significant influence in the 
global space, the state remains the chief interlocutors for country-level engagement 
with the United Nations.   However, according to the glossary of the report, NGOs are 
a significant part of the broader civil society.326 NGOs are seen as the actors that have 
a variety of apolitical expertise. They are perceived as having the core function as the 
voice of public opinion/interests. This unique attribute and function of the NGO could 
be very beneficial to the enhancement of the quality and acceptance of the UN’s 
policy-making endeavours. However, it does not In presenting the report, a 
correspondent asked whether increased civil society participation in the General 
Assembly, which was also suggested in the report could raise tensions between 
government representatives and NGOs, and the case of the invasion of Iraq was 
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pointed out. The response was that the civil society organizations would have no seat 
or vote in the General Assembly, he explained, but would simply be allowed a voice 
The challenge remains that though the functional place of NGOs is etched in the 
fabric of the international community, the form and status by which they are identified 
in the international community remains unclear. The position of the researcher aligns 
with Peter Willet and follows the aphorism in architecture that form follows function327. 
So, given the pivotal role that NGOs play in the international community, debatably 
functioning as the voice of the public opinion/interests, particularly with United 
Nations, they should be given a form and status in the international community that 
reflects their function and relevance in the society.  
This opinion rests on the position of the Cardoso panel in one section of the report, 
which was titled ‘streamlining and depoliticising accreditation and access’. This 
section canvassed for the accreditation of NGOs to be based on functional factors 
such as expertise, competence and skills.  
Additionally, the function and relevance of NGOs in their dealings with the United 
Nations and other international organisations continue to be made more apparent 
since the advent of stakeholder capitalism in the 1980s onwards and particularly in 
1990s.328  Stakeholder capitalism is a classification of corporations orientation to serve 
the interests of all their stakeholders as opposed to just the shareholders.329  There has 
been a wave of global partnerships, multi-sectorial colloquium, multi-stakeholder 
dialogues and collaboration across various constituencies and between public and 
private sector to deal with global issues. These have evolved into various global 
summits on sustainable development and economic enhancement to which NGOs 
have been very crucial. It was on this premise that the Cardoso Report proposed that 
the United Nations should have an Office of Constituency Engagement and 
Partnership with an under-secretary-general in charge. The office was to consist of the 
Civil Society Unit charged to promote a partnership approach.330  
The challenge, however, is the question of whether these key roles that non-
governmental organisations have assumed on the international plane have been so 
assumed legitimately and to whom are these influential non-governmental 
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organisations accountable? This question cannot be adequately responded to 
without an exhaustive debate on the democratic characteristics needed for the 
legitimacy of non-governmental organisations. The democratic elements are 
indicative that it is the will of the majority of the members of the international or 
national society, and not just the overriding influence of a few, or an internal construct 
which is not inclusive. The question of the democratic element of NGOs remains 
central to any debate on the legitimacy of NGOs. For any system to be considered 
democratic, certain factors are taken into consideration. Some of such factors 
include -  the decision-making process which must be typified by transparency, 
diversity, and there must be a system for accountability for the decisions taken.331  
The United Nations and most international organisation contend that they owe their 
accountability to the governments and to the specific stakeholders for which they are 
formed. However, there remains a need for the United Nations and international 
organisations to stay transparent to all direct and indirect stakeholders. Often, it is the 
unspoken rule and role of most NGOs to bring that transparency or lack of it to visibility 
for the public, which would in its turn result in more or less credibility for the international 
organisations. Hence, the role of NGOs in ensuring that democratic principles are 
adhered to globally remains one of its most relevant factors. Their role in the 
enhancement of democracy and reshaping multilateralism cannot be 
overemphasised. As a result of this essential role of the NGOs, the NGOs must be 
themselves of a democratic construct. 
5.7.1.4. An enhanced role of NGO’s in global relations 
The sum of the purpose of the Cardoso report appears to be that the traditional 
intergovernmental process that characterises that United Nations and their dealings 
with the governments of member states need a rethink. The UN and their state-centric 
relations with states in the formulation of global policies which are to be implemented 
are increasingly dated. They have been supplanted what has been referred to by the 
United Nations as the “global policy networks”  which would bring together 
constituencies such as civil society among others, along with central governments, in 
joint initiatives for policy analysis and action332.  
It behoves on the United Nations and other international organisations to adapt to this 
new paradigm and be formally inclusive of NGOs and other key actors, going beyond 
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its core membership of central governments. -  an added organ of the UN referred to 
as the People’s Assembly should be considered.  A network interweaved by civil 
society, of requisite representative capacity to continually engage with the UN-based 
on representing the voice of the people directly to the UN and other international 
stakeholders.   Hence, these new networks should be entrenched in the global 
policymaking system. 
Hence, a rethink of global relations is imperative. On the one hand, the UN Charter 
categorically states that that the world body is made up of states. At the same time, 
on the other hand, it also talks of "universal values," such as human rights. These 
universal values are often advocated for and safeguarded by NGOs as the defacto 
watchdogs of the states.333  The panel’s opinion is that there should be a move from 
the previous top-down approach of governance, i.e. global agreements transmitted 
to governments for national implementation, to a bottom-up approach.  
There should be a change from the top-down approach to the bottom-up approach 
where the United Nations, governments and a range of civil society actors would 
collaborate on strategies for translating global agreements into programmes relevant 
to the national context. At the same time, pushing the lessons learned from national 
processes upward to inform the setting of the global agenda.334 
However, there is a significant portion of governments of states in the international 
community who have been hostile to NGOs. This hostility, exists, regardless of the drive 
for the incorporation of NGOs to the global policy-making. Interestingly, the 
antagonism has not come only from dictatorial governments, but at times, also from 
democratic governments, including the United States, France and India.335  
Today, there are possibilities and increased probabilities of a new norm which 
incorporates other global policy networks, including NGOs, in global policymaking 
and the reshaping of the 21st-century international legal framework; a legal framework 
which ought to be characterised by legal pluralism. However, given the current 
argument that NGOs, even as a watchdog, do not all have the pedestal to be 
watchdogs, especially where their structure is not incontrovertibly considered to be 
democratic. According to some schools of thought, the NGOs need a watchdog,336 
and should not be considered for any elevation from their current state. Hence, some 
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hold the position, that due to the preceding, it is no surprise that there is a lack of a 
precise and formalised status of NGOs in the international space and global 
policymaking. The Cardoso Report confirms that the United Nations and other 
international organisations must be aware of the “democracy deficits” to which 
global governance is prone. As a result, a clear position should be held on this.   
Nowadays, public opinion/interests, of which NGOs increasingly personifies, is on the 
increase. With the advent of the internet and other elements of globalisation, public 
opinion/interests reverberate globally and is indeed a significant and powerful force 
in shaping policies and priorities. Hence, the international community, which is 
consisted of states, should be proactive by facilitating an increased legitimacy by the 
incorporation of the ‘public-opinion/interests-embodied-NGOs’ in global 
policymaking. It is one of the main ways by which the ‘democracy deficit’ that 
plagues global policy-making as well as NGOs could be tackled effectively.  The 
pivotal role of the NGOs in this 21st-century international community can not be 
overemphasised. It is, therefore, in the interest of all actors in the international 
community to legitimise the role of NGOs. It can be done by giving them an 
enhanced status in the international community and regularise their activities, 
creating the expected sense of predictability and accountability that should follow 
such a vital legal construct as the NGOs. It would also guarantee a democratic 
disposition in the carrying on of their activities.  
5.7.2. The scope of NGO’s interface with the UN and its activities 
The United Nations has had a continued interface with non-governmental 
organisations representing the interests of civil societies globally since its inception in 
1945.  
The impetus for creating the United Nations came from an understanding, after two 
world wars, that a global framework for working together was essential to avoid a 
repeat of the catastrophic suffering.337 However, the mindset of working together was 
that of states working together. Over the years, other players have shown significant 
relevance to global work. Today, scepticism is also on the increase globally 
particularly as to the value of multilateralism and the United Nations, while 
approaching its 75th year, continues to face the challenge of remaining relevant and 
effective. Secretary-General António Guterres recognised this when he took office, 
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declaring: “We need to re-assert the value of multilateralism; only global solutions can 
address global problems.”338  
One of the most significant developments in the relationship between the United 
Nations and non-governmental organisations was the resolution of the United Nations 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).  The prescription for the relations between 
the UN and the NGOs are outlined in Article 71 of the United Nations Charter and 
ECOSOC resolution 1996/31. It is one of the few and foremost regulatory channels by 
which the UN can interfaces NGOs.  The rights and privileges enumerated in detail in 
the resolution enable qualifying organisations to contribute to the work programs and 
goals of the United Nations. 
The overarching purpose of the United Nations and the possible cooperation with 
other actors is to help solve the problems facing the world today via camaraderie; 
facilitating communication and information exchange and promoting mutually 
supportive activities between diverse groups of state and non-state actors. To this end, 
the United Nations maintains close relations with thousands of NGOs around the world 
because NGOs play an important role in interactions between civil society and 
government.339  
Before one embarks on an attempt to unpack the provisions of Art 71 and its 
implications, it would be a helpful exercise to get an understanding of the Economic 
and Social Council of the United Nations – The ECOSOC. 
5.7.3. The Economic and Social Council – ECOSOC 
The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)  is pivotal to the United Nations system 
and has described its key objective as the advancement of the three dimensions of 
sustainable development – economic, social and environmental. It stands as the 
central avenue within the United Nations upon which extensive debates and 
innovative thinking is fostered, to the end of reaching an agreement on ways forward, 
working with the relevant stakeholders to achieve the internationally agreed goals.340  
The Economic and Social Council is one of the six organs of the United Nations. The 
United Nations has six major organs, namely; General Assembly, the Security Council, 
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the Economic and Social Council, the Secretariat, the International Court of Justice 
and the Trusteeship Council.341  
The various organs have their various purposes and compositions. However, for this 
work, the ECOSOC is very relevant. The main concerns of ECOSOC are sustainable 
development; social development; status of women; population and development, 
and human rights.342  
The ECOSOC addresses its main concerns by promoting three main activities:  
 •Creating higher standards of living, full employment and conditions for socio-
economic progress and development.  
•Solving problems related to international health, economics and social issues 
and promoting international cultural and educational cooperation.  
•Establishing universal respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for 
all regardless of race, gender, ethnicity, religion or language.343 
As can be gleaned from its website, it primarily deals with matters of the UN that 
revolves around subjects of economic and social relevance. The two terms- 
economic and social, are broad terms, which in turn makes the remit of the ECOSOC 
very wide-ranging. The import of this is that the mandate of the ECOSOC could extend 
into matters human rights, environmental concerns, religion, poverty alleviations, 
national corruption, business and industry, technology and to some extent 
humanitarian response to war-torn areas and the aftermath. The list could be endless, 
and to this end, it could be stated that the ECOSOC is almost all-encompassing.  
At the inception of the ECOSOC after 1945 further to the UN Charter; it was a small 
executive council constituted of members who were just about 18 governments as 
elected by the General Assembly. It was soon expanded to 27 governments in 1965 
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and then 54 members in 1971. The Council's 54 member governments are elected by 
the General Assembly for overlapping three-year terms. Seats on the council are 
allotted based on geographical representation with fourteen allocated to the African 
States, eleven to the Asian States, six to the Eastern European States, ten to Latin 
American and the Caribbean States, and thirteen to Western European and other 
States.344  
Today, ECOSOC  is a network hub of the various other bodies that come under the 
umbrella of the United Nations as part of the UN family of entities with a core 
commitment to ensuring the existence and maintenance of sustainable 
development. For the most part, it provides the overarching guidance and 
coordination for most of these other related entities. The entities include regional 
economic and social commissions, functional commissions facilitating 
intergovernmental discussions of major global issues, and specialised agencies, 
programmes and funds at work around the world to translate development 
commitments into real changes in people’s lives.345  
Further to its capacity and mandate to coordinate the various other related 
organisations within the UN system, ECOSOC is positioned as a gateway for UN 
partnership and participation by the rest of the world. To this end, it is positioned as a 
rendezvous for productive dialogues among policymakers, parliamentarians, 
academics, foundations, businesses, youth and 3,200 plus registered non-
governmental organisations.346 
The increased relevance of the ECOSOC over the recent years have been as a result 
of the reforms over the last decade, particularly General Assembly resolution 68/1. The 
resolution acknowledged the preeminence of ECOSOC in the identification of 
emerging challenges. Including its lead role in promoting reflection, debate and 
innovative thinking on development, as well as in achieving a balanced integration 
of the three dimensions of sustainable development.347 Hence, the leading role of the 
ECOSOC in identifying emerging challenges, promoting innovation, and achieving a 
balanced integration of the three pillars of sustainable development—economic, 
social and environmental has been rejuvenated. The ECOSOC has created the 
primary passage which the civil society interfaces with the United Nations and it is a 
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relevant reference point for other actors on the international plane to determine and 
design the parameters and form of engagement with the NGOs. The need for the 
partnership of the United Nations with the NGOs was enshrined in the UN Charter. 
Article 71 of the Charter will be explored further hereunder.  
5.7.3.1. The Scope of Article 71 of the UN Charter 
Article 71 of the UN Charter provides as follows –  
‘The Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for 
consultation with non-governmental organisations which are concerned 
with matters within its competence. Such arrangments may be made with 
international organisations, and where appropriate, with national 
organisations after consultation with the Member of the United Nations.’348 
This clause means that the ECOSOC can consult with NGOs on matters that are within 
its competence.  
So, are the matters referred to matters within the competence of the ECOSOC or the 
NGOs, or both? Due to the construction of Article 71, there is some level of ambiguity 
in giving a literal and pedantic interpretation.  
The rationale for this enquiry is, if it is interpreted to mean – ‘matters within the 
competence of the NGOs’, then it could be implied that any NGO could be 
consulted by the ECOSOC on any matters. Including matters of international peace 
and security, if they have the competence to hold consultations, even where such 
matters fall clearly within the purview of the UN Security Council. On the other hand, 
if it is interpreted to mean – ‘matters that are within the competence of the ECOSOC’, 
then it means that it excludes some NGOs. So NGOs which may have mandates that 
are linked to international matters that are within the exclusive remits of other organs 
of the United Nations, such as international peace and security et cetera are 
excluded. It means that some NGOs may not be eligible for consultation with the 
ECOSOC of the United Nations under the provisions of article 71 of the UN Charter.  
The predominant consensus is that the latter interpretation is preferred. The import of 
this is that article 71 provides a basis for the recognition of NGOs in their interface on 
the international plane, and the remit of the ECOSOC is vast and could at times be 
considered all-encompassing. However, further to Artice 71 of the UN Charter, other 
organs of the United Nations, still require some legal or regulatory basis to legitimately 
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recognize and interface with NGOs which are driven by mandates that are within their 
remits. 
Scholars have also held this position that given the language of Article 71, the scope 
is quite clear and in context, it suggests that it limits the involvement of NGOs to only 
activities of the ECOSOC itself. It cannot extend in meaning to suggest that the 
ECOSOC could make suitable arrangements for NGOs to interface with other UN 
organs. Notably, the General Assembly upon which rests the responsibility and the 
general competence to deal with all issues falling within the ambit of the UN Charter, 
and the Security Council.349 
Therefore, this thesis opines that there need to be further formal recognition NGOs on 
the international plane and in particular within the United Nations, beyond only 
economic and social matters. 
However, it should be pointed out that over time, the practice of NGOs in the 
international community has seen an evolution. This evolution plays out in the extent 
to which the NGOs now interface with other organs of the United Nations. Of particular 
note would be the increased participation of NGOs in the work of the United Nations 
General Assembly’s main committees and that of some of its subsidiary bodies, as well 
as in special sessions of the Assembly.350 A typical example is the ICC which was given 
observer status with the UN General Assembly in 2016.351 It should be noted that some 
of these participations are still informal and they lack the degree of legitimacy that is 
seen in the participation of NGOs with the activities of the ECOSOC, as a result of 
Article 71 of the UN Charter. 
Additionally, beyond the import that Article 71 of the UN Charter does not extend to 
the involvement of NGOs with other organs of the United Nations, it also does not 
extend to the participation of NGOs with the organisations or specialised agencies of 
the United Nations. It implies that it is the prerogative of the various organisations and 
specialised agencies of the United Nations to design the relevant regulatory 
framework by which NGOs can legitimately be recognised and participate in their 
activities. So, there would be some legal frameworks, by which NGOs are engaged 
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on the international plane. Some scholars have held the view that Articles 71 of the 
UN Charter and the participation of NGOs with the ECOSOC sets a clear benchmark 
for other United Nations Agencies.352 It has been noted that in recent years, many 
United Nations Organisations have been taking steps to review their relationships with 
NGOs.353 However, ECOSOC remains the key gateway by which NGOs can interface 
with the United Nations. 
 
5.7.3.2. ECOSOC Resolution 1996/31 
On the 25th of July 1996, ECOSOC adopted what is now popularly known as the 
Resolution 1996/31 on ‘Consultative Relationships between the United Nations and 
Non-Governmental Organisations’354, under its mandate in article 71 of the UN 
Charter. The resolution makes provisions for the types of consultation NGOs may enter 
into, as well as the extent of the participatory rights that NGOs may have with the 
ECOSOC and its subsidiary organs. The resolution also lays out the basis for 
accreditation of NGOs, the rules for their participation in United Nations’ conferences 
and the grounds for suspension or withdrawal of their consultative status.355  
The Resolution 1996/31 is an updated version of the resolution 1296 of the 23rd of May 
1968,356 which restricted the UN processes to just international NGOs. This restriction 
was done away with the in Paragraphs 5 and 8 of the  Resolution 1996/31, and then 
immediately, UN processes were also opened to national NGOs.  
The definition of NGOs adopted by the Resolution 1996/31, was structured in a way 
that it precludes the involvement of government in the setting up of an NGO.357 Any 
financial contribution or other support, direct or indirect, from a Government to the 
NGO must be openly declared to the Committee through the Secretary-General and 
fully recorded in the financial and other records of the organization. It shall be 
devoted to purposes per the aims of the United Nations.358 
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Paragraph 12 provides as follows –  
‘ Any such organization that is not established by a governmental entity or 
intergovernmental agreement shall be considered a non-governmental 
organization for the purpose of these arrangements, including 
organizations that accept members designated by governmental 
authorities, provided that such membership does not interfere with the free 
expression of views of the organization.’359 
However, the definition of NGOs is tacit on the profit-making element of an 
organisation. It should be pointed out that the structure of the definition implicitly 
excludes profit-making NGOs. The requirements for NGOs to be accredited and 
considered eligible for being conferred with a consultative status includes a 
requirement that the primary resources of the organization shall be derived in the 
majorly from contributions of the national affiliates or other components or individual 
members.360   
Resolution 1996/31, in alignment with the provisions Art 71 of the UN Charter provides 
for the granting of the consultative status to NGOs, and it outlines two key motivators 
for bestowing such status on NGOs. Firstly, to allow for the Council to secure an expert 
opinion from organisations that have specialised expertise and competences in the 
relevant subject area in view. Secondly, to allow for NGOs who represent the views of 
a significant portion of the public opinion to put forth their positions on these issues.361 
According to the resolution, NGOs could be granted different types of consultative 
status. The three types of status include –  
1. General Consultative Status; 
2. Special Consultative Status; or  
3. Inclusion on the Roster.  
All of these would be discussed in further details in the sections to follow.  
The variety of options is dependent on the nature of the NGO and the activities that 
they carry on. Also, the extent of their influence and contribution to the works of the 
council is considered. With each category of status that NGOs could be given comes 
certain corresponding rights. These rights have been clearly stated to be different from 
the rights that could be accrued to non-member states of the council or the rights of 
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the representatives of UN specialised agencies. For example, the provisions of 
Resolution 1996/31 do not provide that NGOs should have the capabilities to 
participate in voting. The extent of the involvement of NGOs with the council was 
primarily to participate without voting.  
It goes to the crux of this thesis. The influence of NGOs on the international plane is 
such that it is deserving of a declaratory status and not only a participatory status.  
NGOs should have a status which allows them to vote rather than having a mere 
participatory status. This restriction on voting right is similar to what is obtainable with 
the states which are not members of the Council. However, it is a deliberate attempt 
by the drafters of the resolution to distinguish the kind of rights enjoyed by different 
actors on the international plane. So, the objective is that the rights that are enjoyed 
by states regardless of if they are members of the council or representatives of the UN 
specialised agencies should be distinguished from the kind of rights that are enjoyed 
by non-governmental organisations in the same circumstance. 
Hence, the provisions of paragraph 18 of the Resolution 1996/31 states as follows-    
‘A clear distinction is drawn in the Charter of the United Nations between 
participation without [a] vote in the deliberations of the Council and the 
arrangements for consultation. Under Articles 69 and 70, participation is 
provided for only in the case of States, not members of the Council, and of 
specialised agencies. Article 71, applying to non-governmental 
organisations, provides for suitable arrangements for consultation. This 
distinction, deliberately made in the Charter, is fundamental and the 
arrangements for consultation should not be such as to accord to non-
governmental organisations the same rights of participation as are 
accorded to States not members of the Council and to the specialised 
agencies brought into relationship with the United Nations.’ 
Notably, it implies that NGOs could have even lesser rights than that that is enjoyed 
by the non-member states of the council or even the UN specialised agencies. To 
further bolster this point, paragraph 19 of the Resolution 1996/31 highlights the fact 
that the wheel of the international system of law and governance need not be 
reinvented and that core purpose for the council should not be altered because of 
the involvement of the NGOs with the council in its consultative role. As can be 
gleaned from the preceding, the rights enjoyed by the NGOs are such that are 




So, the various categories by which NGOs could be involved with the ECOSOC must 
be discussed to ascertain the extent of the rights and influence of NGOs. It is only at 
this point that a valid and informed argument could be made as to the status of NGOs 
concerning their dealings with the United Nations, and particularly the Economic and 
Social Council. This discussion should eventually lead to more clarity for NGOs 
concerning their participation in the international affairs and by extension, increased 
legitimacy within the international legal framework.  
Ripinsky and Bossche hold the view that increased participation and legitimacy may 
stifle the decision-making process of the ECOSOC362, and international law as a whole. 
Moreover, this is not necessarily a negative. The rights accruing to NGOs are severely 
tempered with several conditions. These conditions are to retain ECOSOC’s oversight 
and control over the involvement of NGOs in their organisation. Moreover, so it 
presents a deficit in the international legal order, which is removed from the 21st 
Century realities. This position is held because the role of the non-state actors in the 
21st Century international community is so fast-paced that any entanglement of 
exclusion of such players will be problematic. 
5.7.3.2.1. The General Consultative Status 
Further to paragraph 22 of the Resolution 1996/31, there are specific criteria which a 
non-governmental organisation need to meet to be given the General Consultative 
Status with the ECOSOC.363  
 Firstly the non-governmental organisations must deal in most of the activities of 
the Council and its subsidiary bodies.  
 Secondly, the non-governmental organisation must be able to convincingly 
show that they have significant and consistent contributions which would 
facilitate the achievement of the objectives of the United Nations in matters 
falling within the competence of the Economic and Social Council and its 
subsidiary bodies.  
 Furthermore, the non-governmental organisations must demonstrate that they 
are closely involved with the economic and social life of the peoples of the 
areas they represent.  
 Lastly, their representative capacity should be broad and far-reaching; with a 
significant size of membership which is broadly representative of major 
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segments of society in a large number of countries in different regions of the 
world.  
When a non-governmental organisation meets these criteria, then they are eligible to 
be granted the General Consultative Status with the United Nations Economic and 
Social Council. 
NGOs which attain this status are entitled to very far-reaching rights and privileges, 
beyond what is obtainable in the other two categories of consultative status with the 
UN ECOSOC. Also, the rights would differ where the consultative status is not with the 
council itself, but with its commissions or other subsidiaries organs of the council.364  
However, as shall be noted, there are challenges as to whether these rights accruable 
are enough and whether the privileges should be more rights than privileges, at least 
in practice. 
Some of the rights that accruable to a non-governmental organisation with a general 
consultation status are provided for in paragraphs 27 – 30 of the Resolution 1996/31, 
and they include – 
1. Paragraph 27 provides that Non-governmental organisations with a 
General Consultative Status are entitled to be informed of a provisional 
agenda of the Council.365 
Having a  General Consultative Status entitles the non-governmental organisations 
the right to propose to the Council Committee on Non-Governmental Organisations 
that the Committee request the Secretary-General to place items of special interest 
to the organisations in the provisional agenda of the Council.366 However, this right is 
subject to certain conditions, including informing the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations at least 63 days before the commencement of the session and giving due 
consideration to any comments the Secretary-General may make. The interpretation 
of due consideration remains hanging.367 Moreover, the proposal shall be formally 
submitted with the relevant necessary documentation not later than 49 days before 
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the commencement of the session and the item shall be included in the agenda of 
the commission if it is adopted by a two-thirds majority of those present and voting. 
2. Additionally, paragraph 29 provides that an NGO with General 
Consultative Status may designate authorised representatives to sit as 
observers at public meetings of the Council and its subsidiary bodies.368  
However, it is essential to note that these attendance arrangements may be 
supplemented to include other modalities of participation. 
3. Furthermore, paragraph 30 provides that written statements relevant to the 
work of the Council may be submitted by organisations in General 
Consultative Status on subjects in which these organisations have a special 
competence.369 
Such statements get the audience of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 
who then has the responsibility to circulate same to the members of the Council when 
they are still relevant and in-date. So, where the statements deal with matters which 
have already been disposed of or have already been circulation by other means, 
there would be no further need for the Secretary-General to duplicate the process. 
It should be noted that, concerning the provisions of paragraph 30, certain conditions 
shall be observed regarding the submission and circulation of such statements370: 
Firstly the written statement ought to be submitted in one of the official languages. 
Secondly, sufficient time should be allowed for the Secretary-General and the 
relevant organisation to have the requisite robust consultation, before it is circulated. 
The consultation may lead to views and comments from the Secretary-General, and 
the organisation is obliged to give such and view or comment due consideration.  
If the written statement submitted by an organisation in General Consultative Status is 
to be circulated in full, then the drafters of the statement must endeavour to see that 
the written statement does not exceed 2,000 words. If they fail to do so, then they are 
obliged to submit a summary which shall be circulated. There is also the option to 
provided the full text in enough copies of the full text in the working languages for 
distribution. A statement will also be circulated in full, however, upon a specific 
request of the Council or its Committee on Non-Governmental Organisations; 
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4. Para 32 provides for oral presentations 
A significant privilege that could be accrued to organisations with a general status is 
that the Council Committee on Non-Governmental Organisations shall make 
recommendations to the Council as to which of such organisations should make an 
oral presentation to the Council.371  The Council is entitled to determine the basis or 
terms upon which they should be heard including what items they could be heard. 
Upon their approval, such organisations may be heard. The same organisations may 
further be invited by the president of the Council and shall be allowed to make one 
statement to the Council, subject to the approval of the Council.  
Additionally, whenever the Council discusses the substance of an item proposed by 
a non-governmental organisation in General Consultative Status and included in the 
agenda of the Council, such an organisation shall be entitled to present orally to the 
Council. The presentation shall be as appropriate, an introductory statement of an 
expository nature. Furthermore,  during the discussion of the item, the same 
organisation may be invited by the President of the Council, to make an additional 
statement for purposes of clarification.  
5.7.3.2.2. The Special Consultative Status 
There are Non-Governmental Organisations that have special competence in and 
are concerned specifically with, only a few of the fields of activity covered by the 
Council and its subsidiary bodies.  The NGOs with this status are known within the fields 
for which they have or seek consultative status.372 
An NGO with a General Consultative Status differs from that with Special Consultative 
Status in the scope of their competences. The former must deal in most of the activities 
of the Council and its subsidiary bodies. It must be able to show the extent of their 
contribution to the activities of the United Nations, particularly the ECOSOC and the 
broadness of their membership. The latter, on the other hand,  deals with only a few 
of the fields of activities covered by the council and its subsidiary bodies. 
However, like their counterparts with General Consultative Status, NGOs with a Special 
Consultative Status enjoy some rights and privileges. Most of which are similar to that 
enjoyed by NGOs with a General Consultative Status.  Some of the similarities and 
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differences concerning the rights and privileges that they enjoy are provided for in 
paragraphs 27 – 37 of the Resolution 1996/31, and they include –  
 Being informed of the provisional agenda of the Council and its subsidiary 
organs. 
 Option to attend public meetings of the Council and its subsidiary organs. 
 The possibility of being heard by the council (upon the recommendation of the 
Committee on NGO, and in the case of the NGOs with Special Consultative 
Status, they can be heard only in cases where there is no subsidiary organ with 
jurisdiction over the subject-matter concerned.373 
 Option to submit written statements subject to similar conditions as that to 
which the organisations with a general status are subject. The difference, 
however, is that the written statements must not exceed 500 words for the 
council and 1500 words for the subsidiary organs. Moreover, where they do, 
the NGOs should make arrangements for a summary, which would then be 
circulated. According to para 43 of the Resolution 1996/31, where the council 
of its Committee on NGO or a subsidiary organ have requested the written 
statement, then the prescribed word limit would not be applicable. 
 Upon the request of a subsidiary organ of the Council, they can opt to carry 
out specific studies or investigations or prepare specific papers.  
 Paragraph 28 provides another distinguishing feature between NGOs with a 
General Consultative Status and Special Consultative Status. 
 The NGOs with Special Consultative Status cannot propose to place items that 
they have an interest in on the agenda of the Council or that of its subsidiary 
organs. Also, concerning their privilege of making an oral presentation at the 
meetings of the Council is quite limited. They are only able to make an oral 
presentation in the absence of a subsidiary body of the Council with jurisdiction 





                                                             




5.7.3.2.3. Roster Status 
Besides the first two categories already discussed, there is another category which 
can be referred to as the Roster. Non-governmental organisations which neither has 
the general nor the Special Consultative Status can be included on a list known as the 
Roster. An organisation is put on the Roster, where –  
‘the Council, or the Secretary-General of the United Nations in consultation 
with the Council or its Committee on Non-Governmental Organisations, 
considers that the organisation can make occasional and useful 
contributions to the work of the Council or its subsidiary bodies or other 
United Nations bodies within their competence.’375 
This list may also include organisations in consultative status or a similar relationship 
with a specialised agency or a United Nations body. These organisations shall be 
available for consultation at the request of the Council or its subsidiary bodies. The 
fact that an organisation is on the Roster shall not in itself be regarded as a 
qualification for general or Special Consultative Status should an organisation seek 
such status.376 
Like the previous two categories, there are some similarities and some differences 
concerning the rights and privileges that are accruable to the NGOs in the different 
categories. However, some of the rights and privileges of the NGOs on the roster are 
provided for in paragraphs 24 – 39 of the Resolution 1996/31 and are as follows –  
 They are informed of the provisional agenda of the Council and its subsidiary 
organs. 
 They may attend meetings of the council and its subsidiary organs concerned 
with matters within the field of competencies 
 Upon the invitation of the Secretary-General, the Council or its Committee on 
NGO, the NGOs on Roster may submit written statements to the Council and its 
subsidiary organs. Submission of written statements under this category should 
be made subject to the same conditions that an NGO with a Special 
Consultative Status. 
 Upon a recommendation of the Secretary-General and if requested by a 
subsidiary organ, an NGO on Roster may be heard by a subsidiary organ. 
                                                             




 Upon the request of a subsidiary organ, an NGO on the Roster may carry out 
specific studies or investigations or prepare specific papers.  
NGOs on the Roster are restricted from making proposals regarding what should be 
on the provisional agenda of the Council or its subsidiary organs. The ECOSOC 
Resolution 1996/31 is silent on making of proposals regarding what should be on the 
provisional agenda of the council from NGOs on the Roster. 
Concerning written statements, the NGOs on the Roster can be circulated in full if it 
does not exceed 500 words. Where a statement is more than 500 words, the NGO shall 
submit a summary which will be circulated. However, the written statements will be 
circulated in full only upon a specific request of the Council or its Committee on Non-
Governmental Organisations. 
Concerning oral presentations to the council, NGOs on a Roster are also restricted. 
They are only allowed to speak at the meetings of ECOSOC’s subsidiary organs further 
to the provision of paragraph 38 of the Resolution 1996/31. It provides that on the 
recommendation of the Secretary-General and at the request of the commission or 
other subsidiary organs, organisations on the Roster may also be heard by the 
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5.7.3.3. Critiquing the rights and privileges accruable to NGOs with a General 
Consultative Status, Special Consultative Status and on the Roster: The 
need for a reconceptualisation 
Rights of NGOs in Different Types of Consultative Status378 






To receive the provisional agenda of the 
Council  
Yes Yes Yes 
Tp propose to place additional items on the 
provisional agenda of the Council (through 
the Committee on NGO 
Yes No No 
To attend public meetings of the Council Yes  Yes Yes 
To submit written statements relevant to the 
work of the Council 
Yes (generally of 
no more than 2000 
words) 
Yes (generally of no 
more than 500 
words) 
Only upon invitation 
(generally of no 
more than 500 
words) 





and in the absence 
of the subsidiary 
organ) 
No 
To make oral presentations of an expository 
nature on items included into the agenda of 
the Council upon the proposition of this NGO 
Yes No No 
Subsidiary Organs 
To receive the provisional agenda of the 
subsidiary organs 
Yes Yes Yes 
To propose to place additional items on the 
provisional agenda of commissions 
Yes No No 
To attend public meetings of the subsidiary 
organs 
Yes Yes Yes 
To submit written statements to the subsidiary 
organs 
Yes( generally of 
no more than 2,000 
words) 
Yes ( generally of no 
more than 1,500 
words) 
Only upon invitation 
(generally of no 
more than 1,500 
words) 
To be consulted by the subsidiary organ 
(includes making oral statements) 
Yes Yes Only at the request 
of the subsidiary 
organ  
To undertake specific studies or investigations 
or prepare specific papers, upon request of a 
subsidiary organ 
Yes Yes Yes 
                                                             




The NGOs interface on the international plane, at least in their relationship with the 
United Nation’s Economic and Social Council, differs from one NGO to the next. The 
rights and privileges enjoyed by the NGOs also differ from one NGO to the next.  
With regards to the consultative status, the main difference in the rights and privileges 
of the NGOs with the General Consultative Status and the Special Consultative Status 
rests primarily on three core issues, namely – 
The rights to propose to put items on the list of the council;  
the word limits of written statements that could be presented for circulation; and  
the possibility to make oral statements. 
It has been posited that the allowances given to NGOs to participate in the public 
meetings do not extend to NGOs the preparatory processes that precede these 
meetings.379  So, while NGOs with some status with the UN’s ECOSOC could have 
access to the public meetings, it is implied that they are excluded from the 
preparatory meetings and are not give any preparatory working documents which 
are given to state delegation. They are only given the provisional agenda. 
So, while it can be seen that the rights of an NGO with a general or Special 
Consultative Status is quite extensive, it is subject to the prerogatives of other bodies 
and in effect could bring its independence to question. These rights and privileges are 
better classified as privileges, because, NGOs are not able to use their rights and 
privileges except there are recommendations, approvals, and requests of the 
ECOSOC or other subsidiary organs of the council.380 For instance,  a pre-requisite for 
the circulation of written statements made by NGOs is that the NGOs are mandated 
to take into consideration the comments made by the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations on the written statements.381 Depending on its interpretation, this 
provision could be considered as an impediment to the independence of the NGO. 
Secondly, the restriction as to the number of NGOs that are given an oral audience 
buttresses the point that these rights and privileges are best classified as a mere 
privilege and not a right. This provision allows for arbitrariness in the process by which 
NGOs are selected to be heard. It is based on the recommendation of the Committee 
on NGO before an NGO could be given an oral audience with the council. Even 
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when this is done, the Council is entitled to determine the basis or terms upon which 
they should be heard including what items they could be heard on, and upon their 
approval, such organisations may be heard. This arbitrariness hampers the 
effectiveness of NGOs and reinforces the point that the influence of the NGOs on the 
international plane today is not commensurate to the extent of their recognition, nor 
is it proportionate to the level of regulatory legitimacy that they enjoy. 
It should also be pointed out that, even where NGOs are invited by the president of 
the Council to present orally to the Council, they can only do so ‘as appropriate’. The 
parameters being appropriate is undefined. Where such undisclosed parameters are 
met, the NGOs are only allowed to make introductory statements of an expository 
nature, and in the course of the discussion of the item before the Council, an 
additional statement may be allowed, although, only for further clarification. 
Therefore, the real value that NGOs enjoy from the elevated status with the United 
Nations is the arbitral benefits and privileges. These benefits include having some level 
of access to lobbying as a result of their elevated status. Martens has argued that the 
consultative status is a free pass for the NGOs to the UN buildings and offices; having 
a UN badge gives the NGOs access to directly contact UN delegates and their 
representatives during these meetings, even during the preparatory phases, albeit 
informally. 382 These arbitral benefits and privileges are the real value that NGOs get 
from being recognised at this level.  This access is of key significance and importance 
to the NGOs, particularly to advocacy NGOs more than to service NGOs, as it enables 
them to keep abreast of current discussions, projects and decisions and lobby officials 
informally to influence key decision-makers. Unfortunately, this is beneath what should 
be accrued to NGOs given their influence. The picture of NGOs walking in the 
corridors and walkways, trying to catch a moment with a UN delegate or 
representative to implore and push their agenda is not in tune with the influence that 
NGOs wields in the realms of public opinion. 
5.8. Chapter 5 Part A: Conclusion 
This first part of this chapter focused on providing an understanding of non-
governmental organisations.  
This chapter revealed that there is a paradox of legitimacy with NGOs. It plays out in 
the undeniable informal acceptance of NGOs by the global citizenry and actors of 
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the international community. However, on the other hand, there is an incessant 
reluctance or resistance by the same global actors to formally accept NGOs as a 
legitimate actor of the international community. Hence, NGOs were described as the 
legitimate illegitimate non-state actor on the international plane. The findings from the 
Cardoso report emphasised the point that active engagement with civil society was 
a necessity that was germane to the continued relevance of the United Nations in the 
21st Century. 
One of the principal objectives of this part was to attempt a good definition of an 
NGO and adequately describe it. In embarking on a clear description of an NGO, its 
attributes, classification and functions were examined. The findings revealed that 
NGOs are law-abiding voluntary organisations, intrinsically independent of the 
government and the influence of the government, representing either public or 
private interests. It was also observed that even if NGOs may need to run on profit, 
profit-making cannot be the objective of the NGO.  This examination was imperative 
to make a justifiable argument for their legitimacy. Also, the journey to prominence of 
NGOs due to its endowment with consultative status the ECOSOC was considered. In 
the discharge of their causes over the years, it was observed that although their 
influence is on the increase, their functional role falls short of being decision-makers. 
Essentially, while this thesis seeks out a declaratory status for NGOs, their role in 
international governance remains mainly participatory. Along these lines, the criteria 
by which NGOs are endowed, such even the participatory status were assessed. It is 
summed up to be the need for the NGO to conform with the spirit and purposes and 
principles of the UN, and it should have a transparent and accountable organisational 
structure.  
Additionally, to gain a better understanding of NGOs relationships with globalisation, 
the relationship between NGOs and the United Nations was critically analysed. To this 
end, the Cardoso Report of the Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nation-Civil 
Society Relations of 2004 was thoroughly examined.  The analysis was hinged on  Kofi 
Annan mandate to the panel to review existing generally come review means and 
processes that will enhance the UN’s engagement with the civil society. The findings 
of the report reveal that the enhancement of engagement with civil society is in the 
UN’s interest. It was pivotal to sustaining the relevance of the UN; therefore, a rethink 
of the international legal order was a welcome consideration. The need for the 
paradigm shift is evident in the fact that the UN  Charter acknowledges the significant 
place of states in international relations, but at the same time canvasses for ‘universal 
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values’ such as human rights which are often safeguarded by NGOs as the default 
watchdogs of the state.  
Also, the scope of NGOs interface with the UN and its activities, mainly ECOSOC was 
explored, and the underpinning legislation- article 71 of the Charter of the United 
Nations 1945 is methodically appraised. Along these lines, the ECOSOC resolution 
1996/31on Consultative Relationship between the United Nations and Non-
Governmental Organisations is assessed. The rationale for the granting of such status 
is to allow the Council secure expert opinion from organisations that have specialised 
expertise and competencies in the relevant subject area and to allow NGOs to 
represent a significant portion of the public on relevant issues. The resolution makes 
provision for the types of consultations NGOs may enter into as well as the extent of 
the participatory right that NGOs may have with the ECOSOC and its subsidiary 
organs. It lays out the basis for accreditation of NGOs; the rules for their participation; 
and the grounds for their suspension or withdrawal. 
Consequently, this part considered the general, special consultative status and the 
roster status that NGOs may be granted. A critique of the impact of these statuses on 
the legitimacy of NGOs was carried out. The critique reveals that the real value that 
NGOs enjoys from the elevated status is no more than an arbitral participatory benefit 
and privileges which do not technically extend to any significant right or legal 
obligations. 
This findings of this chapter include the position that the elevated status of NGOs under 
the various legal regime discussed do not correlate with the influence of NGOs. The 
elevation of NGOs has been described as no more than NGOs walking in the corridor 
and walkway of the UN buildings trying to catch a moment with a UN delegate or 
representative to implore or to push their agenda. Occasionally, being called upon 









5. Chapter 5 – Part B: Accreditation and 
Legitimisation of NGOs 
5.9. Chapter 5 Part B: Introduction 
This part examines the legal basis for NGOs elevation statuses discussed in the other 
part. Hence it examines the eligibility requirement of NGOs to be accredited with the 
United Nations on the resolution 1996/31. 
So, the four critical criteria for accreditation are considered. These include  
 the alignment of the NGOs with the United Nations objectives.  
 the democratic constitution and the channels of accountability of the NGOs;  
 the existence and organisational structure; and  
 the basis and source of its funding.  
The procedure for establishing the eligibility of an NGO for accreditation is assessed. 
Additionally, the United Nation’s Committee on Non-Governmental Organisation is 
thoroughly examined. Their role of assessing the application for consultative status by 
NGOs as well as monitoring NGOs activities via the NGOs quadrennial reports is 
evaluated and critiqued. As a result, the political influence in the Committee’s 
discharge of their responsibilities which plays out in unfair and partial decisions or 
decisions along political stance or ideology are identified and investigated. 
Finally, arguments are made for and against the legitimisation of NGOs beyond is the 
current state of elevation. 
5.10. Accreditation of NGOs 
It is imperative to examine the current legal basis for NGOs elevation to these statuses, 
as just discussed in part a of this chapter. ECOSOC’s engagement with these 
organisation will be looked at to see how the NGOs acquire some level of formal 
recognition. The exercise will include looking at the rules for the accreditation or the 
basis for the exclusion of other NGOs from engaging with the same international 
organisations. The extent of NGOs’ accountability and participation in the 
programmes and events on the international plane is very relevant in ascertaining 
whether the status quo sufficiently accommodates NGOs in a way that matches their 
increasing global influence. 
In the context of the United Nations and their interface with NGOs, the ECOSOC 
Resolution 1996/31 creates a clear framework of the eligibility requirements for NGOs 
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to be accredited with the UN. It has been said that accreditation in the UN parlance, 
merely means the conferring of consultative status.383  
Article 71 of the United Nations Charter, which established the ECOSOC stated that 
the ECOSOC might make suitable arrangements for consultation with NGOs which 
are concerned with matters within its competences. Moreover, such agreements may 
be made with international organisations and, where appropriate, with national 
organisations after consultation with the member state of the United Nations 
concerned. 
It is on this premise that the ECOSOC formulates its eligibility requirements for such 
consultative status to be granted. It is important to note that these eligibility 
requirements are for the NGOs to meet and to show that they have met them as 
provided in Resolution 1996/31.  
5.10.1. Criteria for accreditation 
According to the provisions of Resolution 1996/31384, the various criteria for eligibility 
can be broadly condensed into the following -  
 Firstly, whether the activities of the NGO are relevant and align with the 
objectives and competencies of the ECOSOC. Also, whether the NGO is of 
significant representative capacity.  
 Secondly, whether the NGO is democratically constituted; having clear 
and transparent channels of accountability.  
 Thirdly, whether the NGO in existence has a clear organisational structure, 
with an Identifiable headquarters and executive officers 
 Finally, whether the NGO has shown the required basis and source of its 
funding. 
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5.10.1.1. NGO’s relevance and alignment with the objectives and 
competencies of the ECOSOC and representative capacity 
 
Firstly, in determining whether the activities of the NGO are relevant and align with the 
objectives and competencies of the ECOSOC and whether the NGO is of significant 
representative capacity, it is further expounded upon hereunder-  
Paragraph 1 of the Resolution 1996/31385 provides that the non-governmental 
organisation shall be concerned with matters falling within the competence of the 
Economic and Social Council and its subsidiary bodies. Further to the provisions of 
Article 62 of the UN Charter, these matters are far-reaching. It provides that  
‘The Economic and Social Council may make or initiate studies and reports 
with respect to international economic, social, cultural, educational, health 
and related matters and make recommendations with respect to any such 
matters to the General Assembly to the Members of the United Nations, and 
to specialised agencies concerned.’  
Additionally, it may make recommendations to promote the respect for, and 
observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all. 
Paragraph 2 of the Resolution 1996/31386 provides that the aims and purposes of the 
non-governmental organisation shall align with the spirit, purposes and principles of 
the Charter of the United Nations, as provided for in Articles 1 and 2 of the UN Charter. 
Articles 1 and 2 of the UN Charter provided for the purpose and principles of the UN.  
Article 1 provides that purpose of the United Nations is to maintain international peace 
and security and to that end, take measures to deal with threats to peace and acts 
of aggression. Additionally, there is the purpose of developing friendly relations 
amongst nations giving full consideration to equal rights and self-determination of 
peoples. Also, there is the purpose of achieving an international corporation in solving 
global problems that are of economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character in 
the promotion of human rights et cetera.  
The principles of the United Nations are outlined in Article 2 of the UN Charter. The 
chief principle being the principle of sovereign equality of all its Members. Also, there 
is the principle of resolving issues primarily by peaceful means, and the express 
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expectation that its members shall refrain from entering international relations from 
the position of threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or the political 
independence of any state, et cetera. 
From the preceding, it follows that any NGO which acts violently or promotes activities 
that are not inherently peaceful or would not be working towards the adherence of 
the principles of peace and territorial sovereignty of the states. Therefore, are 
contravening the provisions of paragraph 2 and 3 of the Resolution 1996/31. The 
provisions state that the NGO shall be aligned with the spirit, purposes and principles 
of the UN Charter. Hence, this could be sufficient grounds for accreditation request to 
be refused to any applicant. 
Furthermore, ensuring that the activities of the NGO and the United Nations are 
sufficiently linked together to make sense of the accreditation. Hence, paragraph 8 
of the Resolution 1996/31 provides that NGOs across various sections of the national, 
regional, subregional or international communities may be admitted provided that 
they can demonstrate that their programme of work is of direct relevance to the aims 
and purposes of the United Nations. In the case of national organisations, after 
consultation with the Member State concerned. Hence, where the activities of an 
NGO is unrelated or at best, very remotely linked to the aims and purposes of the 
United Nations, such an NGO may not be eligible to be accredited and given a 
consultative status.  
Additionally, paragraph 9 of Resolution 1996/31provides that for an NGO to be given 
a consultative status, such an NGO shall be of recognised standing within the 
particular field of its competence or be representative.387 This provision lacks clarity 
regarding the parameters determining the level of reputation of the applicant NGO 
for such an NGO to meet this requirement. Some scholars have argued that this 
requirement is subjective.388 Usually, some level of recognition from an international 
organisation, some of the specialised agencies of the UN or even a national 
recognition would suffice. It is a question of evidence, and the onus is on the applicant 
NGO to show that they meet the requirement of paragraph 9 of Resolution 1996/31. 
Sometimes the mere proof of the existence of the NGO and the fact that it is active 
in its field of operation should also suffice, mainly where it is a grassroots NGO.389   
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This burden of showing that the NGO has some recognised status goes hand in hand 
with the corresponding requirement – to show that the NGO is representative. It 
suggests that the NGO must show that it represents a substantial portion of the public. 
Where this is shown, it follows then to conclude that the NGO is of some recognised 
status, albeit such recognition has come from the public.  
Paragraph 9 further provides that where there exist some organisations with similar 
objectives, interests and basic views in a given field, they may, for the purposes of 
consultation with the Council, form a joint committee or other body authorised to 
carry on such consultation for the group as a whole. 
 
5.10.1.2. NGO as democratically constituted and with clear and transparent 
channels of accountability 
 
Secondly, in determining whether the NGO is democratically constituted; having 
clear and transparent channels of accountability, is further expounded upon 
hereunder –  
 Paragraph 10 of the Resolution 1996/31 provides that the NGO  
‘…It shall have a democratically adopted constitution, a copy of which 
shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and 
which shall provide for the determination of policy by a conference, 
congress or other representative bodies, and an executive organ 
responsible to the policy-making body.’390 
This requirement has come under much scrutiny amongst NGOs. It is because 
technically, NGOs appear to be inherently undemocratic. They are founded by 
individuals or groups to further a particular agenda in which they have some 
significant interests. The founders of these organisations, while they act in a 
representative capacity, do not have very effective participatory operations beyond 
the request for funds and reporting back on activities. The question then is if this 
requirement is more about a transparent organisational system of operation and 
accountability as opposed to a democratic system. The operational structure of 
NGOs are not more or less democratic than the operational structure of companies, 
and the general principles of corporate governance apply, in addition to the specific 
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guidelines provided by the relevant regulator. The import of this provision is that the 
internal governing structure of the NGO should be in alignment with the principles of 
democracy and checks and balances; where there is a clear demarcation being the 
powers of policymaking and the powers of execution.  
Therefore, it is argued that more emphasis should be placed on the governing 
principles of the NGO rather than the democratic nature of the NGO, and this would 
be more representative of the realities of the workings of NGOs globally. 
Furthermore, paragraph 11 of the Resolution 1996/31391 provides that the NGO shall 
have authority to speak for its members through its authorised representatives and 
evidence of this authority shall be presented if requested. It goes to the question of 
internal legitimacy. This requirement is often met through the provisions of the NGO’s 
constitution or by-laws. The challenge is ascertaining the endowment of mandate or 
authority by the constituents of the NGOs which are represented. Also, the assurance 
of mandate from constituents for whom the NGO claims there is the mandate or 
authority to speak. This question arises because NGOs tend to represent the interest 
of its members. However, at times, it has been criticised to assume the interest of a 
select portion of the populace, and it cannot be ascertained whether that portion of 
the populace has mandated such NGO to represent their interest. 
Paragraph 12 of the Resolution 1996/31 provides that - 
‘the organisation shall have a representative structure and possess 
appropriate mechanisms of accountability to its members, who shall 
exercise effective control over its policies and actions through the exercise 
of voting rights or other appropriate democratic and transparent decision-
making processes…’392  
This provision goes to the question of a transparent system of decision making and 
accountability. The provision refers to an ideal mechanism of decision making and 
accountability to be one where there is effective inclusion regarding the policies and 
actions through the exercise of voting rights or a transparent decision-making process. 
It is important to note that the voting rights requirement is conjoined with the 
requirement for an appropriate democratic and transparent decision-making process 
with the word ‘or’. It indicates that the requirement for voting rights is not mandatory, 
but is in the alternative to an appropriate democratic and transparent decision-
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making process. This line of thought could be in itself moot as voting rights, and 
democratic and transparent decision-making process could be synonymous. 
However, it appears that what is being detailed in this provision is akin to what is 
obtainable in most corporate governance requirements of listed companies. Whether 
this is tantamount to the democratic principle of inclusiveness of the many is 
questionable.  
5.10.1.3. An organisation in existence having a clear organisational structure, 
with an Identifiable headquarters and executive officers 
Thirdly, in determining whether the organisation in existence, having a clear 
organisational structure, with an Identifiable headquarters and executive officers, the 
following is further expounded as follows - 
Paragraph 10 of the Resolution 1996/31 provides that the NGO shall have an 
established headquarters, with an executive officer. It is a straightforward 
requirement.  It exists to ensure that the NGO does have a place from which it carries 
out its objectives. Also, there should be a named person who is responsible for the 
execution of the objectives of the NGO. 
Furthermore, paragraph 61 (h) of the Resolution 1996/31393 states that an NGO that 
applies for consultative status should attest that it has been in existence for at least 
two years as at the date of receipt of the application by the Secretariat and shall be 
in a position to provide the evidence of such existence to the Secretariat.  
Again the import of this is to avoid knee-jerk driven organisations which are not 
sustainable to be elevated to such status. It will reduce the chances that NGOs cease 
from existence even before they are to send in the required quadrennial reports to 
the United Nations. It would lead to more bureaucratic work for the secretariat and 
need to more frequently review their database to ensure that those NGOs which have 
been elevated to such status are indeed still in existence. 
5.10.1.4. The basis and source of its funding 
Lastly, in determining whether the NGO has shown the required basis and source of its 
funding, it is further expounded upon hereunder- 
Paragraph 13 of the Resolution 1996/31 provides that  
‘the basic resources of the organisation shall be derived in the main part 
from contributions of the national affiliates or other components or 
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individual members. Where voluntary contributions have been received, 
their amounts and donors shall be faithfully revealed to the Council 
Committee on Non-Governmental Organisations.’394 
The import of this provision is that the funds of the NGO must be traceable, in order to 
guarantee that the NGO is not doing the biddings of any organisation whose 
objectives are contrary to the spirit, purposes and principles of the United Nations. This 
requirement of financial transparency is also imperative to guard against the 
organisation being linked to potential global money laundering schemes. 
It is important to note that an NGO may be accredited without meeting this 
requirement if it provides sufficient reasons per the complete rendering of the provision 
of paragraph 13 of the Resolution 1996/31. Paragraph 13 suggests that where the 
criterion is not fulfilled, and an organisation gets its finance from other means, the 
organisation need to explain its source to the satisfaction of the Committee. It should 
state its reasons for not meeting the requirements. Any financial contribution or other 
support, direct or indirect, from a Government to the organisation ought to be 
disclosed to the Committee through the Secretary-General and fully recorded in the 
financial and other records of the organisation. Lastly, all the funds souced can only 
be used in meeting the aims of the United Nations.’ 
5.10.1.5. Summing up the criteria for accreditation 
From the preceding, it can be seen that the key four criteria for an NGO to be 
accredited can be summed as follows – 
 That  the applicant NGO’s activities are relevant to the work of ECOSOC 
 That the applicant NGO must have a clear and transparent mechanism for 
decision making and accountability. 
 That there is evidence of the existence of the NGO for no less than two years 
and that there should be the NGO office headquarters and a named 
executive officer 
 That there is clarity as to the source of the funding of the NGO. Where that is 
unavailable, then there should be a satisfactory explanation to that effect. 
However, the Committee on NGO addresses two of the four criteria with more 
significance than the others. They are–  
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 The funding of the NGO – the Committee on NGO wants to be sure that there 
is clarity as to the NGO’s source of funds. That the NGO is independent of 
governments, and it is not a profit-making entity nor is it being funded by some 
interest groups which are not in alignment with the spirit, principles and 
purposes of the UN. Additionally, all the funds of the NGO must be expended 
for the primary objective of the NGO and no other purposes. 
 The activities of the NGO – the Committee on NGO wants to be sure that the 
NGO can practically contribute to the work of the ECOSOC and its subsidiary 
bodies.395  
5.10.2. Criteria for the different status categories 
As per the different categories of the consultative status that the NGOs are eligible, 
further to the provisions of Resolution 1996/31, for an NGO to be elevated to the 
General Consultative Status, paragraph 22 of the Resolution 1996/31 provides that the 
NGO must show that –  
 Its activities are related to most of the activities of the ECOSOC and its 
subsidiary bodies. 
 It has a substantial and sustained contribution to the achievement of the 
objectives of the United Nations. 
 It is closely involved in the economic and social life of the peoples in the areas 
it represents 
 It has a significant membership which is widely representative of the segments 
of the society in a large number of countries globally.396 
 
Concerning the Special Consultative Status, the criteria are as follows –  
 The scope of competence and activities of the NGO are limited to only a 
few fields of activity covered by the Council and its subsidiary bodies. 
 That the NGO is known in the fields for which it seeks to have consultative 
status. 
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NGOs on the Roster are covered explained under paragraph 23 of Resolution 1996/31. 
Paragraph 24 provides –  
‘Where an NGO does not fulfil these criteria for either being eligible for the 
general or the Special Consultative Status, but it can make occasional and 
useful contributions to the work of the council, or its subsidiary bodies, or 
other UN bodies, then such an organisation could be eligible for being put 
on the Roster.’397  
The determination of whether the organisation would be able to make the stated 
contribution is the prerogative of the Council. Alternatively, the Secretary-General in 
consultation with the Council of its Committee on NGO could make such 
determination. Also, an organisation being eligible to be on the Roster is not 
tantamount to meeting the criteria for general or Special Consultative Status should 
an organization seek such status. 
 
In summary, from the preceding, the determinant for what category of consultative 
status an NGO would be given is the scope of its activities and how they relate to the 
activities of the council. Where the scope is broad, then they are likely to be given a 
General Consultative Status. Where the scope deals with only a few of the activities 
of the council, then they are likely to be given a Special Consultative Status. Where 
the scope is neither broad nor deals with only a few activities of the UN, then a 
decision depends on other factors. Notably, the determination made by the Council 
or the Secretary-General of the UN, in consultation with the Committee on NGO, is 
fundamental. So if the NGO could make some occasional and useful contribution, 
then the NGO may be put on the roster.  
5.10.3. The Procedure for Accreditation. 
The procedure for accreditation of an NGO as provided for by the NGO Section of 
the Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) in the Guidelines of Association 
between the United Nations and Non-Governmental Organisations398 is as follows – 
The organisation should write a letter of intent, on its letterhead and signed by its 
secretary-general or president addressed to the NGO Section of the Department of 
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Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) which provides technical support to the 
Committee on NGO. 
Some of the key responsibilities of the NGO Section to the committee, ECOSOC and 
other UN entities are discussed below -  
 They are responsible for the initial screening of the application package from 
NGOs applying for consultative status with the UN. It ensures that all the 
required documents needed for the committee to make an informed decision 
are provided in the application package. Based on that, the committee 
decides whether or not to recommend the status. Their screening confirms 
whether or not the NGO meets technical requirements as prescribed by 
ECOSOC, but they do not decide on whether or not the applicant NGO should 
be given a status. They only screen to see whether the application package 
has all the requisite documents to make the NGO eligible for the consideration 
by the committee. In this period the NGO may be contacted and asked for 
more information or clarification.399  
It is essential to add that the NGO section is not to send an opinion on whether 
or not the NGO should be granted a status when returning the documents to 
the committee. However, it is presumed that when the NGO section sends the 
application to the committee, NGO is deemed to have satisfied the 
accreditation criteria.400  
The NGO section has the powers to reject an application before transmitting it 
to the committee if it considers that the NGO concerned does not meet the 
eligibility requirements.401 
 They have oversight of the authorisation and accreditation process of NGO 
participation in UN-sponsored events. 
 When the NGOs submit their quadrennial reports, a monitoring device which 
states what the activities of the NGO in the four years, the NGO Section has the 
responsibility to process the reports. The report enables the committee to 
monitor the NGOs with either a general or special status to ascertain whether 
they have been amenable to the UN rules and regulations. It details if their 
activities have remained relevant to the activities of the United Nations, and 
have stayed consistent with their initial activities upon which they were 
accredited in the first place.  
                                                             





 They deliver administrative oversight and support, in that they provide a wide  
range of services to NGOs including: 
o They act as a liaison for NGOs to make enquiries on procedures for 
obtaining consultative status or preparing quadrennial reports or 
reclassifying the NGO. To this end, they provide the requisite guidelines 
to the NGOs; 
o They issue the UN passes to representatives of NGOs in Consultative 
Status with the ECOSOC; 
o They act as a liaison with offices of the UN that are relevant to NGOs; 
o They facilitate NGO participation in UN meetings ; 
o They disseminate information on the procedure and other matters 
pertaining to NGOs402 
When the NGO Section of DESA receives the application, they will send the 
application pack by mail, including a questionnaire and all the relevant material to 
the applicant NGO. 
The NGO should fill the application and the questionnaire, and where there are any 
ambiguities or questions, such enquiries should be directed to the NGO section of 
DESA for clarity. 
NGOs are highly persuaded to painstakingly review the instructions for completing the 
application and the questionnaire. To do otherwise may lead to undue delays and 
deferrals in the processing of the application. It may ultimately delay the making of a 
recommendation by the committee. 
The application should include the required accompanying documents, which must 
either be in French or English, before it can be processed by the NGO Section and 
then recommended by the Committee on NGOs to ECOSOC. In circumstances where 
the documents are not written in French or English, then the applicant should send the 
original document alongside an unofficial translation into French or English. The 
requisite documents include403 -  
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o An attestation that the NGO has been in existence for at least two years 
under paragraph 61 of the 1996/31 resolution.  
o A copy of the NGO’s constitution, charter, statutes or by-laws should be 
provided. 
o An attestation or document that the NGO has been in existence for at 
least two years under paragraph 61 of the 1996/31 resolution. It could 
include - Registration papers from the country where the NGO is 
incorporated or holds tax-exempt or non-profit status. For NGOs based 
in countries where there is no legal requirement to register, the NGO 
Section needs evidence that the NGO is a non-profit organisation.  
This document must meet the requirement of being evidence that the 
NGO is in existence must emanate from the government of the country 
where the NGO is registered. Where the registration document which 
evidences the existence of the NGO, originates from an office or an 
entity other than an official government office, such a document will 
not be accepted. 
o A document which shows the source of the funds of the NGO should be 
provided. It includes a copy of the most recently completed financial 
statement, which is prefered to have been audited. The document 
should be exhaustive, stating its income and the source, whether it is 
contributions from members, or if funds have been received from 
governments and inter-governmental sources or they have been 
received from other sources, including private foundations. 
o A list of associations and groups affiliated with the NGO should be 
disclosed. 
o A document showing some of the publications or the reports on the 
activities of the NGO should be provided. These activities should be re 
related to the activities of the United Nations. Publications and articles 
concerning the activities of the NGO  should also be submitted. 
o A completed questionnaire. 
o Finally, a completed summary of the application should be submitted. 
The completed application should be returned to the NGO Section of DESA, and it 
must be received by the 1st of June of the year preceding the year, the applicant 
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NGO is requesting its consideration for recommendation by the Committee on 
NGOs.404 Hence the guidelines give the following example,  -  
‘complete applications, (which include a completed questionnaire and all 
the required supporting documentation) received by the NGO Section 
before 1 June 2000, will be taken up by the Committee on NGOs in the year 
2001.’ 
As aforementioned the key requirements that the Committee on NGOs examines in 
reaching its decision of whether or not a recommendation should be sent to the 
ECOSOC, include the following;  
 the activities of the organisation must be relevant to the work of ECOSOC;  
 there must be a democratic decision-making mechanism;  
 there must be evidence that the NGO has been in existence, having been 
officially registered with a government as an NGO for at least two years; 
 there must be clarity as to the source of funds of the organisation. It will help 
ascertain that the organisation is not government-funded or funded by some 
organisation which does not align with the spirit, principles and purposes of the 
United Nations. 
When the organisation submits its application latest by June of the preceding year,  
the committee will commence the review of the application until a decision is 
reached.  In this period, the contents and facts stated in the completed applications 
would be verified, and potential recommendations would be debated among the 
Committee members. When a decision is reached following these deliberations, the 
decision would be relayed in a draft format to the ECOSOC. It will be relayed in one 
of the Committees reports after either its regular meeting in January or its resumed 
meeting in May.405 
5.11. The Monitoring of NGOs with Elevated Status - the Quadrennial Reports 
NGOs with a General or Special Consultative Status are required to submit a report to 
the Committee every four years. This report is known as the Quadrennial report. It is a 
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brief report of the activities of the NGO in the preceding four years. NGOs who are on 
the Roster are not required to send these reports.406 However, it is essential to note that 
the Committee on NGO may request a report from any NGO. This request could also 
be made to those on the Roster. The Committee may make such a request at any 
time, whether or not the regular four years timeline has elapsed.407 
It is required that the report should be brief, should not be more than four pages, and 
should contain specific information prescribed by the Committee. Some of the 
information required to be in the report include-  
 An introduction, which reiterates the aims and purposes of the NGO; 
 A description of any updates within the NGO, which may have occurred within 
the preceding four years. Some of the changes may include - 
o Whether the NGO has grown in membership strength and expanded 
geographically; 
o whether there have been any significant changes in the source of 
funding for the NGO; 
o whether there are any new affiliations to other NGO in consultation 
status; 
 A synopsis of its involvement and participation in conferences of ECOSOC or 
other entities of the UN stating matters such as their attendance, presentation 
of oral or written statements, dates and places of meetings); 
 A discussion of how the activities of the NGO had contributed and cooperated 
with the UN’s entities and agencies; 
5.12. The Committee on Non-Governmental Organisation and their role in the 
Accreditation of the NGOs  
The Committee on Non-Governmental Organisations was established by the 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in 1946 as a standing committee. It holds its 
annual meetings twice in the year, in January and in May. The January meeting is 
often referred to as the regular session, and the May meeting is referred to as the 
resumed session. After each meeting, it reports directly to ECOSOC. The reports of its 
annual regular session of January and the resumed session of May is sent to the 
Council. It will include the details of matters arising and where there have been 
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resolutions reached, the draft resolutions or decisions on matters calling for action by 
the Council would be stated in the report.408 
The Committee is constituted of nineteen members who are relatively representative 
of the geographical demographics of the member states of the United Nations. 
Hence, there are representatives from five members states from Africa, 
representatives from four members states from Asia, representatives from two member 
states from the Eastern European States, representatives from four members states 
from Latin American and the Caribbean States and four members from Western 
European and other States. Each of these members has a tenure of four years. 
However,  there are no limitations as to the number of tenures. The committee remains 
guided by Resolution 1996/31 and during its proceedings,  by the rules of procedure 
of the Council.409 
The key responsibilities of the Committee include the consideration of the application 
for the consultative status and any requests made by the NGOs seeking to be 
reclassified. They also have the responsibility of monitoring the NGOs and their 
activities by considering the contents of the quadrennial reports submitted by the 
accredited NGOs, either the general or special status. Their responsibility includes 
ascertaining whether the NGOs’ activities in the past four years has remained relevant 
to the work of the Council. 
Additionally, their responsibility includes ascertaining whether there has been a 
substantial change in the source of funding. The Committee checks that the reports 
have a clear description of the NGOs’ continuous contribution to the activities of the 
United Nations, its entities and agencies. Essentially to ascertain whether the NGO has 
maintained its eligibility for its accredited status with the ECOSOC. Hence, the 
committee has the responsibility to monitor the consultative relationship continually as 
well as to implement the provisions of Council resolution 1996/31 and deal with other 
issues that the ECOSOC may require the committee to consider.410 
The Committee makes recommendations which are communicated in the draft 
decisions format, which then requires the Council to take action. Whether or not to 
accept the recommendation or to deny it. When the committee presents its report, 
the draft decisions are usually contained in Part 1 of the report. 
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When the Committee reviews and approves an application from an NGO, such 
approval will be transferred to the Council. It is only at that point, it is considered as a 
recommendation for the consultative status. The approval of the Committee on NGO 
does not in itself confer a consultative status on the NGO.  So when the ECOSOC holds 
its next meeting, usually in July of the same year, the ECOSOC would review the 
recommendations from the Committee on NGO’s reports which have come in the 
form of draft decisions. It is at this point that the ECOSOC may uphold the decision of 
the Committee, thereby granting the relevant status to the applicant NGO. So, until 
the ECOSOC decides to confer the status, there is no accreditation. Any approval 
based on just the decision of the Committee on NGO is at best a recommendation.411 
5.12.1. Criticisms facing the activities of the Committee on NGO 
5.12.1.1. Unfair and partial decisions based on politics 
The predominant critique of the Committee is that their decision of the committee 
could be politicised. There have been concerns raised, from both human rights 
organisations or even some governments, alleging, among others, that there have 
instances where the Committee has made unfair and partial recommendations. 
Some of these alleged unfair recommendations impede the accreditation request for 
consultative status by legitimate and otherwise eligible human rights NGOs. It is 
alleged that this has happened mostly where the Committee has been constituted 
by representatives of members states who have a questionable human rights track 
record.412 Sometimes, it is the case that the representative member states may have 
weak human right track records, and the applicant NGO is a human right activist. So, 
the ideals of the applicant NGO are at variance with the practices of one or more of 
the Committee’s representative member states. 
A typical example was the media report in May 2016, which stated that the UN 
Committee on NGO denied media accreditation to press freedom group. It explained 
that China and Russia voted against giving consultative status to the Committee to 
Protect Journalists, which helps reporters around the world and in conflict zones.413 The 
committee voted 10-6 with three abstentions on Thursday to deny accreditation to 
the application of the group - Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), which was first 
made in 2012.  Azerbaijan, Burundi, Cuba, China Nicaragua, Pakistan, Russia, South 
Africa, Sudan and Venezuela were among the countries that voted against 
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accreditation for the New York-based organisation which sought to protect press 
freedoms around the world and in conflict zones. It was argued that the countries who 
voted against it as the representative members of the Committee on NGO had poor 
press freedom records. The claim was that bureaucratic delaying tactics to 
undermine any efforts that call abusive policies into high relief.414  
Another instance of this kind of criticism is with the rejection of the accreditation 
request by the Christian Solidarity Worldwide (CSW). This organisation made its first 
application for accreditation in 2009. However, Its application had been deferred by 
committee members. It was said that they had who asked more than 80 questions 
about its work over the past seven years.415 
On Feb. 3, 2017, the committee voted 4-11 with one abstention to oppose 
accreditation for Christian Solidarity Worldwide, known by its initials CSW. The four 
votes in favour were Greece, Israel, U.S. and Uruguay. The 11 votes against were 
Burundi, China, Cuba, India, Iran, Nicaragua, Pakistan, South Africa, Sudan, Turkey 
and Venezuela. Russia abstained, and three countries were absent.416 Britain's deputy 
ambassador to the UN at the time, Peter Wilson said that he was "deeply 
disappointed" that the 19-member committee that accredits non-governmental 
organisations voted to reject the U.K.-based Christian group's application. In this 
regards, Britain stated that it would seek to overturn a U.N. committee's decision to 
deny accreditation to the organisation Christian Solidarity Worldwide which promotes 
religious freedom in over 20 countries across Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin 
America.417  Hence, Britain's U.N. Mission said it would appeal the committee's decision 
to the 54-member U.N. Economic and Social Council,  and this ultimately resulted in 
its eventual accreditation. On 19 April 2017, 28 ECOSOC member nations voted in 
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favour of granting Consultative Status to CSW, with 9 voting against and 12 
abstaining.418 
It appears that the rejection of accreditation of this Christian organisation was for 
reasons which seem to be political and perhaps, religious, judging from the religious 
affiliation of the countries. In critiquing the decision of the Committee on NGO, the 
CSW's Chief Executive Mervyn Thomas stated that  
"It is deeply disturbing that the U.N. Committee on NGOs, the very entity which 
is tasked to facilitate NGOs access to the U.N., is instead actively blocking civil 
society access to the U.N…We believe that this decision is effectively an 
attempt to silence CSW and undermine the promotion of freedom of religion 
or belief within the U.N. system."419 
It was a broad consensus among the public that the organisation does significant 
work which was related to the activities of the United Nations. Particularly concerning 
the protection of the freedom of religion or belief. So the actions of the NGO’s 
committee should be to enhance, and not to restrict, the space for civil society 
participation in the United Nations. Hence, if the NGO had apparently met the 
necessary criteria to be accredited and was yet rejected, it follows that one can 
conclude that the decision, at times, remains mostly subjective and consequently 
prone to politics. 
This position has further been noted and reinforced by scholars420 that the work of the 
Committee on NGO could quite easily be politicised. The widespread criticism that 
independent human rights NGOs advance against the Committee and the member 
states that constitute it is -  NGOs which are more likely to criticise the member states 
which are part of the Committee, tend to face difficulties when applying for 
consultative status. Alternatively, where they already have the status, stand a higher 
chance that the status may be subject to certain levels of intimidation, including the 
threat of having their status suspended or withdrawn.  
The preceding are just some of the incidences, where the Committee on NGO have 
faced some criticism.  
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The preceding goes to reiterate the point that the Committee on NGOs could 
sometimes be accused of being politicised. Hence, where human rights NGOs criticise 
member states for alleged human rights violations, they inadvertently create an 
impediment to their attaining the consultative status. Where they already have such 
consultative status, they create an avenue for the criticised member states who form 
part of the Committee, to have their status suspended. 
5.12.1.2. Political stands and Ideologies 
Another challenge with the Committee is that sometimes, due to the facts that the 
Committee is made up of countries with different ideologies and political stands, their 
views could vary and at times, be subjective. A typical instance in with regards to the 
application from the Human Rights Organisation in 2008421, for consultative status. The 
committee was divided in their view, primarily due to their political and ideological 
stands. Some countries, like Cuba, which argued that the chairman of the applicant 
organisation was a convict in Cuba as a terrorist for criminal activities in Bolivia. Some 
other countries, like the United States, held an opposing view, stating that Armando 
Valladares, the chairman of the organisation, was a prisoner of conscience, and now 
a poet and writer in the United States. So, the Committee was divided across those 
lines, and eventually, it was decided that the committee would recommend that 
NGO should not be granted the status.422 
Another instance of the Committee acting along the line of the political interests is the 
case of the Arab  Commission on Human Rights.  One of its representatives who 
addressed the  Human Rights Council, Mr Rachid Mesli, was convicted in absentia by 
an Algerian court on criminal charges along the lines of terrorism.423 However, 
according to Amnesty International, he was a prisoner of conscience. He had been 
targeted by the Algerian authorities for over a decade. It is alleged that he was 
targeted for engaging in activities which exposed the violations committed against 
the Algerian authorities in the 1990s.424 Again, this is another case of the committee 
drawn along the lines of political stands and ideological positions. 
A common theme in the immediate two preceding cases is the issue of terrorism. 
Hence, it is not surprising that the Committee on NGO would use the terrorism-related 
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allegations when trying to determine the decision of the whether or not to 
recommend that such organisation be granted the consultative status. The reason this 
is the case is that the goal to counter-terrorism is a common international community 
goal, and of particular interest to the United Nations, since the 9/11 incidence in the 
United States in September 2001. Terrorism is an internationally recognised activity and 
therefore sufficient grounds for suspension or withdrawal of consultative status 
according to 1996/31. Paragraph 57 of the Resolution 1996/31 provides -   
‘the consultative status of non-governmental organisations with the Economic 
and Social Council and the listing of those on the Roster shall be suspended up 
to three years or withdrawn […]: (b) if there exists substantiated evidence of 
influence from proceeds resulting from internationally recognised criminal 
activities such as the illicit drugs trade, money laundering or illegal arms trade..’ 
The challenge, however, lies with the fact that the use of wide-ranging definitions of 
terrorism which allow the detaining of individuals who is critical of the regime, blurs the 
lines between human rights violations and terrorism prosecution.  This concern was 
observed by the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in 2006. Under that 
resolution, it was agreed that any measures taken to combat terrorism must comply 
with their obligations under international law, in particular human rights law, refugee 
law and international humanitarian law.425  
It has also been seen with the application from NGOs working for the rights of lesbian, 
gay, bisexual or transgender (LGBT) people. It is observed that the position of the 
Committee has been polarised across ideologies and political stand. Hence, the more 
conservative and religious nations like China, Egypt, Pakistan, Qatar, the Russian 
Federation and Sudan were in opposition to the granting of the status to NGOs with 
LGBT mandates. While the more liberal nations like the United Kingdom, the United 
States, Columbia, Israel, Peru, and Romania, were in support of granting the 
consultative status to the NGOs which had an LGBT mandate. 426 
All the issues above that may form the premise of how the Committee on NGO may 
react to applications made to it for some status or the other have the common thread 
of human rights.  The responses of the Committee have been argued to be mostly 
subjective along ideological lines and political stands. Hence, it has been seen that 
human rights NGOs refused their application due to NGO being critical of some of the 
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member states which make the committee. According to Lisa Boström, the dilemma 
then lies in  
‘the question of what kind of human rights organisations should be allowed 
to work with the United Nations, if the ones who criticise members are 
ineligible.’ 
The irony of this response ideally, the protection of human rights is one of the key 
prerogatives of the United Nations. Hence, one ought to be rested in the fact that as 
the protection of human rights is key to the objectives of the UN, then an agency of 
the UN burdened with the responsibility of assessing prospective partnerships with 
NGOs should be elated that the prime objective of the applicant NGO is the 
advocacy and protection of human rights. In reality, this is not the case, and it is ironic, 
especially as many UN  policy and documents are filled with a plethora of provisions 
on the protection of human rights. 
Given this premise, it then becomes slightly irreconcilable that the controversies that 
are seen with how the Committee on NGO have dealt with applications, that the 
committee has put political interests and national ideologies above human rights 
concerns. Again, this brings to bear the question of whether or not national concerns 
often supersede international concerns when international bodies seek to make 
international policies. Again, this goes to the crux of the argument of this thesis. States 
as the only actors on the international plane who are responsible for international 
governance is inadequate. It does not correspond with the realities of the 21st century, 
where there are more actors on the international plane and interface interests. 
Hence, the argument that there should be a reconceptualisation of international law 
in a way that makes it fit for the 21-st century purposes. Also, NGOs are pivotal to this 
reconceptualisation because they are driven by causes and not national agendas or 
politics. With the right measures in place, there could be an international legal system 
that takes on board the activities of various NGOs, which may be at odds with 
themselves.   
However, it would be presumptuous to assume that states would hold their loyalty to 
international interests above their national interests, whether acting within the 
Committee on NGO or in any other intergovernmental committee. The alternative 
perspective should not be that the Committee on NGOs should remain politicised. The 
process by which the Committee decides the fate of NGOs seem arbitrary, and not 
adequately representing the influence of NGOs.  
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5.13. The legitimisation of NGOs beyond ECOSOC 
The ironic dilemma as to the status of NGOs and their legitimisation across various 
bodies is that, while their increased involvement is said to enhance the legitimacy of 
international decision making, they are themselves regarded as having a deficit in 
legitimacy. Therefore, their participatory rights in the international community are said 
to be in question.  
Hence, questions abound as to whom do the NGOs represent? To whom are they 
accountable? What factors give them the credibility to hold themselves out to be the 
voice of public opinion? At least with the democratic governments, they can rely on 
the facts that they are elected by the public. So the democratic government are 
accountable to the electorate and for whom they are responsible. It is not the case 
with the NGOs. Agam has stated that there are some governments which would refer 
to NGOs as organisations with ‘narrow, self-serving interests… driven by the personal 
egos and ambitions of a few frustrated individuals’.427  
The argument has been for a long time concerning the issue of accreditation and the 
focal question of legitimacy. It has been the concern of the international community 
and the relevant stakeholders that NGOs and their representative capacity should be 
the basis for their international legitimacy. Hence, Wapner noted-  
‘[t]o be an NGO these days, it seems one needs only a fax machine and 
internet access’.428  
There are other NGOs which have large memberships that are bigger than some of 
the population of some states. An example of the ICC will be considered in the next 
chapter.  These large NGOs are said to have a democratic structure. It follows that 
these larger NGOs naturally have more political legitimacy than the other smaller 
obscure NGOs. Hence, most international organisations in their accreditation 
processes, take into cognisance these factors that ensure at least a degree of 
legitimacy, albeit, just political legitimacy. The Cardoso Report pointed out that it 
would be reasonable to ‘expect the UN Secretariate to ensure that actors engaging 
in their deliberative processes meet at least some basic standards of governance 
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and demonstrate their credentials. It should be the case whether the actors’ 
credibility is based on experience, expertise, membership or a base of support.’429 
However, it should be noted that both the small and the big NGOs all lack the legal 
or regulatory legitimacy on a broad international basis. It is observed that the political 
legitimacy that is enjoyed by most of the more prominent NGOs are as a result of 
predominantly informal activities and the socio-political recognition of the NGOs on 
the international plane. However, the concern remains as to how could these informal 
activities and socio-political recognition transit to the formal accreditation and the 
legal/regulatory recognition of the activities and status of NGOs on the international 
plane by the relevant stakeholders across the various sectors, beyond the mere 
accreditation with the ECOSOC.   
Some of these informal activities include the activist campaigns, direct personal 
appeals and interface with the key stakeholders and decision-makers within the 
international organisations or national governments. Others include as rallies, topical 
campaigns, proposals and other forms of campaigns and dialogues with the relevant 
key stakeholders in the various sectors or specialities of the NGOs. It should be noted 
that these informal activities and socio-political recognition of NGOs are some of the 
most persuasive factors in the quest for the legal/regulatory recognition of NGOs on 
the international plane. Hence, it is necessary to take seriously the findings of Ecologic 
and Field report on the Participation of Non-Governmental Organisations in 
International Environmental Governance that ‘the informal practices have an 
inherent danger of being easily eroded in the future’.  
Hence, it is essential to deal with the situation with a sense of haste as the need to 
formalise these informal activities, and socio-political recognition are imperative to 
the international legal order or concept of international law, sustaining its fitness for 
purpose. However, it is becoming less likely to easily undermine the increased 
relevance of NGOs to the international community.  
Jeffrey Andrew Hartwick had observed that there are two schools of thoughts on the 
acknowledgement or legitimisation of NGOs and their participation in the 
international community, beyond just the ECOSOC consultative status, 
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The first school of thought is that referred to as the ‘accommodationists’. The second 
school of thought is that referred to as the ‘restrictionists’.430  The accommodationists 
are pro-NGOs and align with the position that increased participation of NGOs in the 
international community would lead to better international governance. Some of the 
propounders of this school of thought even hold the extreme view that NGOs could 
be at par with their counter-part actors on the international scene, such as states or 
other international institutions such as the General Assembly of the United Nations, et 
cetera.431 The radical nature of this viewpoints faces much opposition and in some 
circles, ridicule because of its political impracticability. It is argued that states are not 
expected to relinquish their extreme international powers for the benefit of NGOs, 
regardless of what good NGOs carry out on the international scene. This thesis 
acknowledges the unyielding influence of states, and that it may stay that way for the 
foreseeable future.  However, this thesis also entertains the possibility, not probability, 
that the occurrence of globalisation and the increased relevance of NGOs would 
take the exclusivity of choice from the states. Moreover, the preference of states may 
stand a chance to be overtaken by the necessities of globalisation. 
On the other hand, there is the restrictionists school of thought which holds the view, 
that NGOs should be constrained, as they ultimately serve to impede the state’s 
function in a state-centric international community. Hence, they believe that NGOs’ 
legitimisation should be limited, as should access to meetings and participatory 
rights.432 Also, NGOs’ function in roles that have ordinarily been within the remit of 
states to function should be prohibited.433  
States are the most significant actors in the Westphalian international legal construct. 
However, a significant question that ought to be considered is whether states retain 
this position. If they do retain the position, will lit be as a matter of right and as a matter 
of function in the 21st-century globalised international community? Should the 
question of function come more to the fore, beyond the question of right? It is not in 
dispute that states are and will probably remain the principal actors of the 
international community. So, the quest for the increased legal status of NGOs on the 
international plane could be perceived to be on a collision course with the States as 
it tends to encroach on the power and sovereignty of states. It is more likely to hold 
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this view if the concept of sovereignty and international law does not undergo a 
paradigm shift that conceptualises sovereignty in its full essence, as discussed in 
chapter four.   
 
5.13.1. Arguments for and against the legitimisation of NGOs 
Amidst a myriad of views for and against the increased relevance of NGOs in the 
International Legal framework, some of the more persuasive views include –  
Firstly, some scholars434 have argued that NGOs involvement facilitates the decision-
making process, as NGOs are privy to insights not always available to governments, 
at least not in the same unadulterated form, as it is to the NGOs. It is primarily due to 
the construct of NGOs. Most NGOs are grassroots oriented, and they have specialised 
knowledge due to most NGOs being subject or sector-focused. NGOs’ approach has 
an impact on the quality of the analytical capacity. It also makes them readily 
available with unconventional expertise at their disposal. Hence, it has been argued 
that NGOs provide information, arguments and perspectives that governments do not 
bring forward.435 It has further been posited that NGOs could function as intellectual 
contributors to governments in the formulation of the most effective and efficient 
policies. Due to the robust NGOs’ resources and specificity of their expertise, their 
contribution to international policy-making would enhance the quality of policy 
debates.436  
Secondly, this thesis opines that the increased involvement of NGOs in the 
international plane increases the legitimacy of international organisations. It is 
because of the increased interface between the international organisations and 
NGOs, and it suggests that international organisations are not operating arbitrarily. 
Instead, they are taking into cognisance the interests of the various constituencies of 
the international community. Notably, those that are represented by the NGOs. It 
makes international organisations more democratic in their outlook. As pointed out in 
Chapter 1, NGOs could be referred to as the conscience of the international civil 
society. So, the public’s confidence in the governance of the international community 
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increases when NGOs are seen to interface in the dealings of international 
organisations and other actors in the international community.  
Apart from the enhanced outlook and credibility that NGOs give to the governance 
and dealings of the various actors in the international community, there is the actual 
outcome of increased transparency in the process. It has been argued that working 
with NGOs in the international community enhances an open and transparent 
exchange of rational arguments as opposed to shady bargaining.437 Additionally, if 
there is the NGOs’ buy-in of policies, they could quickly be disseminated at the 
national level, and draw more public support and enlightenment on the subject and 
spirit of the policies. 
In the third place, specific transnational issues may not be considered relevant 
enough to attract the attention of the national governments, and to that extent, are 
not tabled by the national government for consideration in the formulation of 
international law and policy. NGOs play a crucial role in these scenarios. They usually 
have the mandate of the people to table down such issues. Hence, the involvement 
of NGOs in the deliberation and processes of the key actors of the international 
community creates an opportunity for these kinds of issues to be discussed in scenarios 
where it would otherwise not be discussed. 
Fourthly, NGOs thrive better at the national level where the government is democratic 
and open to dialogue from the various constituencies. On the contrary, NGOs struggle 
to survive where dictatorship and other less open government exist. Hence, the 
participation of NGOs on the international plane makes it easier for the concerns of 
the citizenry of such closed states to be addressed, where it is impossible to do so on 
the national level. 
The above four arguments are persuasive and suggest that NGOs should indeed have 
increased status on the international plane. 
On the other hand, there are opposing arguments against the notion that NGOs 
continue to emerge in relevance to the framing of the international legal framework. 
Some have argued that due to the limited representative capacity of NGOs, the 
increased influence of NGOs could end up in the hijacking the policy-making process 
by special interests.438 The position, therefore, is that allowing NGOs to have such 
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increased influence and legitimacy on the international scene; one should be open 
to the possibility of ultimately giving special interests and not public interests, undue 
influence. It is the view of this thesis that the criteria for accreditation used with the 
ECOSOC could be further developed to guarantee that NGOs are not entirely 
overtaken by special interests. 
Secondly, it has been posited that NGOs may lack a comprehensive representation, 
and NGOs may not be inherently democratic. So, there is a chance that the elevation 
of NGOs’ status leads to the elevation of a group representing narrow and non-
encompassing interests. It becomes apparent where it is benchmarked against the 
construct of the governments, which are set with the primary aim of servicing public 
interests.  When an NGO asserts itself internationally, the quest for legitimacy behoves 
on the public to inquire regarding what interests are represented by the NGOs. 
Thirdly, there is the disparity in the buoyancy of NGOs across the world; with the NGOs 
in the developed countries being more organised and financially advantageous in 
comparison to the NGOs in the developing countries who tend to be less organised 
and financed. Hence, there is the chance that countries with the less influential 
representation of NGOs, could be marginalised in international decision making.439 
In the fourth place, the Cardoso Report points out that the involvement of all NGOs in 
international decision making could lead to an infinite long-winded bureaucratic 
process which could end a significant portion of the decision-making process in a 
stalemate. In the words of the report, it was stated,  
‘[i]f the United Nations brought everyone relevant into each debate; it 
would have endless meetings without conclusion […] governments would 
find other forums for negotiation…’440 
Notably from the above and as stated by the UN background paper for the Cardoso 
panel,  there is the chance that increased interface with NGOs could lead to some 
level of confusion. It could impede the inter-governmental search for common 
grounds, erode the privacy that is needed in sensitive discussions. It could lead to over-
crowded agendas. It could very well be a distraction at important meetings.441 
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From the preceding, another perspective could be that the increased interface of 
NGOs with the international community and the formulation of international law and 
policy would enhance the quality of decision making, accountability, and the 
necessary transparency needed for the international policy to enjoy the legitimacy 
needed for it to thrive. It also allows for a process characterised by inclusion. A process 
that is enriched by a variety of views and specific expertise and experiences. 
5.14. Chapter 5 Part B: Conclusion 
This part of the chapter assessed the process by which NGOs obtain an elevated 
status with the United Nations. The chapter set out to critically analyse the roles of the 
UN agencies and standing committees such as the ECOSOC and the UN community 
on NGOs in shaping the narrative of NGOs influence and involvement in the 
international community.  
To this end, the criteria for the accreditation of NGOs as provided on the resolution 
1996/31 was thoroughly examined. The findings from the examination of these criteria 
are as follows –  
Concerning the need for NGOs to align with the UN objectives, it was observed that 
non-governmental organisation must be in tandem with the spirit, purposes of the UN 
charter. Concerning the need for NGOs to be democratically constituted, the 
dilemma that faces NGOs on this point was highlighted. Thus, it is conceded that 
NGOs are inherently undemocratic due to the potential overbearing passion and the 
possible influence of the founders of the organisation on the objectives. However, the 
operational structure of NGOs is not more or less democratic than the operational 
structure of companies. To which, the general principles of corporate governance 
apply, ensuring a measure of accountability. 
Regarding the existence and the organisational structure of NGOs, it was determined 
that an NGO in existence for at least two years at the date at the relevant time of 
application suffices as satisfying the criteria. Finally, about the basis and source of 
funding, it was established that the funds of NGOs must be traceable. This 
transparency is imperative to maintain the independence and integrity of the 
organisation. 
Furthermore, the workings of the NGOs in regulating the procedure for accreditation 
and monitoring the activities of NGOs via their quadrennial report was investigated, 
and the findings revealed some lapses. It was observed that the decision making of 
the Committee in endowing an NGO with elevated staus was at times politicised, 
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leading to unfair and partial outcomes. A typical example was highlighted in cases 
where the representative member state which constitutes the Committee had 
rejected an application from human right NGOs, and it was alleged that these 
member states had questionable human right track records. Additionally, it was 
observed that there are instances where the Committee had been alleged to make 
decisions along the lines of their ideology and political stance. An example was 
identified in the application of an LGBT NGO. The Committee was polarised in their 
decision along the lines of ideology and pollical stance. Hence more conservative 
and religious nations such as China, Egypt, Pakistan were in opposition in granting of 
status while more liberal nations such as the United Kingdom and the United stated 
were in support of granting the application. These observation buttresses the point of 
this thesis that the participation of NGOs on the international plane exists at the behest 
of member states and objectivity is thoroughly compromised. And the concern with 
this arbitral nature of the member states determination of the extent of NGO’s 
involvement in the international plane call for a rethink. 
The arguments of Part A and B of this chapter highlights the current position of NGOs 
in general. The next chapter zooms in further to examine a particular NGO as an 
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6.1. Chapter 6: Introduction 
Further to the finding of the preceding chapter, this chapter examines the 
International Chamber of Commerce as an NGO with significant global influence. It 
explores the ICC intending to justify the core argument of the thesis that the growing 
influence of NGOs in the international plane should accrue to them some legitimacy. 
In proffering an understanding of the ICC, it examines its objectives which include 
fostering international trade, promoting and protecting open markets for goods and 
services and free flow of capital. In meeting these objectives, its activities are hinges 
on three cardinal points which include the establishment of rules, dispute resolution 
and policy advocacy. It is observed that the ICC, although an NGO has an 
unparalleled authority in the setting of rules that govern cross border businesses. 
As a result, the ICC is considered as an indirect international lawmaker due to its 
prevalent standard-setting role which underpins international trade and commerce. 
The ICC is also identified as an example of a global response to global interest and 
challenges. 
Additionally, the historical context of the ICC is critically considered, and the pivotal 
role it has played in international policy decision fora are analysed. The longevity and 
influence of the ICC over the decades lend credibility to the argument on elevating 
the status of NGOs and reconceptualising international law. Its pivotal role to global 
trade and governance, which earns it an epithet as the world’s parliament for business 
is discussed extensively. 
Furthermore, its influence and its relevance to the United Nations as an NGO is 
considered. It is mainly analysed in reference to the ICC attaining a consultative status 
with ECOSOC, and observer status with General Assembly buttresses the 
inadequacies of such statuses in the light of its global influence. 
6.2. Distributing authority across influential NGOs 
As earlier emphasised, the global community continues to face rising complexities in 
the way the global space functions juxtaposed against the theoretical Westphalian 
international legal framework. An intended outcome of this thesis is to move from the 
current state-centric approach of the international legal system to a more inclusive 
approach. Giving the needed legitimacy to the diffusion of authority amongst all the 
global players in the international plane. These global players go beyond just states 
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and include other non-state actors. This global diffusion of authority serves the purpose 
of the reconceptualisation of the notion of sovereignty.  It takes into cognizance the 
realities of globalisation and the rising influence of global non-state actors, the focus 
of which, for this thesis, is the non-governmental organisations. 
Today, international relations confronts a dilemma with its original Westphalian 
attributes. It faces a new question of whether, if the status quo is maintained, it will be 
well-positioned to achieve the global goals of all the global actors, including the non-
state actors in the international space. It should be noted that these goals of the non-
state actors are also in the interests of traditional subjects of the Westphalian 
international legal framework – the states. In reality, the theoretical description of 
international relations or diplomacy is out of touch with the realities. The operational 
ideals of the Westphalian concepts of territoriality and absolute sovereignty are 
removed from the practical socio-political outlay of the international community. 
Ideally, the Westphalian concepts of territoriality and absolute sovereignty are 
inherently state-centric. Today, international relations involve relations which extend 
beyond just states, to embrace other actors, some of which are significant actors of 
the global civil society who are frequently straddling across national boundaries. 
A prime example is the international NGOs. This fact brings to fore the point that the 
international community, which is now consisted of activities by actors pay less 
attention to the significance of territoriality. It is so primarily because the concept of 
territoriality, particularly regarding the process of international relations across various 
industry and other societal sectors, seems to have been fused out of relevance and 
formed into one giant global space. 
In a bid to give legitimacy to the current state of diffusion of authority amongst the 
global non-state actors; particular interest is paid to some specific global actors who 
epitomise the growing influence and operations of NGOs in the international plane. A 
key NGO that best fits this purpose is the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC).  
After careful consideration of the various international NGOs, the International 
Chamber of Commerce stands out as one of the most significant NGOs dealing in the 




6.3. The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) 
6.3.1. Why the ICC? 
In a bid to determine which non-state actor to be the focal point of this research, 
consideration was given to MNCs and intergovernmental organisations. However, 
NGOs were preferred due to their representativeness and the key attributes of their 
essence – being that they are driven by causes and not profit, plus, ideally they exist 
without the encumbrance of government. 
Along these lines, the ICC was chosen for five main reasons.  
Firstly because it is one of the most representative among the NGOs. The ICC 
comprises of MNCs and an NGO, so it was the best of both worlds. The ICC is an 
organisation that straddles two of the most influential worlds of global Non-State 
Actors – the MNCs and the NGOs.  The ICC personifies the international business 
community and in a sense, represents some of the most significant non-state actors in 
the international legal framework - the multi-national corporations. Furthermore, it is 
listed by the United Nations Economic and Social Council as one of the Non- 
Governmental Organisations as of September 2016 and was listed since its inception. 
Any of the other more ‘pious’ NGOs would be counter-intuitive to the argument of the 
thesis because they will essentially exclude a significant portion of the international 
community – the MNCs. It is noteworthy to highlight that the choice of ICC as the 
prime example of NGOs in the context of this argument lends to its originality. This line 
of thought is primarily so because the ICC is not the typical NGO, more so, on the 
surface, it is quite unlikely to be selected as the poster NGO for the purpose of 
furnishing the arguments of this thesis.  
However, as with other NGOs, the ICC exists to canvas causes, albeit for the interest 
of the international business community. It should be pointed out that the international 
business community is also part of the international community. Additionally, 
responsible business conduct is both good business strategy and helps promote 
international peace and prosperity, against which a myriad of all other NGO causes 
are hinged.  
Secondly, The ICC underscores the point that while some NGOs may be a composite 
of all other non-state actors, MNCs and IGOs cannot be a composite of NGOs. So, this 
second point further propels the point that NGOs play a more pivotal role in the 
international legal framework, beyond any other actor on the international plane. It 
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also further accentuates the rationale for NGOs being one of the focal points of this 
thesis. 
Thirdly, the ICC is considered as an indirect international lawmaker due to its prevalent 
standard-setting role which underpins international trade and commerce. Moreover, 
as shall be seen further down in this chapter, while these rules are voluntary, a myriad 
of international commercial transactions are premised on the ICC-established rules 
which are considered as part of regular international trade, which in a sense, usurps 
the traditional function of the Westphalian system, where states are the sole 
lawmakers for the international community. Today, there are examples like the 
recognised Incoterms rules to the UCP 600 Uniform Customs and Practice for 
Documentary Credits, which are used widely in international finance. Along this line, 
there is also the International Court of Arbitration (ICC), which is an ICC institution 
which aids in resolving international commercial disputes.  Although the international 
court of Arbitration is called a court, they do not engage in making formal judgments 
on disputed matters.  They only exercise judicial supervision of arbitration proceedings 
and ensuring that the proper application of the ICC Rules, as well as assist parties and 
arbitrators in overcoming procedural obstacles.442 
In the fourth place, the ICC is also identified as an example of a global response to 
global interests and challenges. As mentioned earlier, the 21st-century challenges are 
global; both states and multinational corporations, as well as other international 
players, encounter common challenges, such as environmental sustainability, 
cybersecurity, human rights and security or labour concerns, et cetera. The sole and 
exclusive response of any of the players will be insufficient to deal with the challenges 
which are not by their nature constituent specific.  So the lone acts of states, or MNCs 
or the Intergovernmental organisations, will be insufficient in tackling these challenges. 
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Administration of Cases under the Procedure under the New gTLD Dispute Resolution Procedure. – See 
'ICANN New Gtld Dispute Resolution - ICC - International Chamber Of Commerce' (ICC - International 
Chamber of Commerce, 2020) <https://iccwbo.org/dispute-resolution-services/icann-gtld-process/> 
accessed 13 July 2020. 
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It is in the common interest of all actors to fashion a concerted common approach in 
dealing with these challenges. To a great extent, the ICC personifies the common 
response to these challenges. The ICC is in a quadrilateral relationship with national 
governments, civil society organisations and multilateral institutions, with the ICC at 
the centre. Along these lines, we find the ICC as the spearhead of some of the most 
effective joint global efforts among all the actors to promote peace and prosperity 
through trade and responsible business conduct. A chief example is the emergence 
of the UN Global Compact, which was emanated from the ICC’s initiated UN - 
Business Dialogue in 1998. It was an initiative which required businesses to align 
strategies and operations with the universal principles on human rights, labour, 
environment and anti-corruption, and take actions that advance societal goals.443   
These principles are another example of soft law, which have indirectly been made 
by the ICC.  
Finally, the influence of the ICC with the UN as an NGO was a persuasive reason to 
focus on the ICC as the poster NGO for the reconceptualisation of international law. 
For instance, it was given a Category ‘A Consultative Status’ with the United Nations 
Economic and Social Council in 1946. Furthermore. In 2016, the influence of the ICC 
was further increased by being the first NGO to be granted the Observer Status with 
the General Assembly of the United Nations.444  This achievement attests to the reach 
of the ICC and underpins the choice for focussing on the ICC as the prime NGO 
example.  
6.3.2. Understanding the ICC 
It is important to note that although profit-seeking businesses are not NGOs, 
associations of business entities can be, such as the International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC).445 
The ICC exists to promote international trade,  responsible business conduct and 
engages a global approach to regulation and dispute resolution services. It comprises 
multinational corporations(MNCs), small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), 
business association and local chambers of commerce446.  
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The International Chamber of Commerce has often been described as the largest, 
most diverse business organisation in the world; with hundreds of thousands of 
member companies from more than 100 countries and broad business interests. It has 
a wide range of members; extending to all sectors. It plays a pivotal role in keeping its 
members informed on matters that are relevant to the affairs of their industries. On the 
other hand, they also act, somewhat, like a conduit or a liaison between the global 
business community and the highest level of global intergovernmental organisations 
and agencies447. 
The choice to focus on the ICC is because it personifies the global business community 
and in a sense, represents some of the most significant non-state actors in the 
international legal framework  - the multi-national corporations. Furthermore, it is listed 
by the United Nations Economic and Social Council as one of the Non- Governmental 
Organisations as of September 2016 and was listed since its inception.  
The ICC is an organisation that straddles two of the most influential worlds of global 
Non-State Actors – the MNCs and the NGOs. However, this is not unique to the ICC, 
as it is found that most of the larger NGOs share the same tendencies. However, the 
same cannot be said for MNCs. Hence, while some NGOs may be a composite of all 
other non-state actors, MNCs cannot be a  composite of NGOs. So, this further propels 
the point that NGOs play a more pivotal role in the international legal framework, 
beyond any other actor on the international plane. It also further underscores the 
rationale for NGOs being one of the focal points of this thesis. The ICC is a prime 
example of an NGO, representing interests of Multinational Corporations and other 
businesses, globally, before intergovernmental organisations such as the United 
Nations ECOSOC, the World Trade Organisation, or the G20 among others448. 
6.3.2.1. The focus of the ICC 
The ICC fosters international trade and is established to promote and protect open 
markets for goods and services and the free flow of capital449. The activities of the ICC 
are hinged on three cardinal points –  
 the establishment of rules;  
 dispute resolution; and  
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 policy advocacy.  
The effectiveness of these activities in the international space is yet unmatched, even 
in comparison to exclusively state initiatives. It is primarily because the composite of 
the ICC is far-reaching and arguably more influential than states alone. So, as 
members of the ICC and their associates engage in international business, the ICC 
has unparalleled authority in setting rules that govern cross-border business. While 
these rules are voluntary, thousands of daily transactions abide by the ICC-established 
rules as part of regular international trade450. Holding this view against the canvas of 
the traditional Westphalian concept of the international legal framework, it becomes 
apparent that the construct of the ICC, as well as other NGOs globally, have indeed 
disrupted the status quo in functionality. However, the concept or theory of 
international law has stayed static to the state-centric position held in the 1600s. 
Unfortunately, the lack of theoretical reconceptualisation of the Westphalian notion 
of the International legal framework has a significant impact on the legitimacy of the 
activities of some of the most significant actors in today’s global space. 
The focal drive of the ICC is to enhance international trade and investments as key 
instruments for integrated growth and prosperity globally; dealing with global 
challenges and reaching universal aspirations. It achieves this through a wide range 
of activities, including resolving disputes when they arise in international commerce to 
providing frameworks to streamline customs and border procedures.  
6.3.2.2. The ICC as an indirect international lawmaker 
Some of the activities carried out by the ICC include matters like advocacy and 
standard-setting, i.e. establishment of rules. However, it is standard-setting that is 
primarily of interest to this thesis. The interest in ICC stems from its standard-setting role, 
which is a less formal way by which laws are made for the global business community. 
These laws are referred to as soft law because they are voluntary in their form but are 
essentially mandatory in their function. The ICC is engaged in facilitating global 
business and legal training, and are the prime publishers of practical tools for 
international business, banking and arbitration. Some of these rules formulated by the 
ICC extend from recognised Incoterms rules to the UCP 600 Uniform Customs and 
Practice for Documentary Credits, which are used widely in international finance451. 
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The effective policy advocacy, development of rules and guidelines by the ICC could 
be referred to as a unique informal body of international law. It is noteworthy that the 
ICC-made rules are practical and adapt to the challenges of trading in a fast-paced 
global economy. However, these ICC-made rules lack, to some extent, in legitimacy, 
when juxtaposed against the multilateral or bilateral state treaties, which primarily 
forms traditional international law. 
Hence, while these legal instruments are, in fact, as significant as some international 
legislation, they lack the legislative legitimacy and as a result, are unable to have the 
requisite force of law. It is one of the primary reasons most of these rules and 
regulations do not cross the boundaries of guidelines due to their inherent voluntary 
nature. The ripple effect soft laws or guidelines is that they leave a loophole for the 
businesses who pay lipservice to these guidelines, sign unto them, perhaps, to brand 
themselves as responsible and compliant, but without sufficient room for 
accountability or enforcement.  Berliner and Prakash452 and others describe paying 
lipservice to soft law without the fear of sanction for non-compliance as "bluewashing" 
-the attempt to cover multi-national corporations in the colours of the UN flag453 in 
order to promote them as having a reputation as a socially responsible and law-
abiding corporation. 
As a result, the mischief that some of these laws seek to solve, remain unresolved. 
Furthermore, this leads to less credibility in statistics and an apparent disconnect 
between the statisticians and the realities. For example, statistics may arise as to how 
many businesses have responded positively to the global concern of climate 
change, and there may be a real disconnect between the statistics and the realities 
on the ground. It is a fact that around half of the CO2 emitted since 1750 has been in 
the last 40 years454 and, Ironically, there appears to be more engagement with the 
problem from stakeholders, at least, statistically; with more climate change soft laws 
that ever before.  
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6.3.2.3. ICC: An example of a global response to global interests and 
challenges 
 As have been pointed out earlier, a significant catalyst of globalisation has been the 
international commerce. The ICC sits at the heart of this, and to a certain extent, sets 
the operational framework for some of the most noteworthy actors in the global 
space; promoting international trade, responsible business conduct, and a global 
approach to regulation.455 
Over the century, there has been an evolving strategy and a reiteration of the driving 
rationale for the ICC.  The global challenges face the states and the business 
communities alike, as well as other players in the international scene. The response of 
either the state alone or the businesses alone will be insufficient in tackling these 
challenges. There is a mutual interest in dealing with these challenges. Challenges 
such as environmental sustainability, cybersecurity, human rights and security or 
labour concerns, et cetera, are aftermaths of globalisation. Globalisation has 
inadvertently established a coalition of interests and interrelated goals across various 
segments of the international society. These interrelated goals and common interests, 
have led to the significant shifts in norms and values across various sectors and has 
given rise for keen attention to be given to these issues when the various actors on the 
international plane fashion their various policy strategies.  
The ICC stands as the very pivot of the delivery of these bespoke policy strategy 
formulation, amongst many other things with which it is involved. Hence, scholars have 
noted that the ICC finds themselves in this quadrilateral relationship with national 
governments, civil society organisations and multilateral institutions.456  However, a 
challenge lies where there is no requisite legitimacy.   This pattern of relationships that 
the ICC has with the international community gives rise to a level of fluidity that stems 
from the lack of legislative legitimacy and ultimately leads to uneven and often 
unpredictable relationships. This challenge is replete among many other relations ships 
on the international plane with influential NGOs. As with other influential NGOs, the 
dynamics of these types of relationships are made possible by the adaptive 
tendencies of non-state actors which adapt being ultimately at the mercies of the 
traditional Westphalian actors. So, NGOs, regardless of the legitimacy limitations, 
generally focus on the global need for which they exist and just tend to adapt to any 
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legislative framework, while trying to meet those needs. Most times, states and NGOs 
have mutual interests, but the interest of the states does not always align with that of 
NGOs. Sometimes, the interests of the states could be largely political and detached 
from the realities of the peoples of the international communities, and their agendas 
canvassed by NGOs. 
However, the mutuality of interests can no longer be ignored. These mutual interest 
and goals require more cooperation among actors, exchange of resources, adapting 
their roles and shaping their policies according to the shifting demands of 
globalisation. This sentiment is shared by members of the key stakeholding 
organisations of the international community. The multinational corporations, the 
states, and the inter-governmental organisations all hold the same view that their 
common interests are common. In 1997, the then UN Secretary-General – Kofi Annan 
echoed this point in his speech to the World Economic Forum at Davos when he stated 
the following -  
‘The United Nations once dealt only with governments. By now, we know 
that peace and prosperity cannot be achieved without partnerships 
involving the governments, international organisations, the business 
community and civil society.’457 
In February 1998, at a joint press release issued by the UN and the ICC, this position 
was further reiterated stating as follows - 
‘There is great potential for the goals of the United Nations - promoting 
peace and development - and the goals of the business - creating wealth 
and prosperity - to be mutually supportive. Development and peace are 
essential for trade and investment to occur and for business to grow. At the 
same time, thriving markets are a precondition for creating jobs, improving 
standards of living, spreading more widely the benefits of globalisation and 
integrating developing countries into the world economy.’458  
The international discourse is replete with statements that ultimately share the same 
sentiments as has been stated above. An instance where this could be gleaned from 
when the ICC announced the establishment of the ICC Geneva Business Dialogue, 
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which met in September 1998.459 One of its focal interests was facilitating a dialogue 
between the business world and the world of inter-governmental organisation. It was 
to the end of incorporating business influence to the decision-making process for the 
global economy.’460 
One of the most notable milestones reached in the quest for a UN-Business dialogue 
was the emergence of the UN Global Compact which was launched in July 2000, and 
within its first ten years became the world’s largest corporate citizenship initiative.461 
Under its aegis, there has been a commitment from major multinationals to observe a 
voluntary set of principles on the environment, child labour, and freedom of trade 
unions. 
Interestingly, this dialogue or collaboration is not only in the interest of the business 
community, but it also helps accentuate the relevance of the UN in a world where 
the growing influence of globalisation puts its significance at risk of a downward spiral. 
Hence, it is generally argued, at least in the international business circles, that the 
initiatives pioneered by Kofi Annan were intuitive and sensitive to the global business 
climate of the day. Annan’s initiatives have been considered by most as being 
valuable to the partnership between the intergovernmental organisations and the 
ICC to the momentum of free trade, the campaign against abuse of human rights by 
businesses and the preservation of the environment.  
The foregoing suggests that the current global challenges of the 21st century are 
common to the various nations of the international community. The best response 
concerning providing the necessary legal order that could respond to these 
challenges is the concerted effort of the various stakeholders of the international 
community. Ideally, these concerted efforts should be back-up by the support of the 
force of law. International NGOs champion these efforts by taking up the global 
challenges on a thematic basis; such as environment, human rights, global health, 
terrorism, international commerce, et cetera. The ICC is a personification of this 
approach. However, due to the lack of legitimacy, their activities requires the 
cooperation of the international community, as it cannot be enforced otherwise, due 
to its informal voluntary nature.  
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The challenge remains that due to the voluntary nature of these rules, standards or 
guidelines, many multinational corporations are increasingly being accused of using 
the emblem of the UN to launder their image. They hide their iniquitous transgressions 
on human rights and the environment while appearing to be adhering to the loosely 
monitored principles.462 
6.3.3. The History of the ICC 
The ICC was founded in Paris, France in 1919. The organisation’s international 
secretariat was also established in Paris, and its International Court of Arbitration was 
formed in 1923. The first chairman of the chamber was Etienne Clementel, the early-
20th-century French politician463. 
The ICC has played a significant role in world politics since the turn of the century in 
the early 1900s. However, to have a holistic understanding of the body, it must be 
considered fully within the context of the earlier phases of its evolution and its 
adaptation to the shifting sands of world politics and the evolving patterns of 
institutional structures and norms, so it is now. Before its emergence, there have been 
national and local chambers of commerce, which played a significant role in shaping 
the national business contexts in which businesses operate. From shaping the local 
and national government policies to the creation of standards with which businesses 
deliver their services amongst themselves. However, after the World War I, the 
International Chamber of Commerce emerged as a federation of national chambers 
with a Paris-based secretariat and an extensive web of specialist committees 
covering most of the key areas of concern to the business community464.  
One of the reasons for the success of the ICC over the years can be traced back to 
its strategy to gain access to key international policy decision fora and multilateral 
agencies to seek to influence its decision process.  Hence, through its various specialist 
committees, it developed close relationships with the relevant sections of the League 
of Nations and the International Labour Organisation as these bodies developed 
during the 1920s465.  
The process by which the International Chamber of Commerce came into existence 
was via a decision to establish a non-governmental organisation which served the 
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interests of world business. This decision was taken at the behest of the US Chamber 
of Commerce in a meeting held in Atlantic City, New Jersey on October 1919, which 
had in attendance influencers of the global business milieu, primarily from UK, Europe 
and the US466.   
Further to this meeting, the ICC was officially inaugurated on June 24 one year later, 
although it had unofficially existed before then. As pointed out by Dominic Kelly, this 
is an example of a non-governmental organisation that is older than the United 
Nations and most of its associated agencies and has outlasted the UN’s predecessor 
– the League of Nations.  It pre-dates the major institutions such as the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund and the ITO/GATT/WTO trio. It is a non-governmental 
organisation that is older than many of the states in which its constituent National 
Committees reside.467  
6.3.3.1. The influence of the ICC over the years: As an international lawmaker 
and diplomat 
The longevity and influence of the ICC over the decades gives credibility to the 
argument on elevating the status of non-state actors. In particular, elevating the status 
of NGOs; giving them requisite legitimacy to carry on the significant activities which 
they already do. The ICC has over the years, not only existed, but its influence is 
undeniable. Some of its influence include the creation of policy which serves as global 
governance standards across various sectors and institutions. Hence, the International 
Chamber of Commerce is a typical example of a non-governmental organisation 
with whom states and inter-governmental organisations have consistently liaised with, 
and drawn from their unmatched resources, in reaching their various decisions over 
the century.  
For years, the influence of the ICC is pivotal to global trade and governance. 
Interestingly, the ICC has taken on different names from different scholars that are 
reflective of its characterisation at each point in time. Ridgeway referred to the ICC 
as an ‘international movement.’468 White referred to it as the ‘world parliament of 
business’.469 The ICC has referred to itself as the ‘defender of the multilateral trading 
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system’ and as a ‘private sector policeman for world-trade’.470 This various description 
gives further impetus to the stance and influence of the ICC globally.  
The role and the effectiveness of the ICC over the century have been both latent and 
dramatically blatant. One of its dramatic impacts was the implementation of the 
Dawes Plan.471 Having come into existence during the end of the World War 1 and 
having to deal with the immediate challenge of business interests as a result of the 
aftermath of the war, it was very instrumental in dealing with the issues of reparations 
which Germany had to pay as a result of the war.472 The United States and a group of 
very able American businessmen-diplomats in the lead, mostly from the International 
Chamber of Commerce, pressured the French to accept the Dawes Plan. It was 
hoped that the plan would solve the reparations problem; encouraging healthy 
economic recovery and growth (which would embrace large sales of American 
capital goods to Germany). Ultimately, it was to ensure peaceful contentment in two 
nations – France and Germany, which were bitter enemies at the time.473 So, they led 
a passionate campaign to break the deadlock over the settlement of post-war 
reparations, actively sponsoring and heavily funding the Dawes Plan, which was 
brought into effect by the 1924 Treaty of London.474  The work of the ICC in the bringing 
to fruition this plan, which also led to Charles Dawes sharing a Nobel peace prize, 
could not go unnoticed as pivotal to the successful resolution of the problem at the 
time. Hence it was stated -  
 ‘The Dawes Plan was really the work of the International Chamber of 
Commerce. Without official standing, without any means of coercion, by 
the sole force of its competency and the weight of the interests it 
represents, the International Chamber of Commerce was able to play a 
decisive part in settlement of a great international question. […] In brief, 
what thirty-two diplomatic conferences with the help of countless meetings 
of ambassadors and interviews between heads of governments were 
unable to achieve, has been done by a private business organisation.’475 
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 The disappointment of war and post-war years had discredited politics and politicians 
but had highlighted the increased relevance of non-state actors, including businesses. 
This public confidence in business empowered businesses to propose compromises 
that would deal with the post-war concerns, including the controversy of French 
Damoclean sword of reparations held over Germany.476 It ultimately led to the 
involvement of American businessmen - Charles Dawe and Oliver Young, and the 
solution was reached devoid of political entanglement of states. 
The foregoing emphasizes the point that the ICC etched itself in the history books to 
come as a result of the active role it played in post-World War 1. Hence, it has also, at 
times, been referred to as the Merchants of Peace. Its global relevance since then 
was not only established but have been on the increase over the century. 
 Dominic Kelly pointed out that this achievement of the ICC in the 1920s was closely 
followed in 1931 by a successful campaign, conducted through the media and 
behind closed doors, to reverse President Hoover’s decision not to make any 
concessions concerning the payment of war debts.477 
As can be seen, at the turn of the 20th Century, the global space had involuntarily 
acknowledged the place of ‘competency’ and ‘influence’ being given free rein 
without the entanglement of politics or the attribution of sovereignty.  
The ICC continued to etch its global relevance beyond its activities post World War 1, 
although in ways more latent, strategic and less dramatic. One of the first projects on 
its agenda was the reintegration of Europe as the centre of the world economy and 
to deepen its relationship with the upcoming global power – the United States of 
America. Its core strategy was to focus on four main sectors of the global economy 
at the time – transport, communication, finance and trade.  What followed was a 
series of conferences, initiatives, commissions, proposals and agreements which 
proffered effective and peaceful standards that underpinned the various global 
trade ventures at the time and ensured continued profitability.  
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6.3.3.2. ICC and historical impacts on global trade as an international 
lawmaker 
One of the ICC’s activities of note was the ICC’s involvement with the World Economic 
Conference (WEC) in 1927 convened by the League of Nations to the end of lowering 
tariff barriers.478 ICC has been seen to have been the conceptual originator of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The influence of the ICC in the run-
up to the conference is apparent from the comments made in the Final Report of the 
conference and the ensuing official commentary. As was scribed in the ICC’s treatise 
– World Peace through World Trade, the following was recorded anonymously -  
 ‘Certain sections of the ICC report [to the WEC] could be regarded as the 
conceptual origin of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: others 
gave virtual draft texts for conventions on specific issues. The Conference 
very largely accepted the report’s recommendations. One significant result 
was the 1928 convention on import and export prohibitions - the world’s first 
multilateral agreement on trade policy.’479 
Hence, this is an instance of the success of the ICC had made its mark in the setting 
of global standards, or put differently, informal international law-making, at least, in 
the international trade sector.  
Of course, this feat by a non-state actor attracted some criticism and backlash from 
some sections of the global community. Having made a significant impact at the 
conference, both from its report and its attendance from various national 
committees. Also, it made direct representation to the Economic Consultative 
Committee of the League of Nations, and it received a variety of reaction from 
different actors on the global space, including other non-governmental organisation. 
An example was the reaction from the International Co-operative Alliance, which 
stated as follows:  
‘Our attention has been drawn to the extraordinary claims which have 
been publicly made that the organised private traders of the world had not 
only succeeded in entrenching themselves at Geneva in the authorities of 
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the League on the basis of equality of voice and voting with the National 
Governments but wielded such influence […] that they practically 
dominated the situation and were even able to repudiate their own 
National Governments…’480 
 Given the foregoing, it is inevitable that the influence of the ICC at least in the area 
of trade was on the increase, albeit, criticised.  
6.3.3.3. The influence of the ICC: As agents of world peace through world 
trade 
Just before the war in 1937, at the Berlin Congress, the ICC adopted as its motto the 
slogan ‘World Peace through World Trade.’ At this congress, Hitler and Goering were 
in attendance.481 ICC’s new slogan was an indication of its intention to intervene more 
in global political and economic matters. It stemmed from the position held by the 
ICC and the wider business community, that business was pivotal to the political and 
economic stability of states. It was of the view that the nature of the market is such 
that, its relevance transcends the complex and petty intricacies of political 
differences. Therefore, in its view, common business interests ultimately resolve 
national and political differences. Their position was given credence due to its past 
successes at the international level, which appeared to have resolved intractable 
problems between states. 
The global influence of the ICC was further enhanced with the collaboration with yet 
another nongovernmental organisation – the Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace (CEIP) via a meeting held between the members of both organisations in 
March 1934 at the Royal Institute for International Affairs (Chatham House).482 Kelly 
noted that one of the significant outcomes of this conference was the formation in 
that same year of a joint CEIP/ICC Committee. The conference was attended by 
business leaders and academics from various countries aiming to lay the groundwork 
for the improvement of commercial and, thus, political relations between nations.483 
It led to the publications of a series of technical reports, which focused on the need 
for monetary stabilisation. It was followed by the 1938 publication from the Carnegie 
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Endowment for International Peace, a history of the ICC which was christened the 
Merchants of Peace.484  
6.3.3.4. The influence of the ICC: Post World War 2 
6.3.3.4.1. ICC and GATT 
After the 2nd World War, the ICC was again involved, as it was after the 1st World War, 
with the need for reconstruction and rehabilitation. This time, its campaign was for 
robust monetary and trade regimes. It led to its short-lived support of the ill-fated 
International Trade Organisation, with the provision that certain agreements on 
commercial policy and trade restrictions, such as the GATT will be incorporated into 
the ITO charter. Unfortunately, this was not the case upon the release of the draft 
charter before the UN Conference on Trade and Employment (Havana, November 
1947 – February 1948), and it resulted in the ICC withdrawing its support for the ITO 
charter and concentrate on building the GATT into a permanent organisation. It led 
to the eventual creation of the World Trade Organisation decades later. The primary 
purpose of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was to facilitate 
international trade by a significant reduction or absolute elimination of trade barriers 
such as tariffs and quotas. It provides that its purpose was the "substantial reduction 
of tariffs and other trade barriers and the elimination of preferences, on a reciprocal 
and mutually advantageous basis."485  
The GATT functioned de facto as an organisation, conducting eight rounds of 
multilateral trade negotiation addressing various trade issues and resolving 
international trade disputes. The Uruguay Round, which was completed on December 
15, 1993, after seven years of negotiations, resulted in an agreement among 117 
countries (including the U.S.) to reduce trade barriers and to create more 
comprehensive and enforceable world trade rules. The agreement coming out of this 
round, the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations, was signed in April 1994. The Uruguay Round agreement was approved 
and implemented by the U.S. Congress in December 1994 and went into effect on 
January 1, 1995.486 This agreement also created the World Trade Organisation (WTO), 
which came into being on January 1, 1995. The WTO implements the agreement, 
provides a forum for negotiating additional reductions of trade barriers and for settling 
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policy disputes, and enforces trade rules. The WTO is a successor to GATT, and the 
original GATT text (GATT 1947) is still in effect under the WTO framework, subject to the 
modifications of GATT 1994.487  
6.3.3.4.2. ICC’s Consultative Status with the UN 
The influence of the ICC increased even further with it being elevated to a Category 
‘A Consultative Status’ with the United Nations Economic and Social Council in 1946. 
As discussed in the previous chapters, the implication of this consultative status is far-
reaching in terms of its global influence, particularly to the process of making 
international decisions on economic and social matters that at times evolve to 
international law.  Since then, the ICC has been an active participant at the UN. 
However, there appears to have been some contention between the two bodies in 
its early years, concerning ideologies and set perspectives of certain country factions 
within the UN, mainly due to the cold war. 
Notwithstanding these slight hitches, the influence of the ICC in the decades that 
followed was almost unimpaired. The world increasingly grew as a predominantly 
capitalist economy and experienced the boom years, as did the conversations 
around the need for an expansion of in an international ambience of free trade and 
tighter integration of with the European Economic Community, following the signature 
of the Treaty of Rome. The ICC’s objective was to also expand its influence beyond to 
West into Asia. In 1955 the first ICC Congress to be held in Asia took place in Tokyo, 
and by 1959 seven new National Committees had been set up, along with a regional 
Commission on Asian and Pacific Affairs. The brief of the ICC’s regional Commission 
on Asian and Pacific Affairs was to coordinate their activities and represent the ICC 
to the regional office of the UN in Bangkok.488  
6.3.3.5. The influence of the ICC: International lawmaker in contemporary 
times 
The growth of capitalism from the end of the 50s through to the next three decades 
were faced with immense challenges for the ICC. At the time it was considered to be 
a western capitalist club. There was a wave of decolonisation in Africa and the 
increasing concerns of the impact of business on the climate and other new age 
challenges of business, globalisation and a myriad of other social issues. These 
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challenges indeed, added to the needed evolvement of the ICC to be relevant to 
the current global commercial challenges. As it was evident that the public exerted 
their anger of the depleting of the ozone layer and the economic challenges that 
came with the decolonisation wave, particularly in the developing countries, led to 
the adverse reaction of the public against the multinational corporations.  
However, the ICC responded quite quickly, re-asserting its influence over the global 
economic and social circles. The trajectory of its narrative as reflected from its major 
themes at the ICC congresses held from the late 50s to the late 60s was intended to 
communicate its reinvention from a pro-capitalist NGO to a socially responsible global 
influencer. In 1959 at the Congress held in Washington, the theme was centred on - 
‘Today’s Challenge to Businessmen - their Responsibility in Domestic and World Affairs’. 
In 1961 (Copenhagen) the theme was ‘Private Enterprise in Economic Development’. 
The 1963 congress (Mexico City) considered the theme of ‘Economic Growth through 
World Interdependence’, while the 1965 congress (New Delhi) dealt with ‘World 
Progress through Partnership’. At the 1967 congress in Montreal the theme was ‘Private 
Enterprise in a Changing World’, while at the final congress in that decade, Istanbul in 
1969, attention zeroed in on the apparent villain of the piece under the theme 
‘International Economic Growth - the Role, Rights and Responsibilities of the 
International Corporation’. 489 One of the strategic steps taken by the ICC in those 
years was the establishment of the inaugural UN Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) held in Geneva in 1964, and again at UNCTAD II in New Delhi 
four years later. The significance of this direction that the ICC took was that it led the 
narrative of the role of business in global peace, prosperity, progress and harmony.  
In all of these, it brought about the various informal legal frameworks within which the 
international business community operated. This approach perpetuated its relevance 
and increased its influence over time. Its influence is characterised in recent times as 
the NGO body which represented the business community in the international plane, 
and then showing that business is pivotal to the economic development and stability 
of the international global community. This characterisation goes back the focal point 
of the discussion of ICC to this thesis – the standard-setting role.  Given the global 
influence of an organisation like the ICC, and how it perpetually comes up with 
standards that regulate the international business community even more than states, 
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feeds to the case for the reconceptualisation of the Westphalian notion of 
international law.  
The ICC used these strategic network built in the global community to enhance its 
creation of standardised regulatory conditions for its members globally. In a sense, it 
was evolving into an informal private international lawmaker. Furthermore, towards 
the end of the 60s into the beginning of the 70s, it began talks on the roles, rights and 
responsibilities of multinational corporations, which eventually led to the launch of its 
‘Guidelines for International Investment’ in December 1972. This initiative persuaded 
governments to investigate and adopt standard investment and insurance practices 
which covered all aspects of private foreign investment.490  In 1976 The Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development; an intergovernmental economic 
organisation founded in 1961 to facilitate economic progress and world trade through 
policy-making, published their own ‘Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises’. It was 
well received by the ICC, due to the significant role the ICC had played in it.491 The 
ICC went on to increase its participation with key projects initiated by the newly-
created UN Commission and Centre on Transnational Corporations. Some of such 
projects included the establishment of a code of conduct for transnational 
corporations (TNCs), international standards of reporting and accounting, and the 
creation of a database on TNCs for government use492. 
6.3.4. The ICC and the Bretton Woods Agreement 
The Bretton Woods agreement was created in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire in a 
1944 conference of all of the World War II allied nations. It brought about a new global 
monetary system which replaced the gold standard with the U.S. dollar as the global 
currency. It inadvertently set America as the dominant power in the world economy, 
creating rules-based organisations such as the World Bank and the International 
Monetary fund, and the defunct International Trade Organisation, which later 
became the World Trade Organisation. The ICC was pivotal to this process. In 1944, 
ICC joined leaders from around the world in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, to create 
the framework for today’s multilateral international system. In the view of the ICC, the 
Bretton Woods Conference was pivotal the creation of a unified international 
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monetary and financial order established better clarity and certainty for business 
around the world. The ICC Secretary General John W.H. Denton AO said -  
“The Bretton Woods Conference was a defining moment that recognised the 
need for rules-based relations between countries to ensure a more stable 
international financial system. As an original participant at that conference, 
ICC continues to support many of the values embedded in the Bretton 
Woods system. We also believe we must channel the boldness demonstrated 
in 1944 to shape a global financial architecture fit for the 21st century.”493 
Under the agreement, countries promised that their central banks would maintain 
fixed exchange rates between their currencies and the dollar.494  
The role of the ICC in this conference, which essentially led to a significant change in 
the international monetary regime globally is another attestation as to the global 
relevance of the ICC as an international lawmaker. 
6.3.5. The ICC and the United Nations 
6.3.5.1. Opportunistic globalisation: The role of ICC in salvaging the relevance 
of the UN in the 21st Century 
Just before Kofi Annan became the Secretary-General of the UN, it combatted the 
premonition of its waning out of relevance due to the trajectory of globalisation. The 
concept - globalisation was an embodiment of irony; it blurred boundaries, 
particularly concerning how to more easily interact, which at the same time raised 
the tendency for higher fences between states, particularly with the increase of 
nationalist narrative. It seemed that the powerful nation used the concept at their 
convenience; embracing it when it served their interest and refraining from it when it 
appeared to curtail their interests. It is a concept not accurately characterised by a 
simple abridging of nations but more accurately, an abridging of the interests of the 
peoples of the world, with the more powerful nation steering the wheels of 
globalisation. So nationalist rhetoric is not just a recent occurrence. However, they 
have been more prevalent in recent times, given the examples of Scotland’s 
independence referendum in 2014, Trump’s administration and policies since 2018, 
and more recently Brexit of 2020.  
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Historically, nations have often served self-interests first.  For instance, the US, in 
response to the calls of a New International Economic Order side-stepped the United 
Nations in favour of unilateral and bilateral management initiatives. The New 
International Economic Order (NIEO) which could have further fostered globalisation, 
although, to serve the interest of the developing countries. It was an initiative which 
came about at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. It 
consisted of proposals from predominantly the developing countries from the Non-
Aligned Movement495 soon after the years of decolonisation. The proposals were to 
advance their interests by stating their own terms of trade, increasing development 
assistance, developed-country tariff reductions, et cetera. The thrust of the NIEO was 
to reshape the international economic system in favour of Third World countries. It was 
to replace the Bretton Woods system, which had benefited the leading states that 
had created it – especially the United States.  
It follows that the US would conveniently ignore the new initiative of the UN, side-
stepping the UN in its effort to bring about the New International Economic Order. This 
sidestepping led to the demise of that initiative.496 How the UN was tossed back and 
forth, seemingly at the convenience of state powers, dealt a blow to its continued 
significance and influence. 
6.3.5.1.1. The depleting reputational capital of the UN 
Smouts argued that the behaviour of big states as to their relationships with the UN 
seemed opportunistic. It was a significant concern as to the integrity of the UN; 
worsening the ‘legitimacy deficit’ for the UN. Examples of this could be seen in several 
instances, including the attempts by the US to persuade the UN to lessen the ‘burden’ 
of its financial commitment, while strong-arming the organisation to align itself with 
the US foreign policy goals.497 The reputational capital of the UN depleted and led to 
the view from sceptics that many reforms of the UN were a scheme to entrench further 
the powers the bigger states at the detriment of the smaller states. This concern was 
significant because the aggregate of the smaller states was a majority and increased 
the likelihood of the UN losing the requisite global goodwill to wield the global 
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influence it purports to wield.  Hence, there were incessant calls for structural reform 
of the Security Council. There were calls to transform the underlying philosophy of the 
UN premised on Western views or even an outright abolition. Then it should be 
replaced with an institution or institutions reflective of the changed circumstances 
and varied social, political and cultural viewpoints given expression around the 
world.498  
The increasing lack of trust stemming from opportunistic globalisation gave rise to an 
increase in the opposition of the underpinning ideology of the UN before Kofi Annan 
became the Secretary-General. Most NGOs directed their activism and agendas to 
counter capitalism or perceived injustice or trans-border damages499 due to 
capitalism in various areas but in particular the environment500. Consequently, the 
activism affected the multinational corporations as well as other global interest, and 
so it was in the interest of both international business community (embodied in the 
ICC) and the United Nations to reinvent themselves.  
6.3.5.1.2. The ICC’s Geneva’s Business Dialogue: Reinventing the UN 
The quest to revitalise the UN came at the time of Kofi Annan, who went to great 
lengths to introduce initiatives geared towards sustaining the relationship between the 
promotion of peace and development and the creation of wealth and prosperity, 
which inadvertently had the international business sector at the centre of his agenda. 
The ICC aligned with the strategy of the United Nations at the time, and proliferated 
the Public-Private Partnership idea, through a myriad of events, press releases, 
speeches, et cetera, all of which led to the Geneva Business Dialogue. Grave 
concerns about the increasingly negative reputation of globalisation and capitalism 
were the focal point of the dialogue. It attracted 450 business leaders from across the 
world who met with representatives of international organizations in Geneva at the 
end of September in 1998.501 The global policy forum in reporting the event stated as 
follows-  
“Captains of industry from the largest corporations on earth, businessmen 
from Third World countries and various political leaders agreed on the need 
to regulate 'hot money' flows, counter 'globaphobia' and establish a global 
                                                             
498 Kelly (n 456), p. 19 
 
499 M. W. Zacher, ‘Uniting nations: global regimes and the United Nations system in Raimo Väyrynen (ed), Globalization And 
Global Governance (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 1999). 
500 Kelly (n 456), p. 20 
501 'The Geneva Business Dialogue' (Globalpolicy.org, 1998) <https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/221-
transnational-corporations/47073.html> accessed 21 March 2020. 
220 
 
framework for 'managing globalization'. Sensing an upcoming backlash 
against globalized neoliberalism, business leaders clearly fear that not only 
the financial crisis but also the debate about how to regulate the runaway 
global economy could move beyond their control and turn against them.”502 
 The ICC was the prime organiser of the Geneva Business Dialogue (GBD), and the 
then chairman Helmut Maucher, stated in his welcome concerning the purpose of 
the event as follows,  
"[the need to] increase mutual understanding between business leaders and 
international organizations[…] to join forces to improve the situation[…] action 
point for how to establish global rules for an ordered liberalism were needed.”  
In his conclusion, he stated –  
"[t]he ICC is in the front of the discussion, as the voice of business, dialoguing 
with the WTO and the UN….to deal with global problems, powers need to 
be delegated to that level".  
This meeting dealt with a wide range of issues which are at the front burners of both 
the United Nations and the ICC’s agenda. The matters included development goals, 
particularly in developing countries. These discussions ultimately led to the campaign 
which underscored the UN Global Compact.  
6.3.5.1.3. The ICC and the UN Global Compact 
Both the UN and the ICC needed the UN Global Compact. The need for it was not 
necessarily only for the good of the global community, but also for the sustained 
legitimacy of both bodies. The UN, on the one hand, faced an imminent risk to its 
relevance in the post-Westphalian world order. In contrast, the ICC faced the 
common challenged faced by the business community – the criticism of capitalism, 
the inequitable balance between the rich and the poor and the blame for the world 
depreciation. Hence, the Global Compact stood as the saving grace for both bodies 
in the late 90s. 
The Global Compact was an initiative which required businesses to align strategies 
and operations with the universal principles on human rights, labour, environment and 
anti-corruption, and take actions that advance societal goals. These principles are 
another example of soft law. 




The UN seemed to benefit substantially from the alliance with the ICC. Some of the 
most significant benefits of the Global Compact and the various Public-Private 
Partnerships was the cash advantage for the UN. The UN gained funding for most of 
its activities due to corporate philanthropy and corporate investment in UN driven 
projects. The corporate world, as facilitated by the ICC, committed billions of dollars 
to fund various UN activities. Also, the ICC’s business world enjoyed the incentive of 
being able to venture into new markets due to the provisions of the predictable and 
stable soft infrastructure brought about by UN development assistance which was 
initially funded by the corporate philanthropists and investors503. In the years that 
followed, many more developing economies joined the ICC, with Russia, Poland and 
Cuba joining in May 2000, and then most countries from Africa joining from 1999 
onwards into the early 2000s. 
6.3.5.1.4. The Global Compact Ten Principles as Soft International Law 
The Global Compact has been described as an initiative which is meant to be a 
‘social norming proposition’504 and ‘a platform for institutional learning’.505 It reiterates 
the set of values and principles contained within the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, the ILO’s Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, and the 
Rio Declaration of the UNCED (1992). Practitioners and scholars have considered it a 
soft international law made by the business community for the business community, 
often through the facilitation of the ICC. 
The Ten Principles are delineated under several broad headings. Hence under the 
concept of Human Rights, there are two principles, which are -  
 Firstly, businesses should support and respect the protection of 
internationally proclaimed human rights; and  
 Secondly, businesses should make sure that they are not complicit in human 
rights abuses.  
Under the broad topic of Labour, there are four principles which are -   
 businesses should uphold the freedom of association and the effective 
recognition of the right to collective bargaining;  
 there should be the elimination of all forms of forced and compulsory labour;  
 there should be the effective abolition of child labour; and  
 the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation. 
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Under the topic of Environment, there are three principles –  
 Firstly, businesses should support a precautionary approach to environmental 
challenges;  
 secondly, businesses should undertake initiatives to promote greater 
environmental responsibility; and  
 thirdly, businesses should encourage the development and diffusion of 
environmentally friendly technologies.  
Lastly, and most recently added, there is the single principle under the broad heading 
of Anti-Corruption. The principle states that businesses should work against corruption 
in all its forms, including extortion and bribery.506 
The above is basically a list of soft international law, and it has faced much criticism 
because of its lack of enforcement powers. 
While the ICC and the UN are quite in tune with the Global Compact, the ICC has 
sought to bring a balance between corporate responsibility and corporate 
profitability.  The ICC holds the view that the international business community remains 
committed to working with the intergovernmental organisations, especially the UN, to 
enhance the international development and corporate responsibility, however, the 
underpinning rationale for the existence of business remains the economic objective 
of making a profit for the shareholders. The ICC must maintain this view in order to 
sustain its relevance to the business community who are its most important 
stakeholders, and for whom it has become a de facto international legislative arm, 
albeit, without the requisite legitimacy. 
6.3.5.2. The role of global crisis in establishing the relevance of the ICC 
The journey of the ICC with the United Nations could be traced back to its inception, 
and the relationship formed at the time with the League of Nations. It appeared that 
global adversity and unrest have always amplified the relevance of the ICC. This fact 
stems from the very first global impact made by the ICC at the end of World War 1 
concerning its role in dealing with the reparations controversy between Germany and 
France. Post World War 2, the ICC, through its national section in America was one of 
the substrata of the emergence of the United Nations at the San Francisco 
Conference in 1945, and it was successful in securing the facilities for consultation of 
non-governmental organisations according to Article 71 of the UN Charter.507 More 
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recently, is the instance of the dwindling fate of the UN due to ‘globaphobia’.508 This 
depletion of the reputational capital of the UN resulted in its reinvention and increased 
the influential role of the ICC in the process.  
6.3.5.3. The inadequacy of ICC’s UN’s Consultative Status  
Thenceforth, in October 1946, it obtained the highest level (Category A) consultative 
status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). This status and 
the provisions of Article 71 of the UN Charter are central to the argument of this thesis. 
NGOs, and the ICC in particular, are acknowledged for the significant role they play 
in the operations of the global community. To an extent, they are part of the team of 
architects that build the international legal framework. However, they still fall short of 
getting the requisite legitimacy needed for their effectiveness. They continue to 
operate from a voluntary standpoint, churning out guidelines that cannot be legally 
enforced due to their intrinsic voluntary tendencies. Today, the consultative status of 
the ICC and other influential NGOs have been considered to be a welcome 
development, albeit, inadequate. At the time when the status was granted, it might 
have been satisfactory and considered to be the best that could be achieved in the 
circumstances. True to the prevailing circumstances at the time, this recognition 
paved the way for submissions both verbal and written, to be made to the various UN 
agencies and global decision-makers. By 1949, the ICC had already had business 
representation at 93 meetings of UN organs lasting 580s, plus a further 21 meetings 
lasting 372 days organised by its specialised agencies509.  
At the end of World War 2 and the growth and intensity of the Cold War wax, and 
then finally waned, so the ICC and its activities continued to thrive under growing 
pressures to justify its actions to a global populace polarised against the increasing 
influence of global capitalism. Consequently, it had to walk a blurred line between 
the campaign for the private interest of its members and the broader global interests 
of an enlightened public. It led to the need for the ICC to reinvent itself and brand 
itself as an organisation with a thrust to achieve world peace through world trade.510 
In a sense, it was amalgamating two polarised sections of the international community 
by their common interests.  
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6.3.5.4. ICC’s early international soft laws 
The members of the ICC contended with the increasing cynicism of the rest of the 
global populace. They realised that a positive role and achievements of private 
enterprise needed to be identified, promoted and defended if it was to be a 
predominant force in the world economy. In a bid to achieve this consideration, it 
was essential to address the cynicism, and there was a need to be introspective and 
determine what they would be promoting and defending. So in the 1967 Montreal 
Congress, it reached the unanimous agreement on a ‘Charter for Private Enterprise’ 
a first world level declaration of principles which stipulated ethical standards for a free 
enterprise system. It inadvertently made private international law, albeit, soft law.511 
The core aim of the ICC have been interwoven in its broad aspiration ‘to make the 
voice of business heard in the global decision making’; ultimately to promote the self-
regulation of business and strategy. Over the years, the ICC has sought the 
achievement of its aspiration through the rapid growth of its network of member 
chambers throughout east and central Europe, Asia, Latin America, and Africa. It has 
set the scene for the creation of national and international legislation and regulation 
by means other than by the traditional parliament, through the creation and adoption 
of self-regulation and standards-setting proliferated by a vast web of issue-based and 
sector-specific committees from member national chambers and multinational 
corporations. The ICC further fostered this proliferation of alternative channels of law-
making by taking advantage of the close relationships and relevance with national 
governments and regional and global institutions such as the EU and the UN system.512  
This harnessing of diverse actors on the international plane inadvertently has made 
the ICC a renowned private international lawmaker, with tremendous global 
influence, increasingly given more impetus by globalisation. More recently, its 
influence has grown even further, particularly with its relationship with the United 
Nations. 
6.3.5.5. The Observer Status of the ICC with the General Assembly of the United 
Nations 
In 2016, the ICC upped its influence by being granted the Observer Status with the 
General Assembly of the United Nations.513 This elevation was an unprecedented 
move, which further underscores the position of this thesis. This achievement is an 
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attestation to the reach of the ICC eclipsing that of most states, especially given the 
fact the UN observers’ status is highly circumscribed and predominantly opened to 
inter-governmental organisations. The implication of this is that it furthers the ICC’s role 
as a quasi-international lawmaker, who now has a direct voice within the UN system. 
Consequently, the ICC can contribute directly to the work of the General Assembly 
and reflecting the increased influence of NGOs across various sectors of global 
governance.  Interestingly, this move is a win, not just for NGOs, but also for 
multinational corporations and the entire category of non-state actors.  IN response 
to this move, the ICC Chairman stated as follows in  
“This is a huge recognition of the role that business can play in contributing 
to a better and peaceful world. There is only one route to meeting the many 
challenges that face our society-from climate change to mass migration-
and that is for governments and civil society to work hand-in-hand with the 
private sector.”514 
ICC Secretary General John Danilovich had pointed out that this move was 
particularly needful given the complexity of today’s global challenges.  It is a win for 
all stakeholders if the ICC could deploy the resources, expertise and knowledge of 
world business in the work of the General Assembly.515  
6.4. The ICC – An example that NGOs are more than a pressure group  
From the foregoing, it is safe to conclude that the ICC like many other NGOs, affirms 
the fact that although new’ forms of diplomacy have not supplanted the ‘old’: they 
have supplemented and indeed complemented them. There is a need to 
acknowledge this in a way that gives them more legitimacy.  
It is hard not to notice the functional changes of the various structures that exist in the 
international space. The state, the inter-governmental organisations, the multinational 
organisations or the nongovernmental organisations, as structures of the international 
community, are evolving functionally in a way that is reflective of the increased 
awareness of material and non-material autonomy dilemmas and constraints. The 
global interaction between all these actors is expanding and birthing new ‘norms and 
‘intersubjective meanings’ archetypal of the global reality.  
The ICC, being one of such organisations undergoing this metamorphosis, seeks to 
play a significant role in the process, as it has done for the past century as a private 





international lawmaker by default. At this point, where it is apparent that the influence 
of business in the international community is arguably more than that of other actors. 
The ICC, which straddles the NGO and the business function, is strategically placed 
and is further entrenching its footprint in the emerging international legal framework 
through its soft law-making endeavours.516 
Given the foregoing, there is credence to the argument that the ICC is more than a 
pressure group. It is a non-governmental organisation which provides a voice and a 
legal framework, in terms of standards and regulations, for the international business 
community as a representative of the broad, diverse and influential community of 
global actors. It is an example of an NGO who operates at a level more influential 
than some states and gives impetus to the argument that the role of NGOs should be 
acknowledged in the reconceptualisation of the Westphalian notion of international 
law to be fit for purpose in a globalised 21st century and beyond. 
6.5. Chapter 6: Conclusion  
This chapter set out to examine the International Chamber of Commerce as an NGO 
with significant global influence. The critical objective was to use the ICC as an 
example which illustrates one the core argument of this thesis that the increased 
influence of NGOs in the international plane should result in legitimising their role. 
It was observed that authority on the international plane could be effectively 
distributed. The activities of the ICC over time attests to the possibility and the success 
of such an approach. 
The ICC was reviewed systematically to provide a detailed account of the extent of 
their influence. Stemming from the core purpose of their existence to promote 
international trade responsible business conduct, and a global approach to 
regulations and dispute resolution services; the ICC is well-positioned to act as a 
conduit for effective governance for the international government community. One 
of the key rationales for opting for the ICC as an example to illustrate the point of this 
thesis is that it is an organisation that straddles two of the most influential worlds of 
global non-state actors -MNCs and NGOs. 
Three core activities that the ICC engages with include the establishment of rules, 
dispute resolution and policy advocacy. The findings of this chapter reveal that in the 
discharge of its core activity, the ICC has proven to be more effective than state 
initiative. One of the rationales for this is the composite of the ICC. It is diverse and far-
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reaching, beyond the limitations that encumber the states. The ICC has members and 
associates that engage in international business from countries around the world. They 
can set cross border business standard with such unparalleled authority due to their 
inherent global nature. However, due to the lack of requisite legitimacy, their roles 
remain voluntary and lacks the requisite element of enforcement. Consequently, their 
laws are aptly referred to a soft law because it is voluntary in their form. However, due 
to the economic persuasion that they wield, the laws are essentially mandatory in their 
function. Hence, it is ideal to describe them as informal, indirect international 
lawmakers. 
An attempt was made to evaluate the significance of ICC to the argument for 
reconceptualization. This evaluation was done by considering the ICC from a 
historical perspective. It was observed that, historically, its role in international policy-
making circles has been both latent and dramatically blatant. Instances of its 
dramatic impact were considered.  Its role in dealing with reparations controversy 
right after the First World War was highlighted. It has been acknowledged that the 
work of the ICC was instrumental in the success of the Dawes plan, which brought into 
effect the peace treaty of London in 1924. Another significant impact of the ICC was 
after the Second World War. Of note is the role it played during the Bretton Wood’s 
conference in 1944 which effectively is the birthplace of the International Monetary 
Funds, and the World Bank. It has also been referred to as the conceptual originator 
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) which eventually led to the 
emergence of the world trade organisation decades later. 
Finally, the influence and relevance of the ICC to the United Nations are crucial. It was 
seen in the role it played in revitalising United Nations at the beginning of the 21st 
Century through the proliferation of the public-private partnership idea during the 
Geneva business dialogue in 1998. Additionally, its significance is seen in the role it 
played in the emergence of the UN Global Compact initiative which required 
businesses to align strategies and operations with universal principles on human rights, 
labour, environment and anticorruption.  
The preceding suggests that the ICC is more than just a pressure group, it also 
underpins the argument that new forms of diplomacy and global governance has 
emerged in which NGOs like the ICC play a significant role. These new norms of 
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7.1. Chapter 7: Introduction 
The preceding chapter highlighted the emergence of NGOs, and in particular the 
ICC. The ICC’s role in global governance and as an indirect international lawmaker 
among other examples of its influence on the international plane underscores some 
of the new norms of the 21st-century international legal system. This development goes 
to the crux of the arguments that there needs to be a reconceptualisation of 
international law in a way that reflects these new norms of the 21st century. So, along 
these lines, this chapter will undertake a study of the development of concept and 
norms in particular. It will focus on the possible conceptualisation of international law 
in a way that incorporates 21st-century international norms. Along these lines, it will 
examine in more detail the concept of state practice and opinio juris in the making 
of customary international law. It will evaluate the dilemma faced in the workings of 
the two concepts and use it as a roadmap for incorporating 21st-century international 
norms to reconceptualise international law. Consequently, Article 38 of the Statute of 
the International Court of Justice 1945 will be systematically appraised. 
Additionally, it will review in detail the emergence of new international norms. It will 
consider their multicentric nature as a pathway to a pluralised international legal 
context. It is a pluralised international legal context which evolves organically. Some 
of these will include the norms of standard-setting and soft law as just observed with 
the ICC. 
Furthermore, steps will be taken to describe the 21st-century pluralistic legal 
environment systematically. First, there will be an evaluation of legal pluralism as the 
bed-rock of the inclusion of added layers in the reconceptualisation of international 
law.  
Finally, on the premise of the preceding, it will lead an argument for the 
reconceptualisation of international law by adding layers to the international 
pluralistic legal paradigm. In so doing, a justification for the legitimised role of NGOs 
as a significant added layer of governance will be made to the end of keeping 
international law in step with the 21st-century global realities. 
7.2. Reconceptualisation – The Two Paradigms of UN- New York & UN - Geneva 
International law evolves or should evolve, in concert with globalisation. Many 
Scholars have attested to this fact, and given the global realities of today, it can be 
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said that they affirm the fact that international law has, in reality, though not, in theory, 
reached a full circle. 517 
It appears that there is a dichotomy between the 'worlds' from the UN New York 
perspective as opposed to the UN Geneva Perspective. While the former remains a 
State centric construct, with the General Assembly and the Security Council, the later 
reflects the reality of today, as it houses most of the UN Specialised Agencies, which 
are flagless, and are a depiction of a cooperative globalised world. 
Further to the publication of the US National Intelligence Council (NIC) –Global Trends 
5182030: Alternative Worlds, there was a wide range of essays that attest to the 
changing global status quo. In it, there was a specific query by the then Senior Vice 
President of International Affairs at the US Chamber of Commerce on whether the 
world is on a path to convergence or a path to divergence.519 He expressly states the 
need for a reform of the major International Institutions to accommodate the 
changing realities of the 21st-Century, or risk the eventuality of obsoleting. He is 
emphatic as to the point that there will be a global change in the international system. 
Though, he clarifies that it will not be revolutionary but evolutionary. This evolution is 
akin to the view of this thesis. This thesis opines that there should be a paradigm shift 
in the way international law is conceptualised to make it fit for purpose in the 21st 
Century.  
7.2.1. The making of international law – incorporating UN Geneva 21st -
century international norms? 
Taking the law to be an ontology of norms; the 'kinds' of law can be described as the 
phenomena through which the norms manifest themselves.520 These 'kinds' or 
concepts have stayed static to the Westphalian international law model epitomised 
by the UN New York paradigm, i.e. the relations of states and the concepts of 
sovereignty in its limited expression as stated in Chapter 4. 
International law and the concepts of its core doctrines, such as sovereignty is central 
to any change in the construct of the international system, whether as reflected by 
the Geneva or New York paradigm.  These concepts create the legal environment for 
which the international community can continue to exist and interact. It goes to the 
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core of the questions that this research seeks to answer; whether there should be a 
gulf or a disjoint between the realities of the 21st-century international relations or the 
international system and the theoretical international law. International law, in theory, 
is still patterned after the Westphalian concept of international law. It has not taken 
into cognizance the plurality of norms that are replete in the 21st-century international 
community.  
From this plurality, a norm that this thesis seeks to entrench as an international norm is 
the increasing influence of non-state actors in international relations. The increase of 
UN agencies in Geneva, which reflect the increasing role of non-state actors in the 
global governance is central to the position of this thesis, in that it lends points to the 
argument that the 21st-century realities include the active role of non-state actors, and 
in particular, NGOs. Most of the UN agencies in Geneva tend to involve NGOs as 
observers in their decision making. Indeed, there is an acknowledgement of the 
Influence of NGOs. Still, the position of this thesis is that it is insufficient – NGOs need to 
be given more than participatory rights than they have in the past, and should in a 
sense be given declaratory rights.  
The plurality of norms should culminate into 21st-century customs, from which 
international law should evolve. Customs are informed by state-practice or norms of 
the society. The international society has seen a proliferation of norms and practices 
which suggest the emergence of new international customs. According to article 38 
of the International Court of Justice provides custom is one of the primary sources of 
international law. It is determined through state practice and opinio juris. However, 
there is uncertainty as to how international custom is formed, particularly concerning 
its core elements –state practice and opinio juris 
7.2.1.1. The Dilemma with State Practice & Opinio juris 
The question of state practice is one that comes with levels of uncertainty as to 
precisely what it is. One of the reasons is the lack of clarity concerning the 
determination of the extent of the longevity of practice to validate the existence of 
state practice. For opinio juris, the challenge also abounds - knowing how one can 
have a belief that something is already a law in order to create it as law.521  
This dilemma plays out in that states do not usually issue general opinions on which 
norms form international law as a result of their state practice. Nevertheless, it is the 
position of this thesis that state practice ought to be continuously observed for 
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international law to evolve. The process by which such observation is made is a 
different question altogether. The import of this should be that where international 
custom evolves, the international legal framework ought to align with any such 
evolution in its custom or the behaviour of the international community. International 
law should adopt and adapt to such changes within the context of the law, as it is 
and as it ought to be. 
Hence, there is a need for an intentional constant observation because with custom; 
there is no inherent 'thereness' waiting to be identified and explored. There is no 
authoritative text that states what a custom is, basically because customs are not 
written.522 Also, the determination of how state practice becomes eligible to be 
classified as a custom is blurred. So the question is whether it is settled state practice 
that the state's interface with non-state actors and in particular NGOs, and their 
growing influence is acknowledged. Should this practice result in the sort of opinio juris 
of a paradigm shift, in the manner international law should be conceptualised? 
One of the most authoritative sources for determining how state practice 
constitutes custom can be found in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases before 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ):  
"Although the passage of only a short period of time is not necessarily, or of 
itself, a bar to the formation of a new rule of customary international law on 
the basis of what was originally a purely conventional rule, an indispensable 
requirement would be that within the period in question, short though it 
might be, State practice, including that of States whose interests are 
especially affected, it should have been both extensive and virtually 
uniform in the sense of the provision invoked . . ."523 
From the provision just stated above, the said practice should amount to a settled 
practice and a belief that the practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of the 
rule of law requiring it. The need for such a belief, i.e. the existence of a subjective 
element, is implicit in the very notion of the opinio juris sive necessitatis.524 
Academics and jurists are more inclined to hold the view that a practice which has 
been exhibited much longer and consistently by more states than another is more 
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likely to be considered custom than the later.525 However, there are dissenting views 
which opine that the 21st-century international society needs less time and repetition 
than was previously required to establish customs.526  
So while the dilemma remains as to longevity, uniformity or consistency needed for 
establishing customary international law persist. It suffices, in the interim, to ascertain 
that if there is a known number of precedents on a particular subject matter or 
behaviour, it should be sufficient to establish the existence of an international norm.527 
On the other hand, concerning opinio juris, it has been considered as the cornerstone 
for customary international law. However, a clear understanding of it is significantly 
conflicted when juxtaposed against the apparent nature of customary international 
law. For instance, customary international law suggests that a custom exists due to its 
reputation as such, and it is not legislated as are other sources of law. Therefore, trying 
to marry that with the import of opinio juris creates a dilemma. On the one hand, 
customary law-making is by nature indirect and unintentional; on the other hand, 
opinio juris is, in a sense an intentional activity acknowledging an unintentional activity 
as law. To put another way – it requires some form of intentional activity, an act of will. 
7.2.1.2. Understanding the making of customary international law 
Koskenniemi suggests that the challenge with customary international law is that it is 
indeterminate because it is circular. It assumes 'behaviour' to be evidence of the 
'opinio juris' and the latter to be evidence of the 'behaviour' assumed, and these 
elements are relevant to create custom.528 Expectedly, the known is used to prove the 
unknown.  For instance, in a criminal case, 'evidence' is typically drawn from factual 
circumstances to prove the mens rea element; being that the mens rea exists within 
the confines of the mind of the accused, which is by nature intangible or unknown. It 
is the same with the ascertainment of opinio juris in customary international law. In 
essence, it should be deciphered from the evidence of prevalent state practices, but 
after such ascertainment, is the consent that such practice should be law.  
This ascertainment is opinio juris in action – a theory which takes customary 'law' to be 
a manifestation of pre-existing law.529 It presents no particular problem - the rationale 
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being that the belief in a law that already exists is not constitutive but declaratory. The 
prevalent role of non-state actors, and in particular NGOs, in the relations of the 
international community, including the extent to which all stakeholders feel a sense of 
obligation to abide by the agenda proffered by these actors, is suggestive of the 
existence of a kind of law. Hence, along these lines, it could be said that the thrust of 
this thesis is not asking for a reconceptualisation of international law in a way as to 
constitute a new legal framework. Instead, in a declaratory way, to bring the 
conceptualisation of international law to align with the realities of its practice, and to 
legitimise that process. 
Therefore, the making of international customary law is inherently paradoxical, or as 
Koskenniemi put it, circular and indeterminate. Raphael Walden, suggest that the 
needed consent that practice is law is not an active one but a tacit one530 - implying 
that consent ought to be inferred and known behaviour should naturally constitute 
international customary law. Given the preceding, the practice of the international 
community and influential NGOs across various sectors, as seen in previous chapters, 
should be perpetually observed and call for a rethink of the international legal order. 
It suffices that the practice is consistent and is known. It is not always the case that all 
states or even the majority of states actively play a significant role in the making of 
anyone norm of customary international law. So as has been argued, it is, at times, 
the case that the 'inert mass' of non-participating states acquiesce, by the 'qualified 
silence', to the creation of customary law.531  
7.2.1.3. Reconceptualisation and Customary international law: Examining 
Article 38 
The challenge with the understanding of the process of customary international law 
mirrors the problem of international law as a whole; the lack of a 'thereness'532. There 
is no perceptible constitution of international law, and this poses a more significant 
challenge for its evolution as it appears to evolve arbitrarily.  Questions abound as to 
what is an accurate depiction of the formal sources of international law. There are 
positions held which do not align with the position that Article 38 is the 'foundation for 
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the doctrine of the sources of International Law'.533 Alf Ross comes to this conclusion 
because for him the sources of law are themselves not based in law, but facts.534  
Consequently, it can be appropriately inferred that to determine the validity of a 
norm, if the process of its emergence is one that is recognised in a normative order, 
that normative order could be considered as a source of that norm's binding force. 
So, the North Sea Continental Shelf case535is considered alongside the provisions of 
article 38536 which provides that customs emanate from state practice and opinio juris; 
it follows that 21st-century global state practices should be taken into cognizance 
when considering the conception of international law. The acceptance of such 
practices is aligned with the process of customary international law. Therefore, such 
acceptance should be the premise for those 21st-century global state practices 
having the requisite binding force that the normative order of the international legal 
system brings under article 38.537 
Hans Kelsen, in his Principles of International Law (1952) postulates that customary 
international law is the highest source, international law's grundnorm is simply –  
'The states ought to behave as they have customarily behaved.'538 
The norm 'pacta sunt servanda', as the grundnorm of the subordinate legal order 
'international treaty law' is, according to Kelson, merely a norm of customary 
international law. Today, states and other international actors, as was discussed in 
previous chapters, have engaged and abided by standards which are created by 
NGOs. Some of the NGOs which were cited include the ICC or ICANN, et cetera.  
Hence, it is plausible that a call for a paradigm shift in the way international law is 
conceptualised in order – a process where the socio-normativity is transformed into 
law by calling it law.539 
As mentioned earlier, a notable attribute of the sources of international law is that no 
constitution is apparent. There is not a law which stipulates the formation of 
international law, nor any which prescribes the form which international law should 
                                                             
533 Alf Ross, A Textbook Of International Law (Longmans, Green 1947), p. 83 
534 Ibid; see also Jörg Kammerhofer, 'Uncertainty In The Formal Sources Of International Law: Customary International Law 
And Some Of Its Problems' (2004) 15 European Journal of International Law 523-553, p,541. 
535 North Sea Continental Shelf Case (n 523) 
536 Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice 1945. 
537 Ibid 
538 Hans Kelson, Principles Of International Law (1952). p 418; see also Jörg Kammerhofer, 'Uncertainty In The Formal Sources 
Of International Law: Customary International Law And Some Of Its Problems' (2004) 15 European Journal of International 
Law 523-553, p,548 
539 Ralf Seinecke, 'Nomological Legal Pluralism', INTRAlawConference Aarhus, (2018) p. 11 
236 
 
take. Instead, the practices of states have been observed and used as the premise 
for the international legal order. It has been observed that the idea of human 
behaviour and events, or in this context, the practice of states, being endowed with 
legal meaning—possessing immanent or ascribed legal sense—was a noteworthy 
perception of Kelsen.540 The challenge is that the observation of these behaviours 
does not seem to have continued. Thus, the legal ascription of states behaviours as 
the law has stayed static. They have not moved beyond the doctrines that emerged 
from early state practices of the Westphalian times and have stayed so posited as 
law. These positive laws, which have emanated from non-positive orders have been 
imposed as the framework of the international legal system and appears to have 
blocked the chances to consider other concepts from the same prism of international 
law in the 21st- Century. Domestically, countries which have a written constitution might 
be not burdened by the same conceptual challenge of what the grundnorm is. 
However, it should be noted that even at that level, the liberation from such burden 
is more pragmatic than theoretical, because, domestic legal systems encounter the 
same legal theoretical problems as to what is the source of the said grundnorm. Kelsen 
recognized that the chains of validity do not regress indefinitely, and one will 
ultimately run out of higher authorizing valid norms.541  
7.3. Acknowledging new international norms  
Firstly, this will be considered from the viewpoint of acknowledging new international 
norms. It has become apparent that new norms have evolved in the international 
community. New trends in governance, patterned in ways which are slightly different 
from what was the norm in a typical Westphalian international construct. The realities 
of the new patterns of governance in today's international political system are 
increasingly complicated. As discussed earlier, there has been an increased mutuality 
of interests and concerns. This convergence of interest has increased the need for 
compromise and the need to adjust traditional positions, transfer new knowledge and 
patterns from one body to another, exchange resources and generally adapt in 
function to the demands of a knottily woven international policy-making milieux.   
As pointed out in preceding chapters, due to the globalisation of the international 
space, the existing governments domestically and international have devised ways 
by which they could be more strategic and tactical in their dealings with themselves 
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and other non-state actors, particularly NGOs. The NGOs, on the other hand, have 
also devised ways to corporate and embark on joint ventures together. In reality, 
traditional patterns of international relations are giving way to the growing influence 
of other non-state actors. However, theoretically, the international legal system has 
managed to stay static to the Westphalian ideology.   
7.3.1. Multicentric norms 
Beyond just the relationships of governments and NGOs, which is one of the focus of 
this thesis, it may be helpful to see that the changes which have occurred in the 
relations of governments with NGOs extend to all other non-state actors. For example, 
the traditional state-centric norm of international relations faces increasing academic 
literature on the engagement of the business community with the international 
community across national boundaries, emerging as new subjects.542  
Today's perception of international relations and diplomacy no longer conjures only 
an image of the state-centric notion of states relating to states across national 
boundaries. Instead, it includes a multicentric environment where there is an 
increasing relationship between states and non-state actors. This multicentricity is the 
introduction of a new norm and a pluralised international legal framework. This new 
norm and pluralised international legal framework is removed from the previous 
monopolised framework. Previously, only states were the key stakeholders, agents and 
negotiators. Today, all actors in the international plane, states and non-states alike, 
have adapted their behavioural patterns to reflect the new norm of this global reality 
and demands for multilateral international diplomacy. This adaptation has been 
somewhat organic and is a reflection of the 'unintentional' natural response of the 
various actors to the persuasive factors of globalisation. As mentioned earlier, this is a 
clear example of state practice and opinio juris. 
Therefore, these new norms and the concept of this plurality of the international legal 
framework are more evident in the increasing participation of the Non-Governmental 
Organisation in global affairs and international relations. This new norm is premised of 
a variety of movements and initiatives of the global civil society and the business 
society. As a result, there is an intricate interaction between the various actors in the 
international plane, leading up to this new phenomenon or new norm removed from 
the previously known attributes or traits of the international community in the earlier 
phases of the Westphalian legal framework. 
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This has led to an increased variety of terminology which attempts to connote these 
new norms, including multilateralism, associate diplomacy or minilaterlism, and 
polylateralism. Multilateralism refers to a situation in which several different countries 
or organisations work together to achieve something or deal with a 
problem.543Associative diplomacy or minilaterlism is a form of multilateral diplomacy 
between a group of countries and organisations, which may also be non -
governmental or other entities in global politics, which focuses on precise matters.544  
More importantly, polylateralism applies in cases where there is the incorporation of 
transnational actors into the mix. Polylateralism is a term that was coined to represent 
the participation of non-state actors in the conduct of international relations545). The 
underlying point with all of these concepts, which are on the increase is that the 
international space has undoubtedly moved beyond exclusive bilateral based 
relations and regulatory framework on the international plane. Rather, the regulatory 
environment is more intricate and involves an increased variety of actors. 
 
7.3.2. Standard-settings & soft law norms 
Non-state actors, including NGOs as was seen in the example of the ICC, have been 
able to influence the outcomes and policy-making processes of the governments and 
the international agenda on related topic areas. These non-state actors have been 
systematically interleaved into the international policy processes, being more or less 
akin to global governors through the emergence of sectorial standards-setting and 
self-regulatory processes as a new norm in the international polity. It is within this 
current context that this thesis evaluates the traditional conceptualisations of a 
Westphalian international legal framework.  
Therefore, there is an increasing quest for the development of new systems or 
structures, whether completely novel or a hybrid of the existing norm and the new 
norms, which would form the new international legal framework that is inclusive in its 
outlook. The process of international law-making today cannot be removed from the 
process of international standards making across industry sectors; even though the 
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former primarily involves the states, the latter is on the increase but is faced with the 
challenge of adequate enforcement powers.  
Today, both the states and the non-state actors' role in forming the policy-making 
environment are interdependent. To a large extent, the success of this process lies in 
the capacity of states and non-state actors to work with mutual respect to the 
international regulatory environment. This mutual respect includes validating the role 
of the non-state actors, and in particular, the NGOs, with some legitimacy. The impact 
of this is that it will make regulations which were facilitated by these non-state actors 
more than mere soft law with no force, at least in theory. 
7.4. Describing the 21st- Century international pluralistic legal environment in 
reality 
In reality, the international legal environment is pluralised. It is challenging to describe 
term - legal pluralism.  An apt definition is as provided by Seinecke -   
"Legal pluralism means that more than one law is observed at the same 
time in the same space".546  
Today's ideal description of the international legal framework is a conundrum of a 
collection of non-hierarchical relationships of a symbiotic nature. It engages the 
various players on the international plane who have like constituents and interests in 
one form or the other and believe in the potency of synergy and cooperation beyond 
national boundaries. 
This phenomenon of globalisation has buttressed the loopholes of governments in the 
carrying on of their activities independently or in synergy with others. Particularly, in 
terms of their scope of activity, speed of response to global issues and range of 
contacts. It reveals that for the most part, the governments might have fallen short in 
addressing global issues adequately, especially when they act exclusively. The 
emergence of public-private partnerships further underscores these deficiencies of 
governments to which other actors can fill.547  
This view has been further supported by the views of scholars including Kelly and 
Reinicke in the Business of Diplomacy and Global Public Policy as follows -  
"It is not that multigovernmental institutions are irrelevant but that the more 
diverse membership and non-hierarchical qualities of public policy 
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networks promote collaboration and learning and speeds up the 
acquisition and processing of knowledge. What [Reinicke] terms' vertical' 
subsidiarity in which policy-making is delegated within public sector 
agencies, has to be supplemented by 'horizontal' subsidiarity through 
outsourcing to non-state actors."548  
Therefore, given the preceding, it is apparent that the aptest description of the new 
norm of governance on the international space is primarily a system of legal pluralism. 
However, this has not been acknowledged theoretically.  
The term has been used quite frequently and is mostly a common catchphrase in 
contemporary legal theory, which cuts across the entire strata of the international 
society. Ironically, it is one of those terms that is prone to be easily misunderstood. This 
thesis opines that within it lies a possible solution to the theoretical disconnect 
between the Westphalian international legal framework and the reality of the 
globalised 21st Century, and therefore, the bedrock of reconceptualisation.  
The term' legal pluralism' is a bit of an enigma, mainly because of the pluralised way 
by which it is used. One of the best comments on the term and attempt to define it 
comes from Ralf Seinecke who stated that legal pluralism is part of a terminology 
struggle rather than a descriptive word.549 Hence, in practical terms, it entails the 
struggle of concepts and the attempt of distinguishing between terms such as – rules, 
laws, legal, customs, norms, regulations, et cetera, while trying to decipher their co-
existence. 
7.4.1. Examining Legal pluralism as the bedrock of the inclusion of the 
order of NGOs in the reconceptualisation of international law in the 
21st Century 
Given the definition of the term given earlier, it is noteworthy to highlight specific 
keywords employed in Seinecke's definition – more than one law is observed at the 
same time in the same space.'550  
Firstly, the import of this definition is that the law is pluralised, i.e. more than one, 
meaning that it goes beyond the singularity of the law. It underpins the reality of the 
21st-century international legal framework which straddles more one legal system, 
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including some entrenched systems, which are very fluid and even unrecognised. 
Hence, it is not far-reaching to extend the concept of legal pluralism to include 
scenarios like the legal framework of the United Nations.551 And within the UN, the 
divergence of frameworks between the Security Council, General Assembly and the 
Economic and Social Council. All of these core organs, being situated in New York, 
representing the New York paradigm.  Beyond the UN organs are the various global 
governance structures of various inter-governmental organisations and agencies, 
including the World Trade Organisation, the International Telecom Union, The World 
Intellectual Property Organisation, the International Organisation for Standardisation, 
World Health Organisation, International Labour Organisations, and the many others, 
mostly situated in Geneva Switzerland. Beyond these, are more legal frameworks, 
which are industry-focused, and they are driven by unions of industry and Non-
Governmental Organisation. The list goes on and on. Hence, the international plane 
is a nest for brooding the concept of legal pluralism.  
Secondly, looking back at the definition of legal pluralism which implies that it goes 
beyond the singularity of the law, then it is essential to explore what the term 'law' 
connotes in the context of this definition. The term 'law' could conjure up different 
labels and concepts. It could include notions like legal systems, legal principles, 
precedents, rules, regulations, rights, et cetera. Again, further explorations of the term 
legal pluralism suggest that there is a multiplicity of laws in force at the same time 
within the same location. The depiction of the international plane and the various 
organisations and the various law/standards that they represent within the same 
global space reaffirms the position that the term legal pluralism is an accurate 
description of the current international legal framework.  
The concept was comprehensives presented in the paper - Nomological legal 
pluralism by Dr Seinecke at the INTRAlaw conference in Aarhus Denmark, in 2017.552 
Here 'law' is described as a 'nomos'.  Robert Cover depicts thus – 
"We inhabit a nomos – a normative universe. We constantly create and 
maintain a world of right and wrong, of lawful and unlawful, of valid and 
void. […] No set of legal institutions or prescriptions exists apart from the 
narratives that locate it and give it meaning. For every constitution, there is 
an epic, for each Decalogue a scripture. Once understood in the context 
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of the narratives that give it meaning, law becomes not merely a system of 
rules to be observed, but a world in which we live."553 
In the background of this canvas, 'law' can, therefore, be described in two levels. On 
one level, as a nomos. On the other level, in a narrower sense,  as embedded within 
the broader context, its nomos, i.e. the legal texts, legal doctrine, legal institutions, 
legal education, legal exams that exist within the broader context of its nomos - legal 
culture, for example, the role of judges, legal methodology, legal science, legal 
practice; legal ideology (world view), for example, democracy, the rule of law, 
liberalism; religion in law, for example, the sovereignty of God, the patterns of faith 
and salvation; legal orders (organisation of society), supranationalism, the order of 
states, regions, businesses, NGOs, individuals, et cetera. On this premise, legal pluralism 
was described as follows – 
 "Legal pluralism is the interaction between a first, dominating nomos of law 
and a second, alternative nomos of law. Legal pluralism is the nomos of 
nomoi."554 
Drawing from this description, it is evident that the law exists within several competing 
law constellations. For example, private law and public law; sources of law, including 
codes against customary law or case law or vice versa. There are competing 
jurisdictions between courts, competing competencies between state powers, i.e. 
legislature against judiciary or executive or vice versa; competing powers of 
institutions. There are also competing legal and non-legal norms, expressed in the 
factual inoperativeness of the 'official' law. So these plays out in instances of socially 
approved disrespect of state law within certain quarters (e.g. the Mafia, Taliban or 
Daesh); religious arrangement with state law (e.g. in canon or Jewish law); and 
traditional or indigenous laws competing with codified law (e.g. the Bukowina).555   
There is also the many traditions inside one legal order. For example, there is the 
'Roman' and 'Germanic' roots of the German BGB  in late 19th Century; traditional, 
religious, colonial, or modern state origin of law in Indonesia; the hybrid influence of 
common law and Roman law in Scotland.556 With this premise, this thesis seeks a 
paradigm shift in international law, only to the extent of adding another nomo to the 
nomoi which incorporates the legal role of non-state actors, and in particular NGOs 
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in the conceptualisation of international law. This paradigm shift will bring put it in 
concert with the 21st-century legal realities.  Along these lines, Eugen Ehrlich stated as 
follows - 
"The centre of gravity of legal development; therefore from time 
immemorial has not lain in the activity of the state, but in society itself, and 
must be sought there at the present time."557 
It follows to align with the position that the reconceptualisation of international law 
can be amply explained using the concept of legal pluralism, which depicts the 
journey of law from the law of colonial societies to the laws of diverse ethnic, cultural 
and religious communities in modern nation-states. Moreover, now, it needs to 
continue on that road focus its attention on a new body of law that emerges from 
various globalization processes in multiple sectors of civil society independently of the 
laws of the nation-states.558  Legal pluralism is evident across various territories, the 
international society, the economic and social systems and the religious sects of the 
international community, et cetera. 
7.4.2. The different expressions of legal pluralism 
Furthermore, many phenomena go by this label – 'legal pluralism', due to the 
subjective bias that comes from it being an observed concept. As mentioned earlier, 
'law' continues to evolve as its constituents evolve. This line of thought is one of the 
cornerstones of the jurisprudence of customary law. In essence, the longevity of 
practice and the plurality of practice gives it some moral credence and often the 
informal legitimacy as the consensus law of the people. The evolution of society must 
continue to be observed and stay open to transformation. One of the bedrocks of a 
pluralistic legal order is that it is dynamic and open to new norms. However, the new 
norms have to be underpinned by principles and practices that could align well with 
the intendment of the term 'legal' or 'law'. So, while legal pluralism must be liberal and 
democratically underpinned, it must intrinsically be 'law' or a means to justice, at least 
in its philosophy. Expectedly, the concept thrives within the context of various non-
state actors. It is primarily so, because states, hold the view that they have the 
monopoly of what 'legal' or 'law' is or is not, and the clarity of state's description of law 
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comes from the singularity of its source and its existence. However, this position is not 
as tenable when viewed within a globalised paradigm.   
7.4.2.1. States' context 
The reality of the globalised worlds is that beyond the nation-states of the Westphalian 
era or the pre-modern worlds are many instances of stateless laws.  An example of this 
could be gleaned from the colonial era, where the indigenous communities of the 
colonial era, contended with the laws imposed by the states, run by the colonialist, 
and the norms of traditions which are stateless and agreed indigenously. This presents 
the dichotomy between the law as it ought to be – posited by the state, and the law 
as it is as made by the prevailing norms of the society. The import of this is that these 
two sets of laws run simultaneously and somehow, the indigenes of such communities 
manage to find the balance.  
Another instance is the legal system within a state context, for example, the 
federalised system of governance. As pointed out earlier in Chapter 4, the federalised 
system of governance is an expression of a pluralised system of legal governance. 
There is a myriad of laws which existed besides the law of the centre. An example of 
the extent to which legal orders are pluralised within the domestic purview will be the 
example from the studies by Franz and Keebet von Benda-Beckmann of the law of 
indigenous communities in Indonesia.559 An examination of the legal order in 
Indonesia elaborates on these points. The legal order of Indonesia reveals that the 
extant law in the communities therein is formed by no more than five legal orders. 
They include their legal traditions, also known as the Adat, the Islamic proselytisation 
commonly referred to as Sharia law, the laws from the influences of the Dutch colonial 
regime.560  
7.4.2.2. Religious context 
Another instance of the legal pluralism within communities is in the religious context. 
The multiplicity of legal orders in a society with religious influences is typical of legal 
pluralism. Some examples of this include sharia law to cannon law.  Interestingly, the 
legal system from the religious context precedes the Westphalian legal order, and it 
appears that the global polity is going full circle to return to the pre-Westphalian age 
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where stateless legal orders were preeminent. In furtherance of the examination of 
the existence of legal pluralism within various segments of the international and 
national communities, is the legal orders in a religious context. 
An example is within the Jewish community, which practices the halakha law. The 
halakha law operates a pluralised system in the dispensing of its law and expectations. 
Hence, there is an internal adherence to the law and resolving of dispute for the sake 
of heaven. However, there is the external disposition of the law, which relates primarily 
with non-Jewish or even anti-Semitic territorial states and empires.561  The Vatican and 
the co-existence of its laws alongside the law of Italy as a state is another example. It 
was before its seeming divorce from the Italian laws. According to a BBC report, 
Vatican legal experts have expressed their concerns with the multiplicity of laws in 
Italian civil and criminal codes and the ongoing inconsistency that the laws have with 
the positions of the Church. They held the view that the laws are sundry and often at 
variance with the moral teachings of the Catholic Church. For example, if Italy were 
to legalise same-sex marriages or euthanasia, for example, the Vatican would hardly 
be disposed to recognise those laws.  This discrepancy between both systems led to 
the decision that the Vatican will no longer automatically adopt laws passed by the 
Italian parliament, but would now require pensive scrutiny before they are adopted 
and are applicable in the Vatican.562 As a result, the Vatican removed from the 
previous status quo under the Lateran treaties between Italy and the Pope where the 
Vatican operated something akin to a monist system, where the laws passed in the 
Italian parliament immediately becomes law in the Vatican.563  
7.4.2.3. Lex Mercatoria and other socio-economic context 
Another instance of legal pluralism exists within a more fluid context – the socio-
economic context of the international plane. Most multi-national corporations are 
motivated mostly by economic standards and regulations beyond states laws. It goes 
back centuries in history with the 'Lex Mercatoria' which governed merchants from the 
medieval age. Merchants came up with what they referred to as the law of 
merchants, which eventually led to the creation of the English mercantile law, and 
has evolved to what is today referred to as commercial law. Some scholars have 
described it as follows -   
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'a form of immemorial custom, which by familiarity was eventually noticed 
by the common-law judges in the same way as the customs of gavelkind 
and borough English were judicially noticed, before 1926, without formal 
proof'.564 
Another way of putting it is that it is a norm that has been in existence for centuries, 
and it appears the international legal system within this context is turning full circle. For 
example, the International Chamber of Commerce, who, being underpinned by 
economic priorities, have been very pertinent to the creation of global international 
regulations/ standards that mostly have an 'economic' bend to it.  
In the postmodern 'leges' there are some other legal communities, which have 
erupted organically from the globalised human community, such as the Lex 
Sportiva565 or Lex Digitalis.566 Although, the Lex Mercatoria seem to have transcended 
ages to maintain its relevance in a  postmodern legal order; evolving into 
organisations like the Intentional Chamber of Commerce and establishing its 
authenticity autonomously. Today, there are establishments like the ICC International 
Court of Arbitration in Paris, the Vienna International Arbitration Centre, the Internet 
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), FIFA567, et cetera.  These have 
been more likely because of the flagless nature of a common cause or of profit. These 
economic exigencies, whether with the modern-day ICC or the Medieval Lex 
Mercatoria, create these regulatory standards and though they may not necessarily 
have the force of the law, they are often more effective than the extant law in place. 
Buttressing the point that there is in existence legal pluralism and the international 
legal context just need to acknowledge what already is essentially in existence.  
Hence, it follows the Shakespearian quote in the fiction - that a rose by any other 
name would still smell as sweet.568 The essence of the international legal system in the 
21st Century operates in a way that in practice, incorporates all players in the legal 
process but only lacks in appending the accurate appellation to the 21st-century 
realities on the international legal process. 
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7.4.2.4. Supranational context 
Beyond the internal legal systems, there is the supranational context. As was discussed 
earlier, there is the principle of subsidiarity. It is best seen in the context of the European 
Union and its relations with the member states.569 However, there have been 
significant controversies on the questions of sovereignty. It is another example of 
contention of states on the notion of sovereignty and legal pluralism.  
The complexity of the international legal framework by default is a breeding ground 
for the plurality of the legal space. Within the existing state-centric structures of 
international law, some fragmentations inevitably allow for a plurality of the 
international legal environment. For example, inter-governmental organisations, have 
created systems within their purview that allow for a pseudo-legal system that 
operates in a manner akin to the regular state-driven legal systems, structures and 
hierarchy. Today, there are different types of dispute settlement bodies which have 
the same force of the law, even though they are not laws, nor are they necessarily 
creations or initiatives of the nation-states. Most of these inter-governmental 
organisations have their headquarters situated in Geneva. 
The preceding underpins the position that at the very core of human existence, and 
every stratum of the global community, from the nation-state level to the international 
level, is the anchor of inter-legality. There is no gainsaying in expecting to see a 
collection of norms or even like-structures; organised in a way that naturally produces 
a legal structure which coexists pari-passu the state-driven laws, and at times, 
involuntarily complements or undermine the official state's legal order.   
7.5. The desired legal effect of acknowledgement of the role of NGOs as one of 
the norms or layers of a pluralised international legal order of the Global 
Community 
 A good understanding of the concept of legal pluralism, particularly for 
reconceptualising international law and opening up more room for added layers of 
today's international legal paradigm is paramount. In doing this, the role and 
legitimacy of non-governmental organisations and the civil society is a significant 
milestone to reach in the intended paradigm shift which seeks to underpin an already 
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existing practical venture theoretically. The role of NGOs is yet abstract and still to be 
legitimised or theoretically acknowledged.  
The NGOs, play a pivotal role in determining the character of a pluralised international 
legal framework, as well as the representative nature of such a framework. This 
pluralised nature suggests that there would be diverse worldviews and philosophies, 
and it behoves on a coalition of NGOs to present a clear roadmap for an international 
legal framework that takes into consideration the diverse global perspectives. The 
concern is how NGOs could coalesce the length and breadth of a diverse global 
community. Coalesce into one legal order -  the dominated and the dominating 
societies; the strong and the weak societies; the majorities and the minorities, with 
each sect of the global community having to justify the legitimacy of their 'otherness' 
in order to have a clear representation in the refurbished international legal 
framework.570 The global relativism is pertinent to the practicality of 
reconceptualisation in a way that elevates the role of NGOs.  
There could be views that a reconceptualisation is a utopian endeavour, which is 
inherently impossible. A good response will be to avert one's mind to the dichotomy 
within the UN structure as represented by New York and Geneva. UN New York is 
reflective of the current theoretical Westphalian legal framework, as headquarters of 
the general assembly, i.e. the states. UN Geneva is representative of a more pluralised 
global community. It consists of the headquarters of most of the international 
intergovernmental institutions. What is sought by this research is to explore ways to 
enhance and move the 'Geneva' ideology forward and bring it more in sync with the 
global realities. The current Geneva layout is evidence that there is room for further 
progress in that direction. 
7.6. Chapter 7: Conclusion 
The chapter set out to undertake a study on the concept and norms with the focal 
point being conceptualisation of international law in a way that incorporated 21st-
century international norms. It determined law as an ontology of norms which 
culminate into various legal orders. To this end, the international legal order of the 
United Nations New York paradigm was compared with the international legal order 
of the United Nations Geneva paradigm. These two legal environments were 
observed as a kind of allegory to the paradigms examined in this thesis; the state-
centric order as opposed to a multicentric order. So, along these lines, it was shown 




as a reflection that highlighted the disconnect between the Westphalian international 
legal order and the realities of the 21st Century legal order. It was revealed in that the 
state centrism that was obtainable in the Westphalian international legal order is akin 
to the construct to the United Nations New York construct being the hub of the 
General Assembly and the Security Council which are essentially a collection of states. 
On the other hand, there is the non-state multicentric reality that is obtainable under 
what could be referred to as a 21st-century legal order. It is akin to the United Nations 
Geneva construct being a hub for non-state actors and intergovernmental 
organisations.  
Additionally, it went on to evaluate the making of customary international law with 
the view to extrapolating the process of its making to the objective of this thesis, i.e. 
reconceptualise international law. In this context, it considered the concept of state 
practice and opinio juris as provided on the article 38 of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice. The dilemma with both concepts was extensively 
considered, particularly in resolving the question of how one can have a belief that a 
pattern of behaviour is already law in order to make it a law. This indeterminacy was 
also premised on the lack of clarity of the ‘thereness’ of custom. In that custom is 
considered law, a source of law, and the process by which international customary 
law is made. The otherness of custom is reflective of the otherness of the practices of 
the NGOs and non-state actors in the order of the international legal system. So, it was 
submitted that the practices of the non-state actors in the international communities 
already existed and thus should be observed as a custom which further to the 
concept of opinio juris should also constitute an international customary order. To this 
end, it is the position of this thesis that it does not canvas for a reconceptualisation of 
international law in a way that constitutes a brand new legal order. Instead, to 
engage with reconceptualisation from a declaratory perspective. It is a 
reconceptualisation of international law that seeks alignment with the realities of 
international practices or customs and legitimises that process. 
Along these lines, it observes that today’s perception of international relationship and 
diplomacy no longer conjures an image of a state-centric notion of international 
relations. Instead, it revealed a multicentric environment where there is an increased 
relationship between state and non-state actors. These create new norms of 




In this process of examining this pluralised international framework, different 
expressions of legal pluralism were examined. This analysis was done to show the 
likelihood of a reconceptualisation goes beyond the remit of possible to probable.  
Examples include legal pluralism in the state context which plays out in systems like 
federalism and dissolution. Secondly, legal pluralism in the religious context was 
illustrated in the co-existence of the Vatican law and the law in Italy. Thirdly, legal 
pluralism in the socio-economic context which goes back centuries in history with the 
existence of the Lex Mercatoria which governs Merchants from the medieval times. It 
was observed that this was the antecedent of the standard-setting role of the ICC. 
This role was discussed more in chapter 4. In the fourth place, legal pluralism in the 
supra-national context was highlighted, with examples like the United Nations and the 
EU and the principles of subsidiarity. 
Finally, the preceding reiterates the argument of this thesis that the international 
community is a multicentric community with various layers of legal systems. The 
plurality of the legal systems around the world lends to the position that international 
practices, such as the increasing role and practices of the NGOs, should be taken into 
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8.1. General findings 
This research set out to consider the question, whether the reconceptualisation of 
international law from a state-centric Westphalian paradigm, to a more inclusive 
concept, is pivotal to making it more fit for purpose in the 21st Century. Further to this 
question, it also considers how  NGOs are central to this paradigm shift.  
These questions were posed to establish the need for a paradigm shift in the 
conceptualisation of international law from its limited state-centric Westphalian 
design to a more inclusive 21st Century conception using the increasing global 
presence, work, and contributions of NGOs as an example. To these ends, steps have 
been taken to systematically resolve these questions; establishing the need for the 
paradigm shift and the central role of NGOs in this process.  
Along these lines, the following steps were undertaken. Firstly, it examined the 
concept of international law. It investigated its processes and established that 
traditional-Westphalian inspired paradigm of international law is incapable of 
providing a contemporary understanding of today's international legal context of 
increased non-state actors, particularly NGOs. 
Secondly, it highlighted the deficits of the Westphalian concept of international law 
in a 21st-century construct; evaluating the concept of sovereignty and its fitness for 
purpose against factors calling for a rethink of the concept.  
Thirdly, it critically examined the process of reconceptualisation and how it relates to 
the notion of sovereignty to the end of depicting sovereignty in its full essence; 
positing that delegated sovereignty does not compromise its efficacy but instead 
reveals it in its full essence. 
 In the fourth place, it set out to investigate the emergence of NGOs, their increasing 
influence, and critique the extent to which they are legitimised on the international 
plane, particularly in their relations with the United Nations, because of the apparent 
disconnect between their participation and their influence.  
In the fifth place, it showed the International Chamber of Commerce as an example 
of the growing influence of NGOs, and as one of the increasing informal international 
lawmaker. It highlighted its composition and workings as an added impetus to the 
argument that new forms of diplomacy and global governance on the international 
plane have emerged, and should be considered more seriously.  
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Finally, it considered the norms of international law and the making of customary 
international law; with a focus on state practice and opinio juris; reconceptualising 
international law by examining the concept of plurality of norms and the 
international legal order as a bed-rock for the inclusion of added layers of 
international law in the 21st Century.  
8.2. Breakdown of findings 
As was pointed out in chapter 2, the continued relevance of the Westphalian 
concept of international law is shown to be hinged on the prominence of state on the 
international plane. This status quo showed in the light of 21st-century realities exposes 
the inadequacies of that concept. The proliferation of non-state actors emphasises 
these points. It was shown that NGOs are increasingly taking a more prominent role. 
The argument that the international legal system is intrinsically different from that of 
the state, and so the approach to the legal order of the international community 
should reflect the peculiarities of the international community. Hence the apparent 
absence of the state-like legislature, executive and the judiciary on the international 
plane point to the fact that the international order should take into cognisance the 
multicentric nature of the international community in the constitution of the 
international legal order.571  
In the examination of the process of international law, the concepts of state practice 
and opinio juris were assessed. Also, the relevance of the doctrine of consent and the 
role of politics in making international law was considered. They were considered in 
light of the expression of sovereignty. These elements of consent and politics were 
shown to exist exclusively within the remit of states. Also, it was argued that the viability 
of Westphalian international law is centred on the question on the status of states as 
the only subjects of international law at the detriment of other actors on the 
international plane as mere objects. However, the likelihood that such a status quo 
will thrive in the 21st-century was untenable, as it was found that there is a proliferation 
of non-state actors, and there is an increase in their global influence. So, although 
non-state actors are classified as objects at law then de jure, they are, in fact 
operating as subject de facto. It gives credence to the argument that the theory of 
the international legal context is not in keeping with the changing global practices. 
Furthermore, on this premise, chapter 3 examined the deficits of the current 
theoretical basis of international legal relations, being far removed from the practical 
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occurrences of the international community is examined. This line of arguments 
supports the point that arises from the first prong of the research question sought to 
clarify– whether the current international legal framework is fit for the globalised world. 
It was shown that the world was progressively departing from the state-centric 
disposition to a more pluralised outlook with the emergence of globalisation.  
Along these lines, the findings revealed that some core characteristics of sovereignty 
had been ousted by factors of globalisation. Emphasis has been placed on only three 
core factors - failed states, global health and the internet.  
In discussing the notion of failed states, it was pointed out that sovereignty could be 
attenuated, resulting in failed states. The symptoms of the failure of states were shown 
in crumbling infrastructure faltering utility supplies, unstable education and health 
facilities, the deteriorating human development indicators such as infant mortality 
and literacy rate, and the barely functional government where the lawmakers, courts, 
civil service and the military lose their capacity and independence.572 Some instances 
of failed states were pointed out, such as the cases of Somalia, Afghanistan and Syria. 
It was shown that the existence of failed states could have dire ramifications for other 
states. This reality often leads to talks of external intervention, which is in itself akin to 
arrogating the sovereignty of the failed state, being that one of the core 
characteristics of sovereignty the right of the state to non-interference. So, when is it 
okay to disregard such sacrosanct attribute of sovereignty for the benefit of the 
broader international community? There were arguments made that the risk of non-
intervention could have adverse impacts on the global community. For example, the 
United Nations had estimated that eight of the most expensive cases are of failing 
state in the 1990 cost the international community over 250Billion dollars.  Arguments 
along this line were also canvassed in chapter 4 concerning the compelling force of 
jus cogens principles. It was argued that jus cogens curb the absoluteness of 
sovereignty. Thus, there are principles of international law which are so compelling 
that there could be no derogation.573 These arguments drive home the core 
arguments of this thesis that a rethink of the Westphalian concept of international law 
is imperative.  
Chapter 3 also evaluated the notion of global health, and the effects of global 
infectious diseases were analysed to see their impacts on sovereignty. The analysis 
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looks at the relativity of infectious diseases to economic globalisation due to 
increasing connectivity and interdependence.574 It was pointed out that the outbreak 
of infectious disease anywhere in the world could spread uncontrollably across 
national borders through the continuous movement of people and capital in the 
name of trade or pleasure. Again, these instances of global health reveal the 
inadequacies of sovereignty in that microbes do not respect internationally 
recognised borders.575  The findings of chapter 3 show that the solution propounded 
by non-state actors576 could only flourish amidst the cooperation of sovereign states. 
It is noteworthy to reiterate the irony of the sovereignty dilemma with global health. It 
is reflected in the irony that the global health concerns feed off the impotence of 
state in controlling national boundaries. However, the solution relies on the potency 
of the sovereignty of the state in consenting to global cooperation and internal 
implementation of proposed solutions. Again, these points underpin the arguments of 
this thesis that sovereignty should not be done away with but should be 
reconceptualised in a way that it is 'pooled' together in the achievement for 21st-
century objectives. 
Furthermore, the non-territorial nature of the internet and its governance by Internet 
Cooperation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), an NGO buttresses the fact 
that the role of NGOs in the international community cannot be undermined. The 
construct of the internet is at variance with the contemplations of the Westphalian 
concept of international order. Also, the increased traffic of human digital interaction 
on these non-territorial platforms across national borders creates a challenge for 
governance. It was established that the internet has a global dimension characterised 
by multiple territorial links.577 As a result, issues caused by this phenomenon cannot be 
solved but by cooperating between global states. The emergence of ICANN as the 
multi-stakeholder governance organisation for the internet, which is essentially an 
NGO, is emphatic. 
These global factors which were discussed in detail in chapter 3 are a persuasive call 
for a paradigm shift in the perception of the concept of sovereignty.  
As a result, the concept of sovereignty was carefully appraised in chapter 4 in 
consideration of the idea of reconceptualisation. So, in dealing with this, the principles 
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of subsidiarity and conferral were examined. This examination was to determine 
whether or not a delegation of sovereign powers will impede the integrity and the 
concept of sovereignty. Or whether it will facilitate an understanding of the concept 
in its full essence.  Thus, it drew on the similarities between the sovereignty of the state 
and the sovereignty of a citizen in a free state. This analysis was used to unravel the 
question of whether collaboration of the sovereign state in the international plan is 
tantamount to the ceding of their sovereignty. In answering this question, it asks the 
same question as to whether the sovereignty of the citizen is curtailed by the citizen 
being subject vertically to the laws of the land or horizontally in contracting bilaterally 
with fellow citizens. So, where a citizen cooperates with the laws of the land or with a 
contract entered with a fellow citizen; does that choice to cooperate, inhibit the 
sovereign will of the individual? These questions underscore the pivotal role of consent 
to a social transaction between the citizens and the state. This attribute of consent is 
an indication of sovereignty in its full essence and not a means by which sovereignty 
is undermined.  Thus, it was pointed out that the common denominator to the principle 
of subsidiarity, federalism and dissolution is the attribute of consent. So, these 
principles, underpinned by consent, do not negatively impact on the essence of the 
sovereignty of a state whose authority has been conferred, delegated or allocated 
whether downwards, horizontally or vertically. As a result, these concepts were 
explored to be considered as possible prototypes of a reconceptualised international 
law, whereby some aspects of the sovereignty of state are delegated to non-state 
actors, particularly NGOs. 
In addition to the jus cogens principle, which was mentioned earlier and also in 
chapter 4, the compelling case of Van Gend en Loos578 was critically analysed. The 
Van Gend en Loos case implied that non-state actors could be granted 'subject 
status' in international law as individuals were granted 'subject status' in European law. 
It authenticated the core arguments of the thesis that international law could be 
reconceptualised in a way that takes into cognisance 21st-century global realities. In 
particular, attention should be given to the need to legitimise NGOs as subjects on 
the international plane. 
The latter parts of the thesis, mainly chapter 5 and 6, deal more with the second prong 
of the research question; appraising the role of NGOs in the reconceptualisation of 
international law. So the emergence of NGOs and the significant role they have come 
to play in global politics and relations were considered carefully.  The thesis points to 
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the increased visibility and evident participation of NGOs in the process of the 
international legal order. Nevertheless, it confronts the predicament that NGOs 
encounter in the conflicts they perpetually face. So while NGOs enjoy some level of 
political and social ascendancy on the international plane, they lack the 
corresponding legal ascendancy. Accordingly, this asymmetry between their socio-
political stance and their legal stance on the international plane results in a legitimacy 
deficit.  
So, in an attempt to better understand this dilemma, an exposition on the description, 
classification and function of NGOs was carried out. Therefore, article 71 of the UN 
Charter and ECOSOC resolution 1996/31 on the Consultative Relationship between 
the United Nations and Non- Governmental Organisations, were evaluated. This shed 
light on the various categories available to NGOs in participation with the United 
Nations. These categories – general, individual and roaster statuses, were then 
critiqued. This critique examined the inadequacies of the level of participation of 
NGOs in contrast to the global realities of the increasing influence of NGOs. 
Additionally, a critical examination of the findings of the Cardoso Report of the Panel 
of Eminent Persons on United Nations-Civil Society Relations of 2004 vis-à-vis the 
cardinal objectives provided by Kofi Anan to the panel was carried out. The findings 
of the report show that the enhancement of engagement with civil society is in the 
UN's interest. It was pivotal to sustaining the relevance of the UN; therefore, a rethink 
of the international legal order was a welcome consideration.  
Furthermore, the United Nation's Committee on Non-Governmental Organisation is 
studied. Their role of assessing the application for consultative status by NGOs as well 
as monitoring NGOs activities via the NGOs quadrennial reports is appraised and 
critiqued. So, the political influence in the Committee's discharge of their 
responsibilities which plays out in unfair and partial decisions or decisions along 
political stance or ideology were identified and investigated. The findings revealed 
that the process by which the Committee decides the fate of NGOs seemed arbitrary, 
and not adequately representing the influence of NGOs. 
The influence of NGOs was epitomised in the assessment of the NGO - International 
Chamber of Commerce in chapter 6. It pointed to the unparalleled influence of the 
ICC globally, to the extent that it could be referred to as an indirect international 
lawmaker due to its prevalent standard-setting role which underpins international 
trade and commerce. Its influence was examined historically. Its role in the aftermaths 
of the two world wars helped shape the international legal landscape for international 
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businesses. Its pivotal role to global trade and governance, which earns it an epithet 
as the world's parliament for business is discussed extensively. It is noteworthy to point 
the significant role it played during the Bretton Wood's conference in 1944, which 
effectively is the birthplace of the International Monetary Funds, and the World Bank. 
It was pointed out as the conceptual originator of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT), which eventually led to the emergence of the world trade 
organisation. Another point of note is the role it played in revitalising United Nations at 
the beginning of the 21st Century through the proliferation of the public-private 
partnership idea during the Geneva business dialogue in 1998. Its significance is also 
seen in the emergence of the UN Global Compact initiative, which required 
businesses to align strategies and operations with universal principles on human rights, 
labour, environment and anticorruption. An attestation to this relevance was the 
granting of consultative status with UN's ECOSOC, and observer status with UN's 
General Assembly. The ICC is one of the several other NGOs which effectively design 
the international legal context, albeit, without the requisite legitimacy.  
Chapter 7 examined the plurality of the international legal framework, which lays the 
premise for the submission that the international legal community already works 
based on a pluralised system. The development of norms was considered; focusing 
on the possible conceptualisation of international law in a way that incorporates 21st-
century international norms. Again, the concepts of state practice and opinio juris in 
the making of customary international law were considered in more detail.  
Additionally, it reviewed in detail the emergence of new international norms. The 
review entailed consideration of the multicentric nature of the international 
environment as a pathway to a pluralised international legal context.  For instance, in 
addition to the distinct pluralistic legal context of the EU, legal pluralism in the state 
context was shown in systems like federalism and dissolution. Secondly, the co-
existence of Vatican law and the law in Italy was another example of legal pluralism 
in the religious context.  Matters like Lex Mercatoria, or the modern-day expression in 
the ICC standard-setting, Lex Sportiva regarding the global law on sports, or the 
various protocols of the internet all reflect legal pluralism in the socio-economic 
context. 
It was established that these pluralised international legal contexts evolve organically, 
and has so evolved with the emergence of non-state actors, and norms of standard-
setting or soft law as just observed with the ICC. However, the challenge remains in 
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the gulf between the theory and practice in understanding the concept of 
international law.   
The 21st-century pluralistic legal environment systematically examined, and the 
findings revealed that legal pluralism could be the bed-rock of the inclusion of the 
new layers of global governance in international law.  The submission of this thesis is 
not for a reconceptualisation of international law in a way that constitutes a brand 
new legal order. Instead, it seeks alignment with the realities of international practices 
or customs and legitimises that process. It is a reconceptualisation of international law 
in the light of adding layers to the international pluralistic legal paradigm. In so doing, 
a justification for the legitimised role of NGOs as a significant added layer of 
governance to keep international law in step with the 21st-century global realities. 
8.3. Summary of the findings 
In line with the preceding, the findings of this thesis reveal that the conceptualisation 
of international law has stayed static to the Westphalian paradigm in theory. 
However, practically, it has moved with the times, although without the requisite 
legitimacy; thus staying within the remit of international 'soft' law. The findings also 
show NGOs as some of the foremost propounders of these soft laws or influencers of 
behavioural standards across various sectors of the international community.  
Additionally, the outcome of this research shows that the concept of sovereignty 
could be understood in its full essence, which includes the power to delegate 
sovereign powers, empowering other relevant actors and still maintain its integrity.  The 
thesis submits that the 21st-century realities entail a pluralised international legal order. 
The entrenchment of this pluralism is akin to a reconceptualised international law 
where sovereignty is pooled in global governance, and NGOs' role is pivotal to this 
process. 
The Westphalian concept of international law, which is hinged on territorial 
delineations and state-centric legal systems is now simply untenable. The continued 
existence of states is not in contention here, and such an argument is not relevant to 
the thrust of this thesis. Instead, the focal point of this work aligns with Berman, that 
physical location can no longer be the sole criterion for conceptualising legal 
authority. States must work within a framework of multiple overlapping jurisdictional 
assertions by state, international, and even non-state communities. Each of these 
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types of overlapping jurisdictional assertions creates a potentially hybrid legal space 
that is not easily eliminated.579 
8.4. Recommendation  
8.4.1. Legitimising new norms  
It is recommended that there should be an acknowledgement of the new norms 
being firmly founded in already existing realities in the relationship between the NGOs, 
and other non-state actors, with states. Further to the earlier arguments on the making 
of customary international law, with the examinations of state practices and opinio 
juris, it is recommended that observation of international practices should continue in 
the 21st Century and new norms of the international community should be legitimised.  
To continue without a formal acknowledgement which gives further legitimacy to 
these new forming relationships is to keep the current concept of international law 
static to the increasing inadequacies of the Westphalian connotation of international 
law. The need to reconceptualise international law in a way that captures the realities 
of the 21st Century, including the role of NGOs on this journey, is central to the 
continued relevance and fitness for the purpose of international law in today's global 
context.  One of many such observations on the relationships between the various 
actors on the international plane provides as follows -   
 '…something is happening in the relationships between governments, 
NGOs and companies which draws them to engage more closely together 
to deal with certain issues. There is a desire to understand better the terms 
of engagement, and an interest in making the engagement constructive – 
to create social value rather than to destroy it by confrontations which 
would be costly and risky for all concerned.'580 
This recommendation primarily campaigns for the enlightenment to the new socio-
political reality of the 21st Century international legal framework. A dilemma fixated 
on the legitimacy and autonomy of the actors in the international plane or the lack 
of it. Particular emphasis is placed on NGOs.  The acknowledgement of these new 
norms and dynamics of the relationships of influential NGOs do not exist in a vacuum. 
NGOs have been seen to campaign for their autonomy and legitimacy in their 
organisational pursuits within the global space. At the same time, observing the 
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boundaries of the sovereignty of states and their traditional role in the international 
law-making milieu.  
8.4.2. Legitimising pluralism  
`The concepts of new norms or a pluralised legal order in the international space is 
not entirely novel. Indeed, it precedes the current Westphalian legal order. Before the 
emergence of nation-states, there have been tensions across various legal orders that 
existed at the time. It appeared the globe was governed by commonalities and a 
collection of interest groups. While some interest or peoples dominated and others 
obliged. It aligns with the arguments regarding the dichotomy between the terms or 
concepts - Nations and State.581 
International law is undeniably law between states. This position has been the case, 
at least, judging from its Westphalian tradition. However, it is helpful to point out that 
historically, the concept of state had little influence in the concept of international 
law, at least concerning the terminology used. According to Fisch582, the history of the 
concept of international law shows a clear insistence on the terminology used, and 
the chosen terminology was dominated by the idea of persons as actors.583 The term 
International law goes back to the Latin term ius gentium.584  The root subject is ‘gens’.  
It is an all-encompassing term, although the term ‘States’ is not one of such terms 
contemplated from gens.  Instead, it connotes a community of common descent. 
Over time, around the 17th and 18th Century, there was a translation within Latin and 
the terms populus and natio was used. It follows that at the core of the terminology of 
international law, the primary focus is on a group or community, it is not a law between 
states but a law between a group of human beings.585  So linguistically, international 
law represents itself as a law between peoples and/or nations. 586  Along these lines, 
a state may be defined as a politically organised body of people inhabiting a defined 
geographical entity with an organised legitimate government. A nation or a people 
is a group of people with a common race, culture, religion and historical experiences 
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but who may not necessarily live together in a single territory. A nation has no required 
geographical tie-in (as an extreme example, consider the nation of Roma, or post-
Diaspora-pre-modern-Israel Jews). 
As pointed out in chapter 2, concerning the pre-Westphalian age, at the fall of the 
Roman Empire in the fifth century AD, power and authority became decentralised in 
Europe.587 By 1000 AD, the major civilisations that emerged from the rubble of Rome 
were the Arabic civilisation which was a religious order with political domination by 
the Islamic caliphate.588 Secondly, there was the Byzantine Empire which stemmed 
from the old Roman Empire in Constantinople and underpinned by Christianity. The 
governance of the rest of Europe was also underpinned by Christianity.589 Also, other 
commonalities, including the Lex Mercatoria590 - the Law of the Merchants, feudal 
principalities controlled by lords and tied to fiefdoms, also held sway. Feudalism was 
the response to the prevailing disorder.591 The disorder of the times was its order.    
States, as we know it today, was not the means of global governance, rather 
governance was pluralised and stemmed from interests, whether religious or 
otherwise. 
Due to the similarity of the plurality of the legal order in the 21st Century with that of 
the medieval times, it seems that the international legal framework is evolving full 
circle. The reality of the legal order in the 21st-century globalised space could rightly 
be referred to as a sophisticated version of what was obtainable in medieval times. 
Although historically, the term 'pluralism' might not have been used at the time, the 
polity of the societies of the time and through time, were constructed in ways the legal 
orders could best be described as pluralistic. The tensions that existed between 
various facets of the society and their legal systems are evident today. Hence, 
historically, the indigenous cultures of the people played a significant role and 
contended with the religious underpinnings of the society and the official law of the 
land.592 The concept of legal pluralism expressed itself in history as phenomena such 
as non-state law, living law, indigenous law, or law in action593.  
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Therefore, it follows to reach the position that the concept of international law should 
not only be linked to the Westphalian concept of a state. Law, in its international 
context, exists outside the paradigm of the concept of the state. So, it is opined that 
if the state is taken into consideration in understanding the extant law, it should be no 
more than when any other actor in the international plane is taken into consideration 
in a bid to understand the terms by which they engage in the international plane. 
However, as reiterated across this work, it should be emphasised that the context of 
reconceptualising sovereignty should not encroach on the concept of supremacy of 
the states.  
The preceding underpin the position that pivotal to the concept of legal pluralism is 
the concept of norms and alternate legal paradigms, which are not necessarily 
hierarchical.594  It follows then that, if the traditional concept of state is challenged by 
the reality of the 21st-century globalised world, then the various structures or attributes 
of this globalised space should be given a closer look. This pluralised attributes of the 
global space should be underscored and examined to the end of reaching an 
understanding of the basis upon which they exist and relate with one another in the 
globalised world. So, for example, the various streams of order in the international 
community today include the religious communities, digital communities, social 
media communities, environmental communities, economic communities, 
supranational communities and multinational communities et cetera. All of these 
should be taken into cognisance in a bid to understand how the globalised world 
operates. Notably, these are often represented by their relevant NGOs. The pluralistic 
nature of the globalised legal framework, at least in a practical sense, should be given 
more serious consideration. However, like the pre-Westphalian times, the plurality of 
the legal space could be described as orderly as it could be described as disorderly. 
Where the latter is the case, then the outcome is chaos and anarchy. Hence, the 
importance of the state comes to the fore to provide the needed balance.  To 
achieve a description of an orderly pluralised legal space, then the concept of the 
sovereignty of state should remain sacrosanct. However, it should be 
reconceptualised by institutionalising the pluralised legal framework with legitimised 
layers. 
Indeed, challenges will arise with the 'inter-legality' of the various family of laws that 
could arise in an institutionalised pluralistic legal framework which preserves 
sovereignty and still seeks to serve the various global communities. The process of 




institutionalising a pluralistic legal framework will entail a process of tensions in 
determining what is the grundnorm or the official law of the sovereign?  What is the 
alternative law? Do they complement or compete? Are they independent, 
interdependent or dependent on sovereign laws?    What is the extent of their 
jurisdiction? Is there a chance to have parallel law for parallel groups?  
The response to these questions would necessitate cooperation between the various 
actors in the international community. Therefore, the states, the inter-governmental 
organisations, the non-governmental organisations and the multinational 
corporations should come together and consider a framework that works. There may 
be no need to reinvent the wheel. A simple evolution of the ECOSOC and the UN 
Standing Committee on NGOs could provide the desired solution. 
It follows then, the findings of this research could reach the position that the 
emergence of new norms in the international space coupled with the prevalent 
concept of legal pluralism could form the premise of the new international legal 
framework. 
The expression of legal pluralism recommended is not a redefinition of the concept of 
law by non-state actors, but an acknowledgement of another layer of the law, in the 
international legal framework. Added to the various layers of monist and dualist 
paradigm of domestic legal systems and their international legal relations, alongside 
supranational laws, bilateral, and multilateral treaties, are other layers which add to 
the fabric of the international legal system. This recommendation does not suggest 
that the nomological paradigm of the law undermines or supplants the significance 
of positive law and established formalised legal institutions. Instead, it insists on the 
acknowledgement of the dynamism of law. This dynamism should naturally 
incorporate other aspects of law constituted by perpetually observed social 
contracts, albeit, unwritten, as part of what should constitute the legal framework, 
whether domestically or internationally. 
 
8.4.3. Applied pluralism: The establishment of the People's Assembly – 
another organ of the UN-facilitated by NGOs 
At the moment, the various arms or organs of the UN include the General Assembly, 
the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council – ECOSOC, the Trusteeship 
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Council, the International Court of Justice, and the UN Secretariat595.  In addition to 
this structure, a People's Assembly should be established.  It should operate as a hybrid 
of the various actors but facilitated and governed by the NGO. The current UN 
Committee on NGOs and the parts of the ECOSOC should be reviewed and 
reinstituted as a People's Assembly. The Committee on NGOs has been criticised for 
being time-consuming, inefficient, and frustrating for many NGO representatives. It 
suggested that $3 million could be saved each year by abolishing the NGO 
Committee.596  
So, the UN Committee on NGOs and the ECOSOC should undergo a rethink 
concerning NGOs. The various categories of accreditation of NGOs should be 
revamped. Although the current process could still be used as a guideline, a new 
system should emerge, which will enhance the inclusiveness of NGOs and promote 
democracy. For instance, the accreditation criteria for the various status is still quite 
vague on which NGOs are eligible, as it merely requires an NGO in existence for two 
years and has an office. However, consideration should be given to the general status 
being used as a guideline for the incorporation of international NGOs to this new 
proposed organ, the special status for regional NGOs and the roster status for national 
NGOs. This recommendation is an area for further research. However, this new hybrid 
of the Committee of NGOs and parts of ECOSOC should re-emerge as a new organ 
of governance within the UN structure. An organ which represents the predominant 
demographic and psychographic of the current international community. It would be 
subdivided into various sectors of the international community. It should cater to the 
various peoples' constituents as represented by various default interests groups. 
Examples of these groups include technological advancement interest groups, 
religious interest groups, entrepreneurial and capitalist interest groups, health and 
social care interest groups, human rights interest groups, cyber & space engagement 
interest groups, et cetera. It should be noted that some of these various constituents, 
already have soft law that regulates their relations, and most of these soft laws or 
standards are facilitated by NGOs. 
However, it is noted that NGOs are very diverse and by no means are all equally 
laudable. Some NGOs act irresponsibly and undermine the credibility of the broader 
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NGO movement. It is particularly problematic when a conservative government’s 
attempt to use these problematic NGOs as justification for severing meaningful future 
NGO partnerships/initiatives.597 
Hence the current steps taken in determining the accreditation of NGOs to be 
granted elevated status with the ECOSOC as discussed in chapter 5, should be 
reconsidered to the end of measuring this recommendation and maintaining the 
integrity of this new system.  
Today, the UN is structured in a way that allows democratic engagement and 
consultation with the international community through its various organs. However, 
the ultimate decisions for the various sectors of the international community remain 
with the UN and its organs, of which none comprises exclusively of the specific 
constituency of the sector group and interests. In line with the arguments put forth in 
chapter 7 relating to the plurality of norms and legal orders in the international 
context, consideration should be given to the inclusion of NGOs in a declaratory way, 
and not merely in the current participatory status that they are granted.  Along these 
lines, the Cardoso panel had recommended a new Office of Constituency 
Engagement and Partnerships.  Some of its subheads to the report included the need 
to "shift the focus from generalised assemblies to specific networks" and to "embrace 
greater flexibility in the design of United Nations forums.598  It is submitted that the 
increased involvement and influence of other actors of the international community 
in global governance is a boost to the objectives of democracy. It remodels the 
conceptualisation of multilateralism. So, multilateralism should be perceived beyond 
engagement with multiple states, but extend to engagement with multiple relevant 
actors, particularly NGOs.   The Cardoso panel argued for greater democratic 
accountability of international organisations and expanded role for civil society in 
deliberative processes." 
It is also noteworthy that the eligibility for access to the various arms or organs of the 
United Nations is prescribed and differs from organisation to organisation. 
Engagement with the various arms of the UN is prescribed to specific requirements. 
For example, a requirement for access to participating in the Security Council as a 
member would require that such a participant is a sovereign state. Even among 
sovereign states, there is a further prescription for eligibility – speaking of the 
                                                             
597 James Forum, 'Credibility And Legitimacy Of Ngos' (Globalpolicy.org) 
<https://www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/introduction/31439-credibility-and-legitimacy-of-ngos.html> accessed 13 April 2020. 
598 Willetts (n 321), p. 313 
267 
 
permanent members and the rotational members of the Security Council. Concerning 
eligibility as a member of the General Assembly, the requirement to be a member is 
simply whether the body is recognised as a sovereign state. However, the closest 
arrangement to this recommended People's Assembly is the ECOSOC. Hence, 
sufficient time has been invested in discussing the ECOSOC and its relationship with 
NGOs in chapter 5. However, the limitation of the structure of the ECOSOC is that the 
best it offers the NGO community and other sectorial constituents of the international 
community is a consultative status which ultimately is subject to the overriding 
endorsement or approval of the UN or its organs. Article 18 of Resolution 1996/31 
provides that arrangements for consultation should not be such as to accord to non-
governmental organisations the same rights of participation as are accorded to 
States not members of the Council and to the specialised agencies brought into 
relationship with the United Nations.599 
Another challenge with the current status of the UN Committee on NGOs is the 
discretional and unilateral way by which decisions are reached. A point in view is with 
the process of granting various status to NGOs and the selection of which NGOs are 
given such elevated status. The workings of the UN Committee on NGOs was 
highlighted as its decisions have been criticised as being politicised. The decisions are 
reached in line with political or ideological stance; it justifies the argument for this 
added layer of governance to the current structure of the United Nations. The 
concern remains that there is a democratic deficit in the workings of the UN. Willet 
had stated in his critique of the UN Cardoso report that the only morally sound and 
politically feasible basis for legitimising broader NGO participation in the UN system is 
the democratic claim for all voices to be heard in global policy debate.600 It argues 
that engagement with the NGOs should be strengthened in order to reduce the 
democratic deficit in global governance. According to the report, non-state actors 
were growing in capacity and influence. New information technology and global 
networks were creating a global public opinion and a cosmopolitan set of norms and 
citizen demands. The need for requisite representation ever more necessary. Even 
though there is a UN practice of having consultations, the constituencies which are 
consulted, do not particularly have a say in what the ultimate decisions are reached. 
The remit of decision making remains with the UN through its members and organs.  
The Cardoso panel contends that the UN needed a new approach. It should become 
                                                             
599 'Paragraph 18 of Resolution 1996/31. Consultative Relationship Between the United Nations and Non-Governmental 
organizations' (Un.org, 1996) <http://www.un.org/documents/ecosoc/res/1996/eres1996-31.htm> accessed 6 August 2018 
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outward-looking and embrace many constituencies, becoming more than an 
organisation exclusively for states. The UN must lead the initiative that effectively links 
the local with the global and be at the forefront of tackling its democratic deficit. The 
report stated as follows –  
'…in practical terms, this means supplementing the "traditional 
intergovernmental process" and existing consultative arrangements…'601 
The Cardoso panel had argued that there is little logic for the United Nations to 
recognise civil society input into the ECOSOC with one breath and with the same 
breath, resist a similar input into the General Assembly committees that discuss the 
same subject.  
Looking at the current impact of globalisation in workings of the international 
community, pockets of communities of interests have evolved globally, and their 
activities and function transcend state boundaries. These global developments give 
impetus to the position that today, the sense of belonging have moved from a mere 
sense of common national heritage to other globalised common interests. It further 
underpins this recommendation that the international legal framework ought to be 
reconceptualised to reflect the global realities of today. One of the ways by which 
this could be achieved is to consider the constituting of a People's Assembly as 
another organ of the UN, which represents the 21st-century communities of global 
interest. 
8.4.4. The Location of Paradigm Shift  
The argument of the thesis and the above recommendation call for a paradigm shift 
in the way international law and the international legal system should be perceived. 
One of the core arguments of this thesis is that the international legal system is 
structured into two paradigms which have been referred to as the UN New York 
Paradigm and the UN Geneva Paradigm. The first well entrenched in the traditional 
Westphalian construct of international law and the second well entrenched in the 
ever-fluid evolution of the international community and globalisation – reflective of 
the ‘passportless’ state of the international community as seen with most of the UN 
agencies in Geneva.  
The Geneva paradigm is more representative of the pluralised international legal 
system, for which this thesis canvases. The argument is that International law, in theory, 
is still patterned after the Westphalian concept of UN New York international law. It 




has not taken into cognizance the plurality of norms that are replete in the UN Geneva 
21st-century international community. Hence, the paradigm shift in the way 
international law is perceived needs to occur.  
Often this types of shift, at least in the way international law is perceived in theory, first 
emanate from the academic circles. Already, as has been pointed out in the UN New 
York/ Geneva dichotomy, the international community is undergoing the shift, and 
the politicians, where convenient, are acknowledging it. More academic research 
and conferences in this area which engage academics and politicians alike, as well 
as other relevant stakeholders, will facilitate this process. The starting point of this kind 
of shift will be located in the circles of academic research and activism. 
8.4.5. Highlighting the originality 
 The above recommendations underscore the originality of this thesis, which ultimately 
is adding to the existing body of knowledge in the subject focus of this work, and 
extending the parameters of knowledge within the current public international law 
discipline. 
However, to more specifically highlight these points, the contribution includes the 
arguments on legitimising new norms, which place NGOs in the centre of the new 
international legal system. The debate across other academic quarters include the 
necessity to give other global players in the world stage some elevated status in the 
international community. However, there appears to be a vacuum in the campaign 
for NGOs, not merely to be given a more recognised legal status, but to be resituated 
as the socio-legal centre of the international community in the 21st Century.  
Additionally,   the focus of the ICC as a prime example of NGOs to underscore the 
point in a way not previously considered by the existing body of works.  
Also, there the progression form the recommendation of the examined Cardoso 
report which was a seminal report premised on an invitation by Kofi Annan at the early 
parts of his tenure to proffer ways by which the UN would work effectively with NGOs, 
in furtherance to the mandate of art 71 of the UN charter. So while the Report 
suggested for new streams of international diplomatic dialogue – they recommended 
a new Office of Constituency Engagement and Partnerships, this work builds on that 
and suggest the institutionalisation of the pluralised international legal system with the 
emergence of the suggested Peoples Assembly. 
Furthermore, along these lines, this work identifies that challenges will arise with the 
'inter-legality' of the various family of laws that could arise in an institutionalised 
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pluralistic legal framework which preserves sovereignty and still seeks to serve the 
various global communities. The process of institutionalising a pluralistic legal 
framework will entail a process of tensions in determining what is the grundnorm or the 
official law of the sovereign?  What is the alternative law? Do they complement or 
compete? Are they independent, interdependent or dependent on sovereign laws?    
What is the extent of their jurisdiction? Is there a chance to have parallel law for 
parallel groups? Hence, in response to these questions, it is conceded that this shift 
would necessitate cooperation between the various actors in the international 
community. Therefore, the states, the inter-governmental organisations, the non-
governmental organisations and the multinational corporations should come 
together and consider a framework that works. There may be no need to reinvent the 
wheel. To this end, this work recommends a simple evolution of the ECOSOC and the 
UN Standing Committee on NGOs to a new legal framework that caters for the 21st-
century international community. So, the UN Committee on NGOs and the ECOSOC 
should undergo a rethink concerning NGOs. The various categories of accreditation 
of NGOs should be revamped. Although the current process could still be used as a 
guideline, a new system should emerge, which will enhance the inclusiveness of NGOs 
and promote democracy. 
8.5. Limitations of the thesis 
This thesis has the following limitations.  
8.5.1. The lack of a homogeneous NGO system 
Firstly, it is acknowledged that there is a lack of a homogeneous NGO system. Due to 
this lack, an attempt to elevate the status of NGOs as a single homogeneous unit in 
the international legal system will lead to considerable controversy erupting from 
various factions of the international community, including amongst the NGOs. NGOs 
come in different sizes and wield different extents of influence.  The smaller NGOs have 
criticised the more prominent NGOs, referring to them as clubs for the rich. The more 
influential ones take attention and relevance from the smaller one. So this lack of 
uniformity of NGOs could be a challenge.   
Additionally, the research method engaged with is essentially a qualitative approach. 
No empirical data was carried out to authoritatively assess the kinds of NGOs across 
the world and the extent of their representative capacity. As a result, the findings of 
this work have been primarily desk-based.  
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Furthermore, a detailed survey on the perspective of the NGOs and relevant 
stakeholders concerning a reconceptualised international law which places them as 
central figures should further authenticate the findings of this work  
8.5.2. Representativeness of NGOs 
NGOs contend for credible representative rights in the constituencies where they 
pursue their causes. There are often the divisions within the not-for-profit sector over a 
myriad of issues. These issues could include economic growth; human rights; religious 
tenets; environmental conservation; abortion and reproductive health; or the role of 
women in society among many others. The views of the NGOs are polarising. For 
instance, for every NGO canvasing against abortion, others are canvassing for the 
right of the choice for women. The NGO sector is very complex, diverse and divided. 
So while some may argue that NGOs are the authentic voice of the people, there are 
opposing arguments that NGOs represent no more than their supporters, who may be 
a minority in the general population.  
So, this lack of a clear representative mandate from the public at large will pose a 
challenge as to know which NGO should be elevated in a representative capacity to 
the global level of decision making. 
8.5.3. The continued resistance by the governments 
While there had been substantial evolution and innovation in the practice of 
engagement with NGOs, governments have remained reluctant to allow changes in 
the rules, for fear of being constrained at some later stage. 
Over the years, various thought leaders, including NGOs, governments and other 
actors on the international plane, have supported the argument that there should be 
a reform and revitalisation of the United Nations. The position is held that a 
revitalisation of the UN must include the enhancement of stronger relationships 
between NGOs and UN policy-making forums. However, there is significant opposition 
from governments, and this poses a challenge to some of the solutions proffered.   
8.6. Areas for further research 
This thesis raises questions and recommendations that need further research to 
ascertain their viability. A significant area of research includes looking into the 
development of the United Nations and organs of the United Nations; considering the 
perspective of the current stakeholders of the organisation regarding the viability of a 
new organ. Assessing the status of the defunct Trusteeship Council and whether steps 
could be taken to refurbish the UN and introduce another organ of the UN. Further to 
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the recommendation of a People's Assembly, empirical research should be 
undertaken to ascertain the perspectives of current stakeholders vis à vis the 
relevance of the UN in the 21st Century.   
Furthermore, concerning the proposed People's Assembly, a focused research on the 
ECOSOC and the UN Committee on NGOs will be of significant benefit. Also, to 
investigate how NGOs could be accredited into that proposed assembly and the 
means of operation. 
An empirical study into global governance and the concept of sovereignty as a 
separate research will be desirable. It will entail an examination of legal systems 
around the world where the concept of sovereignty has been applied differently 
across various levels, whether locally, nationally, regionally or internationally.  
Finally, it will be helpful to carry out a study into the uniformity and diversity of NGOs 
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